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Introduction 
 
In his 1998 catalogue essay for the Jackson Pollock exhibition at the Museum 
of Modern Art, then-Chief Curator of Painting and Sculpture Kurt Varnedoe 
speculates on the continued significance of Pollock’s paintings for artists, scholars, 
and art critics. MoMA’s show was dedicated to understanding Pollock as a 
breakthrough artist, one who put United States painting on the map in a way that 
finally rivaled Europe. As the first New York retrospective for Pollock since the one 
mounted in 1967, just ten years after the artist’s death, the museum situated his 
legacy within the scholarship and art criticism that had been produced about him.1 
Despite this setting, in his catalogue introduction, called “Comet: Jackson Pollock’s 
Life and Work,” Varnedoe emphasizes the continued presence of Pollock’s 
production as existing in mostly “unrecorded, nonverbal, subjective responses.”2 
Varnedoe offers this as a counter to the copious and prolific amount of writing done 
about Pollock, which potentially threatens to compete with the paintings 
themselves. He writes, “There was a time when it seemed very important that these 
be pictures without words—when the man who made them and many who were 
drawn to them believed that trying to say what they meant was a pointless 
betrayal.”3 Here, Varnedoe looks back to the beginnings of Abstract Expressionism, 
                                                        
1 At the time of the exhibition, MoMA launched an interactive online portion of the 
exhibition, still visible here: 
http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/1998/pollock/website100/index.
html. That text frames Pollock and the exhibition primarily within art criticism, 
introducing him to viewers through lines from critics writing about his work and 
life. 
2 Kirk Varnedoe, “Comet: Jackson Pollock’s Life and Work,” in Jackson Pollock, ed. 
Kirk Varnedoe (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1998), 77. 
3 Ibid. 
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indicating that the work at its time of production appeared unsophisticated or even 
“inarticulate,” as he says, thereby resisting words entirely. At the same time, he is 
drawing on the indescribability of a genius such as Pollock, whose mythic legacy is 
now surrounded and supported by words, including those of the popular press, art 
critics, art historians, and well-circulated gossip. In the face of the changes from 
1956 (when Pollock died) to 1998, Varnedoe reflects, “By now, though, these are 
pictures amply wrapped in words: the many stories have themselves become a 
story, and cocoon the work so densely that a full-time devotee of Pollock studies 
might thrive without ever escaping their fabric.”4 Varnedoe does not conclude that 
such words can overtake pictures—he closes his essay by stating that “no matter 
how daunting the store of verbiage on art, there is always…a great deal (sometimes 
the core) left over, and only learnable first hand”5—but his concern about the 
possibility of words eclipsing pictures points to a tension between the artwork and 
what is said about it. “Art is rendered speechless according to Varnadoe [sic],” 
writes Catherine Soussloff in her own essay about Pollock and the MoMA 
exhibition.6 Artworks may be wrapped up in words, then, but do not speak 
themselves—or perhaps cannot speak, because they communicate in a way that 
goes entirely beyond formations and understanding of speech. 
I begin with Pollock, and with Varnedoe’s concern about the “cocoon” which 
surrounds him, because the view Varnedoe shares points out the challenges of an 
object or even an artist being made to speak. Throughout their history, Pollock’s 
                                                        
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Catherine M. Soussloff, “Jackson Pollock’s Post-Ritual Performance: Memories 
Arrested in Space,” TDR 48, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 64. 
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works have been categorized as beyond words even as they have inspired 
thousands of books, articles, lectures, websites, and so on. Varnedoe reveals the 
tension in the idea that even if the works themselves cannot speak, the things (and 
people) that surround them can. Viewers, art historians, and art critics are among 
those who can and do speak for and about artworks, bringing layers of material to 
their interpretations, just as Varnedoe both resists the mass appeal of Pollock and 
necessarily draws on it. To insist that an artwork is “only learnable first hand”—
through some kind of presence—is what is at stake for me here, as I consider the 
ways in which what Varnedoe might consider “second-hand” pictures and words are 
tools for writing art history about the present and recent past. 
The problem that Varnedoe’s essay struggles with in a case study such as 
Pollock—that there is some truth at the core of the artwork that remains constant, 
even when the work and the artist may be so amply wrapped in words, and 
furthermore that that truth is only accessible through some kind of first-hand 
knowledge—is emblematic of all contemporary art history. Motored by 
globalization and ever-expanding technology, art historians regularly write about 
artworks they have never seen and artists to whom they might not have access, even 
in cases where those artists or artworks are contemporary to a scholar. There are 
many tools for doing so: photographic and filmic documentation of events, 
performances, installations, exhibitions, etc.; artist interviews, both published and 
personal; artists’ own writings and curatorial practices; studio, event, or other 
ephemera that may be production- or advertising-related; art criticism; archives 
organized under the auspices of certain time periods, practices, or geographies; the 
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traditional gatekeepers of art history, including other scholars, gallerists, and 
museums; the massive web of the Internet itself, which provides not only formal and 
informal information on any given thing but also the perception (and, indeed, not 
always the reality) of a flexible and democratizing network. Here, I will focus on the 
first two tools: photographic documentation (and more specifically, performance 
photographs—a choice I will explain in the writing that follows) and artist 
interviews. I choose these because contemporary art history relies heavily on both 
tools as offering historical evidence. The two also share some attributes as sources: 
they are simultaneously of the moment and out of time, fragmentary while also 
appearing to be encompassing, definitive in their possibility of making meaning 
despite being highly mediated.  
While photographs and interviews act within a constellation of evidence, I 
argue that there is something particular about their use in contemporary art history. 
One aspect of this is that they trouble clear distinctions between primary and 
secondary sources, in that their production and circulation makes them 
contemporary to multiple historical moments. Furthermore, relying on performance 
photographs and artist interviews privileges the artist as the site of discourse, either 
through the artist’s own viewable body or own words. This particular type of access 
is almost entirely not a luxury currently available to our colleagues who study art 
production of previous centuries, and thus it necessarily fundamentally shapes how 
we currently write history about the present and recent past. I understand our 
contemporary use of performance photographs and artist interviews to be a matter 
of building stories upon stories; thus, I examine both tools through a series of case 
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studies (including one about Pollock’s myth as perpetuated through his own words 
and those of his wife, Lee Krasner). My goal is to interrogate what might be lost and 
gained in using photographs and interviews as historical evidence, and therefore 
what looking at or reading these tools responsibly might entail. To do so, I begin 
with introducing words and pictures in the contemporary most broadly, before 
providing literature reviews related to both interviews and photographs more 
specifically. I then examine these tools through the framework of what I call 
“networked witnessing,” proposing how we could and should use photographs and 
interviews within contemporary art history. With this framework established, I turn 
to my case studies—first performance photographs, then artist interviews—in 
order to offer examples of carrying out my recommendations. While my case studies 
reveal the variety of conclusions one might productively draw from understanding 
historical evidence through networked witnessing, I ultimately reveal the ways in 
which photographs and interviews require a type of inter-viewing—of looking 
again, from various perspectives, through many layers of mediation, for what might 
be unfamiliar—that can change our perceptions of our own scholarly responsibility. 
Words and Pictures 
My research in performance photographs and artist interviews began with a 
seemingly very straightforward question: when I look at a photograph or read an 
interview as a source, what does it reveal and what does it hold back? Put another 
way: in considering these particular formats as pieces of historical evidence, what is 
lost and what is gained? When I look at a photograph of a performance—say, Yoko 
Ono’s Cut Piece—what can I learn about the artwork? And what relevant pieces of 
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information am I missing? In reading an interview with an artist—for example, 
Benjamin Buchloh talking with Andy Warhol—what do I now know that I did not 
know before? What do I now wish I knew? These questions are fundamental to the 
doing of contemporary art history, not only because they imply the sheer number 
and variety of sources that I can access but also because the presence of the artist 
(either as a body in the photograph or as their own words in the interview) in these 
sources is what lends them legitimacy. Thinking about what is lost and what is 
gained emphasizes a concern for what can actually be “historical” evidence in the 
contemporary, and by what methods we could work to interpret or analyze that 
evidence. Historicizing the present and recent past is obviously methodologically 
complex, since interpretation is created alongside the artist and the artwork itself. 
Yet in doing contemporary art history, whatever our individual methodological 
choices may be, we consistently and collectively rely on photographic 
documentation and artist interviews, even as we continually debate the role of the 
“document” in the discipline. 
My observation is supported by the overwhelming number of titles 
appearing in the last 20 years that concern themselves with the document 
specifically in relationship to the contemporary, including but not limited to: Gavin 
Butt’s article “Happenings in History, or, the Epistemology of the Memoir;” Lisa 
Saltzman’s book Making Memory Matter: Strategies of Remembrance in 
Contemporary Art; Margaret Olin’s book Touching Photographs; Amelia Jones’ article 
“‘Presence’ in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation” and book 
Seeing Differently: A History and Theory of Identification and the Visual Arts; Rebecca 
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Schneider’s article “Solo, Solo, Solo” and book Performing Remains: Art and War in 
Times of Theatrical Reenactment; Jane Blocker’s books Seeing Witness: Visuality and 
the Ethics of Testimony and Becoming Past: History in Contemporary Art; Christine 
Ross’ book The Past is Present, It’s the Future Too: The Temporal Turn in 
Contemporary Art; Perform, Repeat, Record: Live Art History, an anthology that 
includes writings by Jones, Blocker, and Schneider as well as Adrian Heathfield, 
Boris Groys, and Guillermo Gómez-Peña; Adrian’s Heathfield’s anthology Live: Art 
and Performance, which includes essays by both artists and scholars; the exhibition 
Haunted: Contemporary Photography, Video, and Performance and its accompanying 
catalogue; Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present, which includes texts by 
Mieke Bal, Mary Kelley, and Marianne Hirsch; and the Whitechapel Gallery’s multi-
volume series entitled Documents of Contemporary Art. The list could go on, though I 
have chosen here many of the texts that have shaped my own thinking and appear in 
my writing. Within these texts as well as others, photographs are treated as reliable 
evidence, even if many of the authors—including Jones, Schneider, Blocker, and 
Olin—equally acknowledge the tenuous relationship such evidence might hold with 
truth. 
Many of the titles I have listed above are specifically focused on performance 
and photography (though references to interviews often appear in their text and 
footnotes), but the prevalence of the artist interview is similarly visible. Artist 
interviews regularly appear in artist monographs and major exhibition catalogues, 
but have expanded beyond that to stand-alone formats. Art critic and curator Hans 
Ulrich Obrist launched his Interview Project in 1996, which includes conversations 
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with over 60 contemporary artists and thinkers, portions of which have appeared in 
Artforum as well as in his books Interviews Volume 1 and Volume 2. Obrist also 
launched The Conversation Series, a 28-book series, with each book including only a 
lengthy interview with one artist without any other supporting material. In 2015, 
Art Journal dramatically increased the “Conversations” content on their website, 
while interviews appear as a typical form of art criticism on Hyperallergic, a website 
dedicated to writings about art and other cultural events. Artforum and Art in 
America have long published interviews with artists since their founding in 1962 
and 1913, respectively, even as other prominent journals—including October—have 
mostly (though not entirely) stayed away from the format. And of course, there is 
Interview magazine, whose famous founder Andy Warhol appears in a case study 
here as well. Interview began in 1969 with the intention of presenting unedited and 
often more personal conversations between leading art world figures, and the 
repercussions of such an approach are visible in the other examples I have listed. 
The trend of interview-as-criticism has grown out of a number of institutions’ long-
term commitment to collecting artists’ voices, such as the Smithsonian’s Archives of 
American Art (which has various offices across the country), UCLA’s Oral History 
Research Center, the Museum of Modern Art Artist Oral History Initiative, the Video 
Data Bank in Chicago, the Hatch-Billops Collection in New York (which focuses on 
interviews with black artists), the Hubell Trading Post in Arizona (which focuses on 
interviews with Indian-American artists), and the Chicago Historical Society in 
partnership with the Art Institute of Chicago. Such massive acts of collection seem at 
least in part made more urgent by the increasing critical attention on identity as 
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well as the anticipated loss of pioneering artists from the 1960s and ’70s, who are 
growing older and passing away. 
My case studies focus on examples in which performance photographs and 
artist interviews are expressly used to write history about the present and recent 
past. The core (to use Varnedoe’s word for what he believes is “sometimes leftover” 
in the doing of art history) of each case study is a concern with presence and 
absence, both in relationship to the artist’s own body and the artist’s own words. To 
understand presence in the contemporary, I use the definition proposed by Amelia 
Jones in her reflection on the recent “obsession” (in her words) with “live art, its 
histories, and its documentation and re-enactments.”7 She argues that this obsession 
is a desire for presence, even if that desire becomes misplaced or misrecognized 
through the assumption that presence “promises a transparency to an observer of 
what ‘is’ at the very moment at which it takes place.”8 The myth of such a 
transparency, as Jones points out, is that no moment can ever be entirely 
transparent, or in other words, unmediated. While mediation might not be so 
apparent in live performance (even though such an event is mediated by our bodies, 
minds, and settings, to name just a few possibilities), it becomes painfully obvious in 
documentation, since the photograph or the interview offers access to the artist 
even as the two mediums assert their after-the-fact status. The desire for presence 
does not just privilege our bodies and experiences; it also privileges the artist as the 
primary site of discourse in the contemporary. Thus, a clearer vision of how 
                                                        
7 Amelia Jones, “‘The Artist Is Present’: Artistic Re-Enactments and the Impossibility 
of Presence,” TDR (1988-) 55, no. 1 (April 1, 2011): 17. 
8 Ibid., 18. 
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photographs and interviews have developed within the art historical field helps us 
to better understand how our use of words and pictures as historical evidence is 
deeply connected to such desire for presence. 
Words 
In her article “‘Presence’ in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as 
Documentation,” Amelia Jones directly addresses the conundrum of writing about 
performances she has never seen, and using photographs to do so—a project that I 
engage in here as well. Her conclusion is defensive if also completely necessary: of 
course one can write about performances one has never seen, because the notion 
that first-hand experience or immediacy would provide completeness or truth is no 
longer an acceptable belief in the contemporary. Instead, we believe that many 
layers of mediation come with and impact any experience, and we recognize that the 
body in performance purposefully relies on contingency as a mode of representation 
and meaning.9 Jones’ view is shaped by her own practice of writing with (or 
without) performance photographs and artists’ words. She shares that she has been 
criticized for not getting to know the artists she writes about, with the presumption 
that the artists’ words would substitute for the knowledge that Jones lacks, 
specifically, the knowledge gained by seeing the live performance. Jones explains the 
complications of such a presumption:  
At least for me personally I find it impossible, once I get to know 
someone, to have any sense of clarity about her or his work 
historically speaking (that is, as it may have come to mean in its 
original and subsequent contexts). Once I know the artist well, I can 
write about her or his work in (I hope) revealing ways, but ones that 
                                                        
9 Amelia Jones, “‘Presence’ in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as 
Documentation,” Art Journal 56, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 17. 
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are (perhaps usefully, perhaps not) laden with personal feelings and 
conflicts involving the artist as a friend (or not, as the case may be). 
Furthermore, as noted, such relationships—especially if they are not 
positive—increase the logistical difficulties of writing and publishing 
on the work.10 
 
Jones’ acknowledgement of her own (potentially useful, potentially not) subjectivity 
points to an often-opaque process in art historical writing: the logistics of obtaining 
information. The personal relations that go into such work are often relegated to a 
footnote (for example, “Personal correspondence with the author”) if not written 
out of history all together. But published artist interviews can begin to make visible 
this process of exchange, not because the interviewer and interviewee are always 
close friends, but because the interviews themselves propose and circulate ideas of 
what it could or should be like to talk to artists about their work. 
Yet even given the extensive proliferation of artist interviews in our moment, 
as I pointed to earlier, they lack a methodological foundation within the discipline of 
art history. Interviews have a lengthy history of use in many fields within the social 
sciences, including linguistics and anthropology/ethnography, as well as education 
and curriculum instruction, journalism, communication and media studies, and 
psychology. Logically, these fields have developed sets of best practices around 
interview techniques and assessment, including outlines for case studies, coding 
procedures to explicate the text, and methodologies of approach and analysis. But 
most foundational texts about how and why to do interviews as part of a research or 
writing practice originate outside of the humanities, and certainly outside of art 
history. 
                                                        
10 Ibid., 11–12. 
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The literature on interviews can, for the most part, be split into three genres: 
therapeutic interviews, journalistic interviews, and interviewing as research. I will 
not discuss therapeutic interviews here, as that body of literature is primarily 
housed in the field of psychology (though I will say that “talk therapy” shares a 
certain concern with witnessing, which I will discuss, in that both aim to restore the 
well-being of an individual through the mutual acknowledgement—in the form of 
speaking for the patient, listening for the therapist—of trauma). Within journalism, 
interviews began to appear in the middle of the 19th century, with the original credit 
given to Horace Greely as the editor of the New York Herald Tribune, whose 
interview with Brigham Young was published in 1859.11 It was a fairly controversial 
practice at first, though quickly became popular, including with art critics in the 
later 19th century (as Sarah Burns references in her book Inventing the Modern 
Artist: Art and Culture in Gilded Age America, which I will discuss further in my 
second chapter). Journalistic interviews can be a form of research for a larger story 
or appear in Q&A format, where they are typically designed to reach a specific 
audience within a limited amount of space. Journalism differs from therapeutic and 
research practices, however, in two respects: journalists have a right to protect who 
they interview as a source and they also need not tell the interviewee up front 
exactly how their words will be edited or analyzed.12 
                                                        
11 See: Christopher Silvester, ed., The Penguin Book of Interviews: An Anthology from 
1859 to the Present Day (London: Penguin Press, 1993). 
12 For further discussion on the differences between interviews within journalism 
and within the social sciences, see: Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, InterViews: 
Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2009), 284. 
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Interviewing as a form of scholarly research is a relatively young topic, with 
serious scholarly consideration beginning in the early 1980s, even though 
interviews appear in research studies beginning in the early 20th century. 
Interviewing as research is concerned with best practices to the extent that ethical 
positions and foundations of knowledge shape methodological choices, which 
ultimately impact study results. Early texts within the social sciences, including 
James Spradley’s 1979 book The Ethnographic Interview and Elliot Mishler’s 1986 
book Research Interviewing: Context and Narrative, introduced the roles that 
interviews could play in quantitative research. These eventually led to more 
comprehensive writing on researching with interviews, including Nigel Fielding’s 
Interviewing, publishing in 2003, and Jaber Gubrium and James Holstein’s 2002 
Handbook of Interview Research, both of which more firmly situate interview 
research as a qualitative method within academic fields such as sociology and 
anthropology. Currently, Steiner Kvale and Svend Brinkmann’s 2009 book 
InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing is a primary text 
for conceiving of the craft of interview research as well as its accompanying 
epistemological and ethical issues. The authors draw on a unique set of texts that 
incorporate philosophy, writing and literature studies, sociology, and psychology, 
including authors such as philosopher John Dewey, education researcher Elliot 
Eisner, and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Kvale and Brinkmann’s goal is to elucidate 
the ways in which we live in an “interview society,” one in which “production of the 
self has come into focus and the interview serves as a social technique for the public 
construction of the self.” The first half of their study considers the ethics of 
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interviewing, in which (most significant to my inquiry) they pose interviewing as a 
social practice of the postmodern age. In particular, they focus on Jean-François 
Lyotard’s diagnosis of postmodernism as rooted in a “disbelief in universal systems 
of thought.”13 Lyotard discusses this in his 1984 book The Postmodern Condition as 
part of his insistence that knowledge has become a commodity in and of itself.14 
Kvale and Brinkmann use Lyotard’s views to highlight the ways in which an 
interview is a “production site of knowledge,” thereby emphasizing differences over 
universality, since an interview society relies on the narratives humans strive to 
build in conversation with one another.15  
In the second half of their text, Kvale and Brinkmann break down interview 
research into seven stages: thematizing an interview study, designing an interview, 
conducting an interview, transcribing an interview, analyzing an interview, verifying 
that analysis, and reporting results.16 These stages are geared toward qualitative 
research studies, in which interviews with participants shape final conclusions and 
recommendations, but they are transferrable to the work of art history. Art 
historians and critics think about why they might do an interview, map out their 
questions, conduct, transcribe, and then typically share their “results” in one form or 
another, with conclusions and recommendations clearly correlating to 
interpretations. What Kvale and Brinkmann’s comprehensive text provides that is 
often lacking in art history methods is a thorough examination of the choices an 
                                                        
13 Ibid., 52. 
14 See: Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
15 Kvale and Brinkmann, InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing, 53. 
16 Ibid., 97. 
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interviewer (as the person who becomes responsible for interpretation and 
analysis) might make “based on knowledge of the topic of the study, the 
methodological options available, their ethical implications, and anticipated 
consequences of the choices for the entire interview project.”17 
Kvale and Brinkmann acknowledge that the publication of interviews can be 
misleading; they state, “Articles in social science journals often give a rather 
formalistic picture of the research process as following a clear methodological 
procedure. Editorial requirements promote a distorted rationalized picture of 
scientific research as a logical, linear process—which is far from the continually 
changing actual research process with its surprises, design changes, and 
reformulations of concept and hypotheses.”18 They contest this false tidiness by 
tending to the many choices, challenges, and opportunities that arise in an interview 
setting, focusing on the emotional dynamics between interviewer and interviewee. 
Such a perspective helps drive their argument: researching with interviews is 
fundamentally about “attempt[ing] to understand the world from the subjects’ 
points of view,” and therefore, an interview is—at its most essential—a 
conversation.19 Genres of conversation may vary in place and purpose, but are 
always guided by rules and techniques that are, according to Kvale and Brinkmann, 
established through interdependent forces, including human interaction, setting, 
and topic.20 The idea of interdependence is certainly translatable to the work of art 
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18 Ibid., 100. 
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history, and is the “best practice” of interview research that I pull into my 
assessment of interviews’ potential value. 
While art history must borrow from other fields to gain better perspective on 
interviewing practices more specifically, the discipline could join such methods with 
foundational understandings about the power of words. Arguably, no other author 
in the humanities appears more in a discussion of how words function and make 
meaning than J. L. Austin. The 1962 book How to Do Things with Words gathers 
together his extensive lectures on words as performative utterances, and it 
continues to elicit reflections and citations from contemporary art historians.21 
Austin’s argument turns around the idea that “to say something is to do something,” 
rather than to simply state something.22 His primary examples are that of a marriage 
ceremony or a boat christening, in which speaking words is not a matter of stating 
fact but of creating reality. Such performative language presents us with the 
promises words are capable of making, in that a promise can either be present and 
implemented or not, and therefore void. What we can take from Austin into a 
discussion of interviews is his proposal that “[i]t has come to be commonly held that 
many utterances that look like statements are either not intended at all, or only 
intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.”23 
Austin is concerned with how this phenomenon of less-than-straightforward 
language arose philosophically and grammatically, but for my purposes, its 
                                                        
21 It is worth noting here that How to Do Things with Words is itself composed out of 
abbreviated notes, personal writings, and tape recordings—mediums that are 
themselves complicated by editing and interpretation. 
22 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1962), 12. 
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significance is in making clear the possibilities of manipulating the words we speak, 
and the many reasons for that manipulation. Words, according to Austin, are not 
inherent truth-tellers but instead, their use tells much more about us. Indeed, Austin 
sets aside truth as a concern within his examples—“None of the utterances cited is 
either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it.”—to focus on 
intention and operation, for it is in intention and not truth that words can become 
controversial, or even dangerous.24 Austin points to this in saying, “The utterance of 
the words is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading incident in the performance of 
the act…the performance of which is also the object of the utterance, but it is far 
from being usually, even if it is ever, the sole thing necessary if the act is to be 
deemed to have been performed.”25 The danger here is that even when words do 
work (such as in the act of saying “I do” at the altar), they are never working by 
themselves; they also rely on circumstances and context (for example, for saying “I 
do” to work legally or potentially even emotionally, I need to not have another 
current marital partner). In this way, words do not work without supplemental 
information. Austin thinks through this problem in terms of presence and absence, 
in that performative utterances cannot in fact be false, in the sense that they cannot 
be incorrect, but that they can be void if the appropriate circumstances and 
context—the supplements to the words—are absent. 
In his essay “That Dangerous Supplement,” which appeared 15 years after 
the publication of Austin’s lectures, Jacques Derrida puts the supplement into focus 
by addressing the ways in which it eclipses its object. He bases his interrogation on 
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philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argued throughout his writings about the 
secondary, or supplemental, role of writing to spoken language. Rousseau was not 
worried about the practicalities and subsequent ideologies of transcription, but 
rather more philosophically concerned with the feeling of presentness.26 In a 
presumably secondary role, the supplement is actually dangerous to speech because 
writing destroys the notion of presence, compromising the integrity of the subject in 
relationship to speech. Derrida, on the other hand, seeks to show how writing is an 
addition to speech, but is also essential to the constitution of speech itself. As he 
states, “To write is indeed the only way of keeping or recapturing speech since 
speech denies itself as it gives itself.”27 This evokes a more performative aspect of 
speech,28 which is temporally produced and experienced. It also touches on how the 
production of writing both denies the present moment while also creating a space in 
which that moment is valued. Though his argument is rooted in spoken words, 
Derrida’s essay also addresses other circulated forms of supplemental 
communication, including arguing that art is a supplement to nature.  
As Derrida points out, the potential for the supplement to become dangerous 
lies in the “eclipse,” implying that by gaining something we may necessarily lose 
something else. Jones discusses the dangerous supplements that performance 
creates—“the body ‘itself,’ the spoken narrative, the video and other visuals within 
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Starobinski in Paris in 1961. 
27 Jacques Derrida, “...That Dangerous Supplement...,” in Of Grammatology, trans. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), 142. 
28 Here I do not mean “performative” in the J. L. Austin sense, as to words that are 
able to perform certain realities, but rather “performative” as reliant on person-to-
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the piece, the video, film, photograph, and text documenting it for posterity”—as 
both formulating and replacing any sense of presence that the performance event 
itself might provide.29 This is a matter of reproduction, in that it is “an infinite chain, 
ineluctably multiplying the supplementary mediations that produce the sense of the 
very thing they defer.”30 She concludes, “[r]ather than confirming the ontological 
coherence of the body-as-presence, body art depends on documentation, 
confirming—even exacerbating—the supplementarity of the body itself.”31 How 
quickly a concern for words becomes a concern for the body, a transition that 
indicates how we understand speech as primary and authentic, and thus as much 
from the body as performance is. Presence can be connected to artist interviews as a 
matter of writing out an exchange. Subsequent publication both competes with the 
exchange (evident in the mis-translations and –transcriptions that happen around 
interviews) and creates an opportunity for valuing it (evident in the publication and 
circulation of artists’ words to the ends of preservation). In many cases, it is the 
words—not the moment—which we can hold on to as substitutions for the many 
layers of exchange happening in an interview.  
The purposes of the artist interview are several-fold and often overlapping. 
First, scholars interview artists to sort out what we might call the logistical: Where 
was this shown and when? Who owned it then? Where were you living at the time? 
Artists can and do misremember such facts or details, but scholars still ask. Then 
there is the artist interview that seems to be more about chatting, or even gossiping. 
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This style points to an element of insider networking that pervades practice, where 
an artist may choose an interviewer based on an already-established relationship, 
such as Ed Kienholz choosing Willoughby Sharp to interview him for the UCLA 
archives.32 This happens not just in archival situations but also in art criticism, 
where friends chatting about some “stuff,” as Andy Warhol calls the art historical 
content of an interview with Benjamin Buchloh, is subsequently published and 
circulated in the realm of the “critical.” A third purpose brings together some of the 
concerns of the first two in the idea of validation. Both interviewers and 
interviewees enter into these conversations to confirm such logistics but also to 
validate relationships and experiences. Here we may think back to the criticism of 
Jones that I began with, where interviewing artists would have validated the 
experiences of the artists as well as Jones’ own credentials. Within this mode, the 
discipline of art history continues to prioritize interviews as primary sources, or 
first-hand accounts of the truth of an artist’s feeling or thinking. Interviews function 
somewhat like eyewitness testimony, in that truth is housed in the body that can 
speak its own words. Furthermore, because of legal and journalistic precedents, we 
expect interviews of any kind, including those with artists, to offer us access to the 
unedited and original artist.   
For this reason, while I am certainly concerned with the actual work of 
producing the interview (was it done in person, over the phone, or through writing, 
for example), my examples focus on those interviews that began orally and are now 
in printed, published formats. I have two reasons for choosing this focus: 1) the 
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artist interview in the format of the Q&A carries the look of authenticity, in that it 
masquerades as unedited, as if it diligently transcribes a real-time conversation; and 
2) an ability to be published and thus circulated is what provides opportunities for 
art historians to use these exchanges to write history. In this type of interview, an 
exchange that is necessarily embodied in its practice primarily becomes one of the 
written word, now accessible through time and space rather than confined to one 
moment or potentially, in some cases, particular bodies, even as it still centers the 
artist as the site of discourse. 
Pictures  
The thoughts and presumptions that continue to shape the contemporary 
ways in which we see photographs were forged in partnership with the 
circumstances of the writers of photo history and theory, which by most accounts 
begins in earnest in Europe and North America in the 1920s and ’30s.33 In taking 
Walter Benjamin’s proposal that it is interrogation—not introduction—that brings a 
new medium into maturity, we may see the first half of the 20th century as this time 
of growth, during which we developed a fuller understanding of the ways in which a 
photograph shows us what the camera sees. The emphasis on social and 
technological change during the earlier 20th century correlates to the heralding of 
photography as a literally new, and thereby modern, way of seeing. At this time, 
many practitioners of photography and writers of its history considered technical 
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reproduction to be the unique factor of the medium, labeling this ability as its truly 
revolutionary contribution.34 In this case, reproduction is the notion that 
photographs—unlike instances of production in other media—may be widely 
circulated and thus widely seen, drastically altering their audience opportunities.35 
In his 1932 essay “A New Instrument of Vision,” Lázló Moholy-Nagy begins by 
stating, “In photography we possess an extraordinary instrument for 
reproduction.”36 Moholy-Nagy makes a case for the newness of photography, by 
which he means its ability to reproduce “what has been,” as necessary for seeing the 
modern world. The ability to see differently that he is so encouraged by is intimately 
tied to the concept of reproduction, of being able to see not just once, but over again.  
Moholy-Nagy’s theories join those of Walter Benjamin, whose prolific essay 
of 1936 entitled “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” grapples 
with the perceived significance of mechanical reproduction to art and the world. In 
his interest in pinning down what exactly is so different between previous image 
production and the abilities of photography, Benjamin is primarily concerned with 
an artwork’s aura, by which he means the presence of the original or the authentic.37 
According to him, photography threatens the aura of the artwork through its ability 
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“aura” in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1936). 
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ed. Liz Wells (London: Routledge, 2003), 92. 
37 Walter Benjamin, “Extracts from The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction,” in The Photography Reader, ed. Liz Wells (London: Routledge, 2003), 
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of technical (rather than manual) reproduction. His reasoning is twofold: first, that 
technical reproduction happens more independently from an original than manual 
reproduction and therefore allows for images that do not occur naturally, and 
second, that technical reproduction allows for the copy to appear in situations in 
which the original would not.38 Even in this early moment of photography 
theorizing, Benjamin was already concerned with how such a unique yet 
reproducible image might appear to a viewer: “Unmistakably, reproduction as 
offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the 
unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are 
transitoriness and reproducibility in the former.”39 Here, Benjamin proposes a 
central tenet of reproduction: the nature of reproducibility is inherently transitory, 
and therefore fully acknowledges the notion that reproduced photographs solicit 
unpredictable audiences. Attention to how they appear to these audiences, and their 
subsequent impressions, becomes a question of repetition and substitution. 
While authors of the later 20th century, including Hubert Damisch, John Tagg, 
and Allan Sekula, consider photography in terms of the documentary, linking its use 
to the needs of the state and capitalism, their work continues to rely on the 
mechanical practices of photography as the theoretical foundation of the field, in 
which the production of photographs in and of itself is meaningless without taking 
into consideration their ability to be exchanged for various purposes. Their work 
also coincides with major movements around feminism, critical race theory, and 
queer theory, all of which work to better understand subjectivity and identity in 
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relationship to representation of the self and others in photography as well as other 
media. Authors such as Jan Avgikos (who specifically considers Cindy Sherman’s 
artwork), Pierre Bourdieu, bell hooks, Stuart Hall, and Angela Kelly moved 
discussions of a photograph’s value firmly into a sociocultural and even domestic 
realm by simultaneously inheriting and complicating our psychoanalytical 
relationships to images and memory. Their goal was often to understand how 
personal photography can become just as powerful as its more officially regimented 
practices, such as surveillance, categorization, profiling, documentation, and record-
keeping. 
Lisa Saltzman picks up the threads of the personal concerns and habits of 
photography in her book 2006 book Making Memory Matter: Strategies of 
Remembrance in Contemporary Art, which proposes repetition and substitution as a 
method of collective memory. Saltzman considers the ways in which certain types of 
monuments “bear witness,” by which she more precisely means that they create 
public memory through the repetition of cultural association:  
Central and repeated elements in cultural practices of memory that 
range from vigils and shrines to funerary monuments and family 
albums, the candles and photographs stand as much for these rituals 
and sites of remembrance as they do for the individual young men 
they seek to honor and remember. Attributes that reinforce the 
memorial testimony each subject offers, the candles and photographs 
are also a reminder of a set of visual strategies, a set of visual 
technologies, with which their testimony is registered and through 
which their testimony will be witnessed.40  
 
Saltzman is concerned with the idea that the meanings of things like candles and 
photographs are know-able because of repetition; we now recognize that candles 
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and photographs not only represent but also in fact mean loss. In looking closely at 
examples of public monuments and remembrances, both government-sponsored 
and community-driven, Saltzman draws our attention to visual strategies and the 
creation of objects—“[R]ecorded not by a history but by an artist and destined not 
for an archive but for an audience”—that are intentionally public in their function.41 
Photographs are among those material objects that Saltzman has stand in not just 
for memories, but experiences or even people themselves. Such a substitution 
changes a sense of what kind of witnessing may be possible through memory, since 
in the case of photographs, witnessing does not happen between two subjects but 
rather between one subject and one object that now represents or embodies a 
subject. 
 We can relate a formation of substitution through visual strategies like 
Saltzman’s to Roland Barthes notion of “punctum.” Barthes undoubtedly touches 
almost all iterations of photographic writing produced in the West since the 1980s, 
with his distinct mix of the deeply personal and the heady theoretical. Barthes’ 
concept of punctum is introduced in his seminal text Camera Lucida, which aims to 
eulogize Barthes’ recently deceased mother through an almost-meditative 
examination of the essence and effects of photography. About the punctum, Barthes 
writes, “it is the element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, 
and pierces me.”42 Barthes’ most evocative example of the concept of punctum 
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within a photograph is performed with a family portrait photograph by James 
VanDerZee, taken in 1926 (Figure 1). Barthes writes, 
Reading Van der Zee’s photograph, I thought I had discerned what 
moved me: the strapped pumps of the black woman in her Sunday 
best; but this photograph has worked within me, and later on I 
realized that the real punctum was the necklace she was wearing; for 
(no doubt) it was this same necklace (a slender ribbon of braided 
gold) which I had seen worn by someone in my own family, and 
which, once she died, remained shut up in a family box of old jewelry 
(this sister of my father never married, lived with her mother as an 
old maid, and I had always been saddened whenever I thought of her 
dreary life). I had just realized that however immediate and incisive it 
was, the punctum could accommodate a certain latency (but never any 
scrutiny).43 
 
Barthes is pricked, or bruised, here by a photograph that becomes deeply associated 
with his own memory as well as his own sadness. The necklace worn by the woman 
in VanDerZee’s family portrait becomes that of Barthes’ aunt, reminding him 
through its presence of the necklace’s physical absence (as it is “shut up in a family 
box of old jewelry”) as well as the absence of his aunt and the absence of happiness 
within her life. Discovering the punctum is not necessarily immediate, as Barthes 
notes in the last sentence, but instead can be a dormant element, or even not 
something that initially catches the viewer’s eye; furthermore, the punctum may be 
or become so personal that it does not hold up careful and logical examination. This 
is not unlike Saltzman’s visual strategies of substitution, where reading a certain 
object in a certain context endows that object with meaning that is both personal 
and memorial. 
But such desire for substitution can be dangerous, or, when Barthes initially 
defines the punctum as “that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant 
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to me),” it may be the “accident” that requires more of our attention that then “prick.”44 
In order to elucidate the potential dangerous of substitution that arise when we begin to 
make associations based on what we know and desire, in her book Touching Photographs 
Margaret Olin walks her readers through Barthes seeing the set of pearls in VanDerZee’s 
photograph as “this same necklace (a slender ribbon of braided gold) which I had seen 
worn by someone in my own family,” which allows the photograph to touch Barthes by 
evoking a personal memory.45 However, the sitter in VanDerZee’s photograph is not 
wearing the necklace Barthes sees; in fact, she wears a string of pearls. As Olin points 
out, this confusion persists without comment from most readers of Camera Lucida, 
perhaps because Barthes’ writing and VanDerZee’s photograph fall relatively far apart 
from each other in the book, and for this reason, readers are unlikely to actually do their 
own looking. Barthes’ mistaken punctum is not just that to Olin, however, who notes that 
“the detail he thought he needed to search for was indeed important, if absent.”46  
Margaret Olin’s proposal of the “performative index” helps to explain why 
photographs are so often treated as substitutions, both legitimate and mistaken. For 
Olin, the performative index “performs a relation that may not depend on 
resemblance,” creating an exchange in which a viewer builds a connection between 
a photograph and something else not because of what the photograph depicts but 
because of how the photograph accesses more personal memories, feelings, or 
desires.47 For Olin, this access is the ultimate power of the photograph, in that “this 
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relational sense gives a photograph its power to stand in for a person.”48 Olin 
considers different types of photographs and the (close) looking they solicit, 
including a teenager’s selfie “as a witness to her devotion as well as a surrogate 
companion to her boyfriend.”49 In an example like this one, “photography merges 
the language of witnessing with the language of the index” by positioning 
photographs as both recorders of and substitutes for people, places, and events.50 I 
would add to Olin’s analysis that this performative index is what allows a 
photograph to stand in for not just a person but also an event. By creating an 
affective exchange that does not depend on exact resemblance but rather on 
perceived connections, photographs of performances become effective substitutions 
for the performances themselves, even when we know that their resemblance to an 
event is not and cannot be “exact.” A substitution like this is reinforced by 
reproduction, because it is the technology of reproduction that creates the 
circumstances for circulation of a particular image.   
To understand the work of substitution, Olin expands on Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of the “habitus” and his own take on photo history. As previously 
mentioned, Bourdieu did work during the 1960s to understand the patterns and 
desires of personal photography. In his research, he found that—as a result of the 
rise of accessible photographic technology—most (now culturally amateur) 
photographers focused on two things: family and events. Thus, the photograph came 
to be a recognizable symbol for important family or community moments, resulting 
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in domestic placement of photographs at the center of the home or in obvious 
community locales.51 We see the echoes of this not only in Olin, but also in Saltzman, 
where prominent placement of images within mutually agreed upon community 
gathering spaces is what provides images with such substitutional power. 
Bourdieu’s findings about personal photography practice rely in large part on his 
understanding of habitus, in which individuals engage in certain beliefs or behaviors 
primarily out of socialized habit, rather than perhaps fully recognizing or 
understanding the origins of such attitudes or actions.52 Through examples such as 
photo ops, snapshots, and saving photographs as mementos, Olin argues that certain 
actions become habitual and recognizable: “Actions surrounding photographs 
include not only taking them but also posing for them, or even just looking at 
them.53 Olin recalls Bourdieu in order to make one of the central points of her book: 
“how photographs look may be less central to their habitus than how people look at 
them. Or how people refuse to, fail to, or simply do not look at them.”54 By this, Olin 
means that there is a recognizable way not just of posing for photographs, but 
looking through them: the scroll, the search, the comment, the split-second 
judgment that is conjoined with the archive, the record, the stilling of activity and 
affect. 
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What I find so significant about Olin’s distinction is the act of looking at a 
photograph as productive, even generative. In connecting back to Saltzman and 
collective memory, Olin notes, “It is possible to regard the role that photographic 
practices play in witnessing as equivalent to an action.”55 As photographs circulate, 
people register events, and the feelings or memories they evoke, as their own. The 
power of visual technology, then, is in both capturing a memory but also producing 
it. By looking at and circulating such visual strategies, we are creating recognizable 
substitutions that are layered in their understanding, rather than isolated. Rebecca 
Schneider dismantles the romance of such perceived isolation in her essay “Solo, 
Solo, Solo,” in which—amidst a discussion of what could really possibly be so “solo” 
about performance—she argues, “The photograph appears to represent a singular 
event. It appears to document a performance by a singular artist and to stand as a 
trace of that original solo action.”56 Schneider goes on to say, thinking specifically 
here of Yves Klein’s famous photograph Leap into the Void, “as the historical record 
makes clear, the event and the image is a re-enactment of an event, not the event 
itself. And, it is the re-enactment that never took place ‘as real’ … It is, thus, a record 
of a re-enactment that never arrives at the ‘real’ it sought to cite via repetition, even 
as it strives to make the act present for witness.”57 Within this, the photograph both 
cites and creates through repetition and circulation. Looking at a photograph, then, 
is an act of engagement and exchange, in which one enters into a sort of contract of 
response and responsibility with the work. Such a level of engagement and 
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exchange is not dissimilar to the experience of the live audience member. Thus, not 
only does an understanding of photography that focuses on the action of looking 
challenge the idea that one must be at a performance in order to understand it, but it 
also refutes the idea that any performance or photograph or viewing experience is 
an isolated one; instead, all acts of looking are mediated and networked. 
All of these authors center the meaning and importance of a photograph as 
its looking at, rather than its taking. Taken together, their perspectives provide a 
framework for thinking about how what is not in the photograph, or what we think 
we see in a photograph when we view it, is as meaningful as what information a 
photograph does yield up to our gaze. Particularly when we view a photograph over 
and over, in varying contexts, what we think we remember seeing is enhanced by 
repetition. In her seminal work On Photography, Susan Sontag frames this as a sort 
of stillness in action: “Photographs are a way of imprisoning reality, understood as 
recalcitrant, inaccessible; of making it stand still.”58 Sontag’s view of stilling as a type 
of imprisonment is particularly harsh when juxtaposed with Varnedoe’s concerns 
about the cocoon, as photographs may seem to imprison not only artists and 
viewers but also particular readings of artworks themselves. In this way, repetition 
of the still may allow for a diversity of audience, but does not necessarily imply a 
diversity of perspective.  
 Schneider concludes with this idea as well, noting, “Looking across examples, 
much intermedia ‘solo’ work depends on the fact that ‘solo’ acts produce choruses of 
witnesses – that is, various audiences of persons, objects, documents, photos or 
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testimonies that stand as witnesses, each, in different ways, rendering accounts in 
diverse but collective reiteration.”59 She calls performance events “veritable witness 
machine[s],” in that they produce witnesses ad infinitum into the future because of 
their documentation. In this process, the “site of the event is in the witnessing, the 
re-telling/re-seeing, not in the ‘event’ itself; and yet the ‘event itself’ becomes what 
is told in retelling.”60 Schneider echoes Varnedoe’s concern at the beginning of my 
Introduction. By now, the pictures are so amply wrapped in words—the images and 
their accompanying stories so circulated through re-telling—that the reality of the 
event itself is no longer the actual inquiry. Rather, the focus is on how we (as art 
historians) might (along with other witnesses of varying types) act as witnesses, and 
what would be gained or lost in that exchange. 
As photography theory and history is so concerned with presence—either in 
the form of the aura, the “it” that is there, or the substitution—performance theory 
has taken up presence as well. My reasons for writing about performance 
photographs with an attention to presence are particularly shaped by Peggy Phelan, 
who draws a connection between performance and photography through the 
characteristics of the claims of photo history: presumed uniqueness and built-in 
repetition. She argues, “We have tended to fetishize the uniqueness of each live 
performance while neglecting its repetitive aspects, and we have tended to ignore 
the complex performances involved in both taking and seeing photographs. Like 
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photography, performance is rooted in copying.”61  With this in mind, my interest in 
performance photographs is a choice to forefront the ways in which performance is 
rooted in reproduction, and how this creates photographic documentation that is 
always already transparent about its own historicization. While Phelan believes that 
“we have tended to ignore the complex performances involved in both taking and 
seeing photographs,” my dissertation considers those performances that are 
produced intentionally alongside their photographic (and often filmic) 
documentation. They have already been given over to history by purposefully being 
documented. Thus, we cannot ignore the ways we look at that documentation in the 
form of photographs, including what, how, when, and where we see. 
Just as with interviews, documentary photographs uses and purposes within 
art history are several-fold and often overlapping. First, they provide what we might 
call logistical information: Where was a performance or event? Who was there? 
What happened throughout? Second, they provide access to a type of privileged 
viewing in which certain elements or aspects of a performance may be more visible 
to viewers of a photograph seen after the event itself. As an example, we could think 
of Gavin Butt’s analysis of Samuel R. Delany’s account of Allen Kaprow’s 18 
Happenings, in which audience members’ views were intentionally obscured during 
the performance whereas photographs of the work provide perspectives that 
viewers did not have at the time.62 Third, they offer compelling evidence of potential 
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historical narratives around an event. Put another way, we look to them as support 
for our own interpretations and understanding of the artwork, the artist, and the 
audience (even when we leave out the presence of the photographer). There are 
many cases in which documentary photographs are used to almost completely 
propel a certain theory or interpretation of a work, and my first chapter considers 
one of these—the photographs of Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece performance and their 
critical reception—in particular.  
By more clearly defining these purposes, we may begin to understand Olin’s’ 
argument that looking at a photograph “is more act than reading; it produces more 
than it understands.”63  
Similar to interviews, the discipline of art history especially prioritizes documentary 
photographs as primary sources, particularly in the cases of performances or events, 
even though photo history and theory has established photographs as highly 
mediated and ultimately dependent on the value determined in their social 
exchange. Essentially, as art historians, we know that photographs are fraught 
pieces of evidence, but we keep using them anyway, out of both choice and 
necessity. We expect performance photographs to offer us access to an experience 
otherwise lost because of time, because in them we see not only the artist’s body but 
also contemporary viewers, who in some cases are understood as adequate 
substitutions for ourselves as viewers in the present day. 
Evidence and Testimony 
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The literature on interviews and photographs emphasizes the document, as I 
previously outlined as my concern, but mostly does so in terms of a certain set of 
rhetorical affiliations: evidence and testimony. Photographs and interviews are 
discussed as “evidence” in that they are sources used by art historians to support or 
defend historical conclusions while visual and rhetorical strategies are talked about 
as providing “testimony” about events, experiences, and feelings. I want to draw 
attention to these terms because not all of the authors I discuss offer clear 
definitions of “evidence” and “testimony,” particularly in terms of what responses 
are elicited by these types of evidential or testimonial documents. Thus, here I will 
provide my own working definitions of evidence and testimony, as understanding 
these terms is crucial to understanding our response and responsibility to these 
documents. 
While “evidence” plays a role in a number of fields, perhaps most obviously 
in the legal arena, art historian Gavin Butt significantly informs my understanding of 
it. I choose Butt as a guide because his scholarship focuses on the ways in which 
history is produced and knowledge is made, emphasizing the various complex 
contexts that contribute to our sociocultural understandings. His writing also often 
deals specifically with how truth is at stake in artworks (such as performances) and 
their documentation, as with his 2001 article “Happenings in History, or, the 
Epistemology of the Memoir.” Butt expands this type of work in his 2005 book 
Between You and Me: Queer Disclosures in the New York Art World, 1948-1963, in 
which he Butt traces histories of artists through rumors or presumptions about 
their sexuality in order to show that such gossip impacts not only the artists’ works 
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but the visibility of the artists’ bodies as well. In complicating the emphasis on facts 
within art history, since gossip is valuable both when it is and is not true, Butt aims 
to “queer” the writing of art history by practicing “an intentioned embrace of some 
of the things that are customarily taken to be bad.”64 To do so, Butt asks readers to 
adjust what may qualify as evidence. He states, “[G]ay art history has more 
commonly been concerned with the actual ‘facts’ of who was or wasn’t gay” and has 
therefore “been dogged by the relative paucity of sexual evidence.”65 This means that 
rather than thinking about how socio-cultural concepts of gayness, homosexuality, 
and maleness impact the field of art history, art historians focus instead on the 
alleged “facts” or “truths” of history: who was or wasn’t “actually” gay, and what 
kind of evidence or activity might prove this.66 Thus, (art) historians get caught up 
in trying to find incontrovertible evidence of sexual activity, and in the midst of 
doing so, often bemoan “the lack of available testimony from (still) closeted artists 
and critics” in order to validate their own theories.67 Evidence and testimony here 
are linked, then, in the name of art historical research. Yet by defining gossip as 
evidence, and thereby arguing that evidence is valuable even when it is unreliable, 
Butt dismisses the idea of searching for the “truth” about the sexuality of these 
artists. His aim then is not to collect evidence or testimony that might demonstrably 
prove a fact about an artist’s sexual activity, but instead to trouble evidence as being 
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entirely visible in the work or on the artist, and in this way allowing for 
“nonevidential evidence” to be valued.68 
Butt’s main nonevidential evidence is gossip, about which he employs artist-
poet John Giorno’s identification of gossip as the so-labeled “hardcore of art 
history.”69 About this particular type of exchange of information, Butt argues, “as a 
form of witnessed knowledge, [gossip] is often taken by academics as being only as 
unreliable as the person conveying the information, and, by definition, it is not 
necessarily unsubstantiated.”70 I understand performance photographs and artist 
interviews to work in a comparable way; the information they offer is often judged 
by the reliability of their circumstances, in that a particular point of access or 
interviewer bio lends credibility to their production. Performance photographs and 
artist interviews are tools, just like gossip: they provide “those meanings which 
exist, as it were, to the side of the [artwork]; ones which refuse to stabilize as visible 
sign but which nevertheless come to animate its significance or affect.”71 In this way, 
the subjects of my concern are certainly the artists, artworks, pictures, and words 
named throughout, but even more so the meanings found to the side of these 
subjects, the “stuff” of art history that can be gathered not just in conversation 
between you and me, but also in looking with a magnifying glass or reading between 
the lines. 
Looking to the “stuff” of art history to provide truth about artists and 
artworks, rather than operating as if truth can be entirely contained within the artist 
                                                        
68 Ibid., 21. 
69 Ibid., 2. 
70 Ibid., 6. 
71 Ibid., 20. 
 38 
or work itself, is not without its risks. One could lose sight of the nuances of a work 
or of the value of formal analysis, or one could ignore the very real impacts 
circumstances and contexts have on both art works and artists’ lives. One could also 
start to believe that the only possible truths are those contained outside of the artist 
or artwork, thus operating from a constant place of skepticism rather than a place of 
invested belief. But the point of valuing historical evidence like artist interviews and 
performance photographs is not to put these many objects of study at odds, but 
rather to understand the ways in which they all contain valuable (if mediated) 
truths that may be put into conversation. Butt explains this in terms of gossip, which 
would potentially function as an entirely pejorative term, if not for that fact that 
“even if gossip [or some other type of nonevidential evidence] gets some things 
slightly skewed, it nevertheless contains some kernel of truth” and thus provides an 
idea, an inkling, a trace “of some historical real—or some event, act, or identity.”72 
For the art historian, such an idea poses a challenge to what constitutes historical 
evidence and how we might interpret that evidence; as Butt notes, “If all of this 
places [his] book in an experimental relation to the discourse of history in general, 
then it also raises methodological questions about the interpretive procedures of art 
history in particular.”73 I argue that what is at the center of those methodological 
questions is how we understand truth in relationship to documentation, as truth 
becomes the lynchpin of historicizing the present or recent past through a reliance 
on the documentary photograph and the interview. 
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In writing about and with photographs and interviews, I employ a post-
positivist approach to truth. Post-positivism developed in response to positivism, 
which insists that truth can be found only through direct sensory experience that is 
then combined with reason, a process that creates certitude of knowledge.74 A 
positivist perspective relies on a belief that there are absolute truths about humans’ 
existence just as there are absolute laws of nature, like gravity. Post-positivism, 
which is manifested mostly in writings on philosophy and science, rejects the 
principle of the absolute. Instead, post-positivism proposes that truth can indeed 
exist and be found, but always in a mediated form. There is no possibility for non-
objective truth, because our understanding of truth cannot be omnipotent, 
authoritative, or removed from our experiences.75  
Within a post-positivist framework, I understand the ontology of past events 
to be know-able but only through and within their own mediation and our own 
subjectivity. Thus, the truth that I am concerned with is a truth that is networked 
among myself and other objects and actors within history. Here, I recall Jones, who 
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stridently defends her ability to write about performances she has not seen by 
focusing on subjective perspective. She notes, “While the live situation may enable 
the phenomenological relations of flesh-to-flesh engagement, the documentary 
exchange (viewer/reader  document) is equally intersubjective.”76 If in 
positivism truth is defined by such a phenomenological relation that can only be 
derived through presence, post-positivism makes clear that presence is just as much 
a factor in other forms of exchange, since we always come to them subjectively. 
Furthermore, the truth that we shape and propose relies on our ability to change the 
position from which we may witness the past; as Jones concludes, “it is hard to 
identify the patterns of history while one is embedded in them.”77 Instead, we get at 
truth by acknowledging the layers of mediation existing between us and any 
experience, and in doing so extending a notion of presence to that which goes 
beyond the merely immediately physical. 
Witnessing 
Both Butt and Jones write about evidence and testimony as elements of 
witnessing, but neither completely fleshes out that framework in their own texts. 
Yet the presence of witnessing—that it appears not just in the texts of Butt and 
Jones but also Saltzman, Olin, Barthes, and Schneider—proposes the centrality of 
understanding what it might really mean to be a witness in the contemporary 
moment. What does one witness, and what is expected as a response? 
Answers to these questions often forge their roots in trauma theory, since 
psychoanalytically and culturally, witnessing and trauma are linked experiences. 
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What we might typically think of as traumatic events have, of course, always been 
going on since the beginning of the human species, but early theories of trauma 
begin with Sigmund Freud’s fascination with patients who seemed trapped in their 
previous experience—an interest that not only appears chronologically parallel to 
concerns ways of seeing and understanding photographs but also provides the 
foundation for talk theory formatted as an interview, as mentioned earlier. Trauma 
means “wound” in Greek, and Freud was interested in how trauma is in fact a wound 
or an injury of the mind, rather than the body. In Moses and Monotheism and Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, both developed and written in the 1920s and ’30s, Freud puts 
forth the idea that trauma is an event that simply cannot be fully processed and 
understood as it occurs, and thus repeats for us, as we continue to try to assimilate 
such an experience into our subjecthood.78 In her review of Freud’s psychological 
vision of trauma as it intersects with literature, Cathy Caruth writes, trauma “is 
always the story of a wound that cried out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us 
of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available. This truth, in its delayed 
appearance and its belated address, cannot be linked only to what is known, but also 
to what remains unknown in our very actions and our language.”79 Trauma is thus 
most fundamentally about the stakes of knowing the truth about our own 
experiences. With Freud’s proposal that trauma destroys the ability to conceive of 
one’s self as a subject, Caruth asserts, “Traumatic experience, beyond the 
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psychological dimension of suffering it involves, suggests a certain paradox: that the 
most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it.”80 
This paradox is played out in Caruth’s text by considering Freud’s conception 
of trauma and repression alongside that of Jacques Lacan, another foundational if at 
times competing voice in trauma theory. In his 1900 text The Interpretation of 
Dreams, Freud relays a story told to him by a patient, though not of her own dream; 
rather, it is someone else’s dream that she has now fixated on. The circumstances of 
the dream are that a father has been watching over his sick child and goes to the 
next room over to sleep, and while dreaming, the child appears by the father’s bed 
and asks his father, “Don’t you see I’m burning?” The father wakes and rushes to the 
next room, to discover that his dead child has been partially engulfed in flames from 
a fallen candle.81 In this example, Freud is concerned with how the dream may keep 
the father asleep in order to shield him from the violence of his reality, namely his 
sick and then soon dead child now burned. The dream fulfills the father’s wish that 
his child still be alive and able to come to him, to talk to him, even for just a moment 
longer. On the other hand, in his Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan 
suggests “that it is because the father dreams, paradoxically enough, that he 
precisely wakes up.”82 Such a shift in perspective reveals how the traumatic may not 
always be where we think it is, as in Lacan’s reading, awakening from the dream but 
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too late to help the child is more traumatic than the death of the child itself, because 
waking up means experiencing “the necessity and impossibility of responding to 
another’s death.”83 In both cases, the father has seen his child’s death but does not 
know it in that he did not experience death himself, which is a traumatic form of 
survival. 
At its most broad, witness theory attempts to negotiate the paradox of 
trauma: that to see an event is not to actually know it. Negotiating such a paradox 
means grappling with Caruth’s primary question, drawn from Freud’s observations 
and Lacan’s interpretations: “Is the trauma the encounter with death, or the ongoing 
experience of having survived it?”84 This is a question that opens up the many layers 
of witnessing: an individual may experience or witness a traumatic event; an 
individual may witness their own response to such an event, either in the moment 
or throughout the rest of their lives; other individuals may witness the same event 
or another event entirely, those individuals may witness their own similar or 
differing responses, or they may only witness the individual’s response after the 
event (where the event is both the encounter and the ongoing experience). The 
inherent layers of witnessing are embedded in witness theory, in which it can be 
difficult to parse out who exactly might be the witness and to what in any given 
exchange of crying out and addressing. 
Writing almost a century after Freud, who composed Moses and Monotheism 
in the shadow of Hitler and with concerns about Jewish persecution, Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben composed 1999 book Remnants of Auschwitz: The 
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Witness and the Archive. Agamben grapples with the paradox of trauma: “The Shoah 
is an event without witnesses in the double sense that it is impossible to bear 
witness to it from the inside—since no one can bear witness from the inside of 
death, and there is no voice for the disappearance of voice—and from the outside—
since the ‘outsider’ is by definition excluded from the event.”85 To attempt to 
understand such an impossible reality about an event that must be remembered, 
Agamben tries to explicate exactly what is meant by “witness” through a tracing of 
the word’s origin, noting that in Latin there are actually two words for this term:  
The first word, testis, from which our word ‘testimony’ derives, 
etymologically signifies the person who, in a trial or lawsuit between 
two rival parties, is in the position of a third party. The second word, 
superstes, designates a person who has lived through something, who 
has experienced an event from beginning to end and can therefore 
bare witness to it… But this also means that [one’s] testimony [as a 
witness] has nothing to do with the acquisition of facts for a trial 
([one] is not neutral enough for this, [one] is not a testis).86  
 
This etymological division elucidates the differences not just between testifying and 
witnessing, but also between ethics and law, which Agamben asserts are quite 
different, since law is not about truth or justice (as an ethical response would be) 
but instead only about judgment. Clear judgment (either guilty or not guilty) 
becomes the “substitute for the true and the just,” because law cannot go any further 
than a sentence of judgment through the form of a trial.87 Thus, in the same way that 
a witness cannot in fact testify, because he is simply too close to the truth, a trial 
cannot restore justice, because it is by definition removed from the truth. The 
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problem with such a system, as Agamben identifies, is that we confuse judgment 
with justice, and therefore understand trials to be a matter of overcoming or solving 
the trauma of something like the Holocaust. 
The reality, according to Agamben, is quite the opposite: “The ‘true’ 
witnesses, the ‘complete witnesses,’ are those who did not bear witness and could 
not bear witness. They are those who ‘touched bottom,’” by which he means those 
who did not survive.88 Because they are no longer living, “survivors speak in their 
stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses,” but they do so knowing that they “must bear 
witness in the name of the impossibility of bearing witness” because—of course—
the dead have nothing more to say.89 And as we confuse the categories of witness, 
we also confuse our own responsibilities to witnesses themselves. Trials and 
sentences “articulate zones of non-responsibility,” allowing for a belief the 
confrontation is either over or not ours.90 Here, clear divisions of presence and 
absence fail us, because the presence of law signifies the absence of truth while the 
presence of survivors professes the absence of witnesses. 
 While Agamben’s work grows out of the incredible trauma of the Holocaust, 
he urges writers to avoid situating the experiences and events associated with the 
Holocaust as “unsayable” or “unspeakable.”91  He does so because to make what 
happened at Auschwitz unsayable is to assert it as incomprehensible, and thereby to 
glorify it as un-knowable in its exceptionalism. Instead of fixating on something as 
unsayable, he argues for the idea that “language, in order to bear witness, must give 
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way to a non-language in order to show the impossibility of bearing witness.”92 
Furthermore, he encourages readers not to dismiss the possibility of testimony but 
rather to embrace the ways in which a lack of “complete witnesses” can alter our 
understanding of what qualifies as testimony; the absence of complete testimony 
“makes it necessary to look for its meaning in an unexpected area.”93 
We could think of this approach as Derridean approach, as I discussed 
earlier, in which the written word eclipses the spoken one, simultaneously securing 
its existence and marking its loss. We can also take Agamben’s thoughts as 
encouragement to seek out the truths of witnessing in something other than the 
facts of testimony; we should instead be looking for meaning in unexpected areas, 
and in doing so, adjusting our definitions of reliability. Reliability—or the paradox of 
witnessing an event without actually knowing, so then speaking as a witness while 
also not able to witness—is of great concern to many writers addressing or using 
witness theory, including Kelly Oliver, whose 2001 book Witnessing: Beyond 
Recognition begins with how this paradox is related to truth. She opens with a story 
about the Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, a project that began in the late 
1970s to collect stories from Holocaust survivors and now comprises over 4,000 
video-recorded testimonies housed at Yale University, which facilitates the sharing 
of such materials with researchers and the general public. About one survivor’s 
recorded tale, Oliver recounts,  
The woman reported four chimneys going up in flames and exploding, 
but historians insisted that since there was only one chimney blown 
up, her testimony was incorrect and should be discredited in its 
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entirety because she proved herself an unreliable witness… The 
psychoanalysts responded that the woman was not testifying to the 
number of chimneys blown up but to something more ‘radical’ and 
more ‘crucial’—namely, the seemingly unimaginable occurrence of 
Jewish resistance at Auschwitz.94  
 
Here, unreliability becomes a legitimate source of reality, in that the act of 
witnessing reveals different truths of experience than those gleaned from other 
sources. For Oliver, this unreliability is in fact a strength: “Seeing the impossible—
what did not happen—gave [the woman] the strength to make what seemed 
impossible possible: surviving the Holocaust.”95 Her account does not help those 
outside of the event to understand how many chimneys there were; rather, it 
produces the chimneys—the reality and the implications of their presence—for us. 
Witnessing, then, provides veracity in its very act of doing by making survival, and 
its subsequent words, present. 
Jane Blocker discusses the same story in her book Seeing Witness: Visuality 
and the Ethics of Testimony in order to position both Oliver’s account and the 
original recording by psychoanalyst Dori Laub as ekphrasis-like, in that both (and 
Laub in particular) describe the “survivor’s act of witness as a work of art, as though 
the story’s details were those of a painting or photograph.”96 Yet, as Blocker goes on 
to say, the inaccuracies of the woman’s story throw history into debate, in which the 
“image painted by this witness is, to the historian’s mind, inaccurate, unrealistic, and 
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wanting in detail…it lacks the documentary accuracy of the photographic.”97 Blocker 
points out that both Laub and Oliver are concerned with validating the woman’s 
testimony, even with its flaws, as if they themselves are appropriate judges of 
traumatic memory. But what Blocker’s critique also indicates is that the story 
becomes photographic in its repetition—told and re-told by the survivor, by Laub, 
by Oliver, by Blocker, and others, and in this way circulated like a photograph.  
Oliver’s concern with validating testimony underlines her notion of how 
response and responsibility work within witnessing. In the introduction to her book, 
Oliver states, “Address-ability and response-ability are what I identify with the 
process of witnessing. Subjectivity is the result of the process of witnessing. 
Witnessing is not only the basis for othered subjectivity; witnessing is also the basis 
for all subjectivity; and oppression and subordination work to destroy the 
possibility of witnessing and therefore undermines subjectivity.”98 According to 
Oliver, the most pivotal act of witnessing is in engaging in exchange, which affirms 
the subjecthood of both parties because it involves both parties in witnessing (one 
recounting what she witnessed and one listening to that account). Oliver’s model 
proposes a modification of recognition within the act of witnessing, in that when we 
witness something (or report on events from the past), we are only able to report on 
that thing in terms that match our own experiences; in other words, we cannot 
accommodate for that which we do not already know. Yet it is the exchange that 
brings about the “transformative power of witnessing,” since “[r]eality and 
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experience are themselves processes continually transformed through 
witnessing.”99 This exchange between subjects brings an ethical component to 
witnessing, where witnessing does not need to be limited only to trauma. Blocker 
makes witnessing an obvious part of our everyday existence by arguing any kind of 
witnessing may be traumatic, in that “to be a witness means by definition to stand 
outside events, even those quotidian events we experience directly.”100 The ethics of 
such everyday witnessing become more about exchange than confirmation or 
validation in that, according to Oliver, we are “obligated to respond to our 
environment and other people in ways that open up rather than close off the 
possibility of response.”101 Blocker clearly explains this ethical shift: “To witness is 
to occupy a position from which one is able to address another, an other whose 
responsibility is to respond.”102  
Networked Witnessing 
        With the response and responsibility of witnessing at the forefront, Blocker 
poses a question about the actual act of witnessing: “Given the political stakes of 
witnessing (of the sworn testimony’s production of reality), the moral stakes at 
work in interpreting acts of witness, and the artistic stakes of representation, how 
then should we examine and occupy the domain of witness?”103 Blocker shifts the 
terms of this question in order to examine not “how” but “who,” by situating the 
witness as a privileged subject position and going on to consider this subject 
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position in specific relation to visibility and invisibility. My answer to her question is 
that we should occupy such a domain by being attentive to the ways in which our 
witnessing is mediated across multiple platforms, and thereby networked rather 
than dyadic. Oliver’s notion of response and responsibility in witnessing is based in 
a one-to-one association. This dyad comes out of the circumstances of Oliver’s 
examples, which are primarily located in the literary and psychoanalytic—and thus 
privilege language over the visual—in which survivors of trauma are heard and 
validated by a listener. Oliver’s model roots ethical witnessing in the notion that 
subjectivity is affected by trauma, and that damaged subjectivity can be repaired 
through speaking and being heard; thus, for her, “address-ability and response-
ability are the roots of subjectivity."104 For Oliver, that address-ability and response-
ability requires the dyad, where one person is the speaker and another is the 
listener/responder, in order to generate the healing activity of witnessing. The 
“transformative power of witnessing” she references, then, is based on mutual 
recognition as the process of change. But transformation can also result from the 
confusion or disjuncture caused by the unfamiliar or even the unknown, which does 
not preclude the possibility of response and responsibility; instead, such un-
recognition can potentially uncover and subsequently validate unanticipated truths, 
or truths that are shared not through corresponding experiences but in recognition 
of the unfamiliar. 
According to Oliver, historians, who listened to testimony from Holocaust 
survivors in order to “hear confirmation of what they already knew,” only 
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complicate such a dyadic relationship compared to psychoanalysts, who were 
“listening to hear something new, something beyond comprehension.”105 This 
division is possible in the case of something like the Holocaust primarily because the 
Nazis kept such meticulous records, which historians use as primary sources to 
determine the facts that can then be compared to survivors’ stories. But art records 
are rarely so meticulous, even though art historians still frequently turn to primary 
sources in order to glean a comparable level of factual information. With that in 
mind, I question: are art historians, then, always listening (or reading, or looking) 
for what we already know, or think we know? Oliver poses a version of this 
question: “What are the effective and affective differences between listening for 
what we already know and recognize in [a person’s] testimony and listening for 
what we don’t know, or what is beyond recognition?”106 Oliver is only concerned 
with asking this question of an exchange between two people, because, again, her 
dyadic model of witnessing emphasizes recovering subjecthood. But the question 
could be productively asked of the tools I have discussed here: What are the 
effective and affective differences between listening or looking for what we already 
know and recognize in a photograph or an interview and listening or looking for 
what we don’t know? In historical evidence like photographs and interviews, what 
might be beyond our recognition? 
        Answering these questions requires acknowledging the complexity of the 
ways in which documents come to us, both socio-culturally and art historically. 
Within a documentary photograph of a performance, acts of witnessing are 
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incredibly layered: there is a performer looking at the cameramen and audience, the 
audience looking at the performer and cameramen, the cameramen looking at the 
performer and the audience, the art historian looking through the camera at the 
performer and/or the audience. Interviews are similar: there is an interviewer and 
interviewee, but also a transcriber, a translator, an editor, and a reader. Layers are 
continually added as such documents are circulated and historicized, drawing 
attention to the modes through which such facts may be delivered (such as 
textbooks, image searches, or even slide identification exams). This is indicative of 
the contemporary nature of witnessing, which is driven by desire for experience as 
well as global access. 
        Like photo theory, current views on psychoanalysis, and post-positivism, our 
understanding of a global experience economy is particularly modern. Globalization 
(a force that is economic, social, cultural, and geopolitical) paired with both 
decolonization and decentralization of geographies and governments have 
connected whole countries and single individuals in unprecedented ways. Terry 
Smith summarizes this through the lens of awareness, in saying, “What each nation 
does becomes quickly known around the world, and can have global consequences. 
Equally, no nation, however large or small, can shield itself from global economic, 
political, technological, and cultural currents.”107 Smith is drawing here on work 
done by scholars such as philosophers Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, whose 
postmodern and post-Marxist perspectives influence their proposal that 
globalization has forced a disintegration of the nation-state to make way for the rise 
                                                        
107 Terry Smith, Contemporary Art: World Currents (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
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of international alliances and organizations. Scholars such as Smith, Irit Rogoff, 
Charlotte Bydler, and Grant Kester link the impact of such a transition to artists 
making work that is transnational in its concerns and subjectivities.108 The artists I 
consider in my chapters are working just prior and firmly within the era of 
globalization, and their performance practices as well as interview subjects make 
visible the many questions of cultural exchange, national identity, and access that 
are relevant to their work. Scholars, too, bring global perspectives to their 
interpretations and at times uphold no-longer clear divisions, as I will discuss in my 
chapters, from American writers understanding Yoko Ono’s work as a direct 
product of her traumatic experiences in Japan during World War II (without, in 
general, a great deal of self-reflection as to how the United States created those 
circumstances and what it might mean for Ono to be performing certain works with 
American audiences) to Benjamin Buchloh’s seemingly derogatory remark in a 2005 
interview with Thomas Hirschhorn, in which Hirschhorn admires Andy Warhol’s 
criticality and Buchloh asks, “Is that what Europeans still think?” prompting 
Hirschhorn to respond, “Fine. You live in America.”109  
But what scholars’ writings also reveal is a fixation on experience, which is a 
concept deeply tied to globalization. When Smith says that what happens in one 
nation can now be quickly known and felt by those around the world, he is also 
                                                        
108 See: Irit Rogoff, Terra Infirma: Geography’s Visual Culture (London and New York: 
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Contemporary Art (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 2004); Grant H. Kester, Art, 
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109 Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, “An Interview with Thomas Hirschhorn,” October 113 
(Summer 2005): 77. 
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talking about an experience economy that is both global and particular in its effects. 
The concept of the experience economy grows out of research on consumer 
behavior and business management, leading to the prioritization of creating 
memorable experiences and a certain “feeling” for customers with the intention of 
ultimately providing “transformation” in addition to services. According to Joseph 
Pine and James H. Gilmore, this economy is the natural progression out of 
agriculture, to industry, to service, and now experience.110 Though Pine and 
Gilmore’s examples are mostly major corporations like Starbucks or Walt Disney, 
and criticisms of their concept include the assertion that all exchange is experience-
based and thus there is not anything so particular about this shift other than name, 
it is not difficult for us to see the ripple effects of the experience economy in art-
making and practice. In her essay on the legacy of first-wave feminism in 
contemporary practices of photography and self-representation, produced on the 
occasion of the seminal exhibition WACK! Art and the Feminist Revolution, Abigail 
Solomon-Godeau speculates about the impact of a global experience economy—fed 
by psychoanalysis, post-structuralism, and postmodernism—on our possible 
conceptions of subjecthood. About the intellectual turn that the global experience 
economy has brought about, she writes, “Although by no means universally 
espoused, a conception of a radically disunified, divided, plural, and dispersed 
subject has now become a kind of default position, even a prevailing orthodoxy in 
                                                        
110 For a more complete description, see: Joseph Pine and James H. Gilmore, The 
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the more intellectual and theoretically sophisticated precincts of the art world.”111 
Solomon-Godeau ultimately connects this to the power of feminist artists and 
artworks, which resisted a unified selfhood by exploring passivity and 
documentation against complete self-representation. She concludes, “From our 
present position in time, and given the power of the New Right and social 
conservatives, and the accompanying backlash against feminism, it is more 
necessary that we—we as feminists—recharge our batteries, so to speak, by 
recognizing the accomplishments of the women artists who, with so few artistic 
precedents to guide them, dared to challenge, mock, subvert, or deconstruct 
omnipresent regimes of representation.”112  
Contemporary artists such as Pierre Huyghe, Thomas Hirschhorn, Marina 
Abramović, or The Yes Men offer examples of such deconstruction even as their 
work attempts to create specific audience experiences through both traditional and 
new media platforms. But the origins of their practices can similarly be traced back, 
as Solomon-Godeau argues, to those of Andy Warhol, Yoko Ono, Cindy Sherman, and 
(earlier works by) Marina Abramović. Furthermore, our privileging of historical 
evidence like artist interviews and documentary photographs is a privileging of 
experience (that of the artist, the audience, the interviewer, and the photographer) 
while at the same time a willingness to rely on the networks that globalization 
makes available. Thus, we as (feminist) contemporary art historians must realize 
that the potential usefulness of witnessing is not at least entirely in confirming a 
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unified sense of self, but in recognizing and valuing the complexities of selfhood and 
self-representation, as those complexities are available to us through historical 
evidence.  
Within the experience-driven and global economy of the contemporary, the 
witnessing I identify here is what I call “networked witnessing.” My proposal 
identifies witnessing as no longer dyadic (or, at least, no longer solely dyadic) but 
instead fully interchanged through multiple platforms and people. Networked 
witnessing is still about response and responsibility, but the goals that Oliver 
identifies—recognition and validation of humanity—seem less isolated within a 
larger network rooted in multi-modal communication. Such a network requires 
variety within responsibility. We should be aware of the effective and affective 
differences that come as part of our looking and listening, rather than treating these 
tools as confirmation for what we already believe we already know. In networked 
witnessing, our first responsibility then is to look for the unfamiliar and to 
acknowledge what might be beyond our recognition. What this requires is attention 
not only to the complexities of the subjects of our studies, including artists and 
artworks (given that those complexities have built entire fields around biography 
and practice), but also equal engagement with the complexities of the objects of our 
studies, namely photographs and interviews. 
 In changing Oliver’s question to be not just about dyadic human-to-human 
witnessing but instead to be about objects and humans across various lines of 
communication, networked witnessing focuses on multiple exchanges around the 
subjectivity of both humans and objects, rather than automatically privileging the 
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artist’s appearance in such tools as primary. As networking witnessing breaks the 
dyad, we no longer promote the idea that centering the artist (or the art historian, 
for that matter) is the only valuable way to use or understand photographs and 
interviews. Instead, we value the ways in which these materials reach us as well as 
the multiple layers of witnessing happening within, on, and to them. Such layers—
personal, ideological, historical, and socio-cultural—of networked witnessing are 
central to challenging the dyadic nature of traditional witnessing scholarship, as 
these many layers realize a post-positivist approach, in which we move from 
searching for one truth to understanding any truth as related to our own 
subjectivity. In such a scenario, the historians and the psychoanalysts are no longer 
at odds, in that both are engaged in valuing subjective truth rather than confirming 
their own knowledge. 
In order to engage these layers as a way to understand response and 
responsibility within networked witnessing, I examine my objects of study—both 
documentary photographs and artist interviews—through an acknowledgement of 
the inter-view. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “interview” comes 
originally from the French entrevue (to come upon seeing), in which s’entrevoir 
means to see each other. Even with its current definition as an oral examination or 
conversation, the concept of the interview is based in mutual seeing, or mutual 
recognition. Kvale and Brinkmann draw on this origin as well, usefully defining an 
interview as “the inter-change of views between two persons conversing about a 
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theme of mutual interest.”113 But by engaging in inter-viewing, I am employing a 
framework that acknowledges and incorporates the views of many persons and 
technologies (such as the camera or the art magazine), rather than emphasizing an 
exchange between only two persons. In examining interviews then, I am thinking 
about the ways in which multiple (and multi-modal) views become inter-related or 
inter-woven through the course of a discussion. And in examining photographs, I am 
concerned with how the many views of an image—the performer, the audience, the 
cameramen, the historian—also become inter-related, with “inter-” (coming from 
the Latin inter) revealing the mutual (and again, multi-modal) exchanges between or 
among such witnesses. Both artist interviews and performance photographs can be 
understood through the inter-view. In this way, response and responsibility of 
witnessing is not limited to confirmation or validation. Even as our contemporary 
practices rely heavily on documentary photographs and artist interviews as 
historical evidence, our relationship to these tools is much more complex than 
confirmation or validation. Imagining witnessing as networked provides scaffolding 
for approaching these objects of study with a focus on the presence not only of our 
own subjectivity in any given exchange, but also that of others. 
All I Have 
If Oliver is concerned with the question, “What kind of recognition, if any, do 
survivors want and need?” then I find myself concerned with what subjects of 
interest or inquiry—what examples of historical evidence—could be categorized as 
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survivors.114 Here I do not wish to diminish the sheer extremity of surviving 
something like the Holocaust, a reality that is truly unrecognizable to me in many 
ways. I do aim, however, to use Oliver’s phrasing to think about our treatment of art 
history’s “survivors,” namely documentary photographs and the artist’s own words. 
An example helps to clarify: in her essay “Remembering Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece,” art 
historian Julia Bryan-Wilson makes an argument about how essential 
documentation is to any understanding of the now-famous performance work in 
which Ono sat passively onstage while audience members were invited to come up 
and use scissors to cut off her clothing. Bryan-Wilson ends her essay by stating, 
“Today the photographs are all we have to remember this event; and although they 
are flat relics, they are by no means mute. To conclude, I leave you with these 
images, these memories….”115 For Bryan-Wilson, the photographs are the survivors, 
by no means mute, useful in their ability to offer us memories. 
This is an odd, if not disciplinarily unusual, conclusion for Bryan-Wilson to 
draw. Obviously, the photographs are not all we have to remember this event; there 
are the instructions of the work, there is a nearly 10-minute long film of one of the 
performances, there are the experiences of the cameramen and the audience 
members, there are the bits of cloth that have been saved or discarded or circulated 
by the participants, there are frequent recent performances of the work (including 
one by Ono), there are the common inclusions of the instructions, photographs, or 
film of the work in current exhibitions, there are thousands of writerly takes on the 
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performances both from the time and into the present, and then there is Ono herself, 
who spoke a great deal about Cut Piece at the time of the initial events and continues 
to talk about the experience. I don’t think that Bryan-Wilson is unaware of these 
other “relics,” as she calls historical evidence, but I do think that she is manifesting a 
particular art historical tone for writing about performance from the 1960s and 
’70s: she is bemoaning the fact that she must write about such iterations of Cut Piece 
without having seen the work itself, because the photographs lack a presence, and 
she wishes there was just something more.  
When she says that these photographs are all we have, she is placing her 
emphasis on the all, implying that we not only desire them to be more but also that 
somehow they could never be enough. Framing such tools of the job in this way 
undermines the networks in which these objects appear, networks which we are 
ourselves are a part of, and thereby privileges them as independent truth-tellers 
that also helpfully validate the truths we use them to tell. In the case studies that 
follow, I approach understanding performance photographs and artist interviews by 
reminding myself that I am all they have. Rather than wishing they were more, I 
push myself to be more to and for them, by looking for the unfamiliar—or even the 
unrecognizable—rather than seeking in them confirmation of what I already know. I 
am obligated as an art historian to be an ethical caretaker of this evidence. We 
should not say that these documents are all we have, then, meaning that they are the 
only things that provide access to the privileged site or experience of the artist. 
Instead, we should say, act, and write as if we are all the documents have, meaning 
that we are responsible for listening and looking for the unfamiliar, and 
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acknowledging the ways in which historical evidence exists beyond our full 
recognition without discarding our ability to witness its truths. These tools have 
been used—these photographs have been looked at and these interviews have been 
read—so many times; now, our responsibility is to willingly see them anew. 
What follows are case studies organized into two chapters, one on 
performance photographs and one on artist interviews, though there is certainly 
useful dialogue between them. Certain works and artists appear multiple times, not 
only as manifestations of the repetition evident in photographic (re)production and 
interview publication, but also to emphasize looking and looking again as a method 
of art historical practice and analysis.116 From a quick glance at my objects of 
interest, it would appear I have chosen only to focus on artists already firmly 
entrenched in the canon of art history. This is a purposeful decision, even though I 
believe that critique of and intervention within such a canon is important work for 
art historians. I have made these choices because my most broad object of study is 
the networked practice of art history itself. To gain perspective, and to set a scope 
for my own examination, I must consider where the themes of art history that 
interest me—such as circulation, access, celebrity, and death—are played out across 
multiple platforms and between many people. Furthermore, my chapter on 
performance photographs includes only women while my chapter on artist 
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interviews includes exchanges only between men, a division that I did not intend 
when beginning my research. The tendency became intentional when I realized that 
it revealed: (1) the much wider acceptance of women artists when placed under the 
heading of performance or body art, and the many documents that historically and 
rhetorically confirm their place in this schema, and (2) the dominance of male 
artists’ voices within widely circulated publications, and the many systems that 
reinforce the desirability of “his own words” in print. 
The case studies here often reveal truths for which we might not have 
actually gone looking. My interest is in the ways these truths then reveal our own 
relationship as contemporary art historians to our objects of study and to the act of 
historicizing. In many ways, global contemporary art history is often concerned with 
terms central to witness theory—reality, truth, trauma, evidence, testimony—
without necessarily acknowledging a responsibility toward the tools (photographs 
and interviews) on which both witness theory and contemporary art history rely. 
Bringing witness theory to bear on contemporary art history helps to better explain 
how these tools can be used and what they reveal. Thus, the intervention I seek is to 
use the significance of exchange as proposed in witness theory in order to 
complicate the status of performance photographs and artist interviews as historical 
evidence within art history about the present and recent past. Rather than putting 
these sources and resources to the demonstrative work of evidencing the past, the 
framework of response and responsibility encourages us to respond to photographs 
and interviews by looking for the unfamiliar, thus building a responsibility to them 
as objects while also engaging in forms of validation that might happen beyond our 
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own subjectivities. The stakes of such a project are not isolated to single 
performance events or interviews, or even single pieces of historical evidence, but 
are a matter of a condition of the contemporary in which we’re simultaneously 
inundated with information and also feel as if we know nothing at all. In this state, 
how we measure the presences and absences made manifest in and through 
historical evidence becomes critical. We need methodologies for sorting through all 
of the “stuff” of art history, as Andy Warhol quips. Here, I propose and practice one 
possible methodology: that of the response that is attentive to the various networks 
at work in and upon any object of evidence, and the responsibility to seek from 
historical evidence that which we do not already know. 
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Chapter One: The photographs in our hands 
 
Nearly every art historian is familiar with the slide identification exam, that 
pedagogical practice that relies on memorization as the key factor of displaying 
knowledge. I took my first slide identification exam under the auspices of 
“Introduction to Art History,” a yearlong 200-person course offered at my liberal 
arts undergraduate college. At the end of each semester, I was asked to identify 
many slides as they were projected (by this point, actual slides were no longer in 
use, but digital images, even as the name of the exam itself persists) onto a giant 
screen at the head of the classroom. To study, I—with an almost religious zeal—
printed and affixed copies of each considered artwork to index cards, essentially 
creating a one-to-one association between the photograph of a work presented in 
class and its most basic details. For example, it was the spring of 2004 when I first 
memorized this photograph of Cut Piece (Figure 2)—the fairly famous and oft-
restaged event in which performance artist Yoko Ono sat still while audience 
members were invited to cut away her clothing. If this image appeared on the screen 
during the exam, I knew the correct answer would be the following: “Yoko Ono, Cut 
Piece, 1964-66.” 
The precarity of such a one-to-one association did not occur to me at the 
time, but is illustrative of the ways in which photographs are central to the practice 
of art history both logistically (art historians use photographs to teach, research, 
and publish) and theoretically (photographs as well as their uses have become 
objects of study in their own right). The infinitely reproducible photograph 
necessarily props up the act of memorization. Yet we know that memorization, as a 
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version of rote learning, is bad pedagogy; recognizing a specific image of a certain 
work is not the same as knowing and understanding the work or the artist. When 
confidently writing down “Yoko Ono, Cut Piece, 1964-66” in my blue exam booklet, I 
was purposefully reducing the work’s and photograph’s complications to an 
efficient list, and in doing so, refusing to register the presence of the audience, a 
photographer, or even my own status as present-day viewer of mediated 
information. 
My act of memorization was not a practice only of looking; I shuffled those 
index cards and flipped them front and bank hundreds of times. I handled these 
artworks, now all made the same scale and weight, as images that required my 
touch in order to be known. In my current study, I draw from the intentionality of 
such an art historical practice, where the consistency of the meaning of a certain 
image—no matter where it appeared in the deck—was paired with my own action. 
This action recalls Rebecca Schneider, writing in her seminal book Performing 
Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment, examines case studies as 
diverse as Civil War reenactments, medieval pageant plays, and contemporary art 
photographs through the lens of stillness and action. In doing so, she continually 
circles back to Toni Morrison’s feminist assertion that the future of any potential 
writing is “in your hands,” being the hands of the reader.117 Schneider ultimately 
develops this as an ethical message, encouraging her own readers to acknowledge 
                                                        
117  Schneider cites Toni Morrison’s 1994 Lecture and speech of acceptance upon the 
award of the Nobel Prize for literature, delivered in Stockholm on the seventh of 
December, nineteen hundred and ninety-three, published by Knopf. 
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that the “photograph or the text or the gesture is an event that takes place ‘in your 
hands, it’s in your hands.’”118  
A focus on hands for Schneider is in part about recalling the well-known and 
often-taught Bayard photograph. Hippolyte Bayard, an early experimenter in 
photographic technology, developed his Self-Portrait as a Drowned Man in 1840 
(Figure 3). After the French government officially credited J. L. M. Daguerre, over 
Bayard, with the invention of photography, Bayard composed this self-portrait as a 
sort of mourning card. On the back of the image is a note reading, “The corpse which 
you see here is that of M. Bayard, inventor of the process that has just been shown to 
you, or the wonderful results of which you will soon see.”119 Schneider explains that 
“to understand the photograph, the photograph has to meet the hands – be turned 
around – looked at from all sides. A body is thus both imprinted in the photograph, 
and required of the photograph.”120 This observation—that a photograph requires 
handling in order to understand how to look at it—is what makes the Bayard 
photograph so widely popular as a teaching tool, lending weight to Schneider’s 
conclusion: “What you do with your hands becomes the photograph.”121 This is 
reminiscent of Allan Sekula’s warning, offered in his pivotal article “The Body and 
the Archive,” about photography’s easy application toward the unrelenting 
progression of modernity, in which he cautions readers that photographs may easily 
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fall into the wrong hands when put to the work of surveillance, social control, and 
categorization.122 
Indeed, even when not in use by the government or another body of power, 
the production and experience of a photograph—the manipulation of the camera 
apparatus, the development of the image (either in chemical baths or through 
computer clicks), the passing around of school photos or sonograms—is a tactile 
one, as Margaret Olin discusses in her book Touching Photographs. So then, we must 
consider our physical as well as our conceptual distance from the photograph, by 
which I mean that we must consider our position as observers. If what we do with 
our hands becomes the photograph, then understanding how we handle and 
exchange images, again physically and metaphorically, is essential. What is at stake 
here is considering how photographs get put to the work of providing evidence, by 
tracing the ways in which photographs both drive their own reading and are read 
through various contexts. Thus, my intention in this chapter is to consider the 
following questions: In a photograph of a performance, what is lost and what is 
gained? What might we find hiding in plain sight, if we go looking for the unfamiliar? 
 The artists included here are deliberately concerned with the ways in which 
photographs document their performances. Artists themselves are in many cases 
the directors not just of performances but also of performance documentation, in 
some cases joining with other artists or institutions to create images that are 
intentionally reproduced and circulated. Of course, this is not necessarily unique to 
performance; painters and sculptors have also set parameters regarding how and 
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when their work may be photographed. But performance is a medium that draws on 
formations of “evidence” and “testimony” through its planning and practice. The 
performances I am interested in are scripted and often include notes and drawings 
(both individual and institutional) related to their execution, which is bolstered by 
advertising, art criticism, and other ephemera. Furthermore, art history about 
performance intersects eyewitness accounts with other evidence, including 
photographs, in order to build an intentionally truthful experience of a single event. 
This intersection creates an authoritative archive of the event while simultaneously 
offering up nearly infinite accounts of its unfolding.  
In order to make response and responsibility necessary to understanding 
performance photographs, my examples emphasize the layers of witnessing that are 
visible in any given photograph, once we commit ourselves to looking past that 
which confirms what we already know. First, I examine Cut Piece more closely, 
particularly in terms of its accompanying film, and then move to a pair of images, 
including one made by Cindy Sherman, printed in Schneider’s Performing Remains, 
in order to think about the ways in which art photographs appear in non-art books. 
From there, I place Cut Piece in conversation with one of its contemporaries: Rhythm 
0 by Marina Abramović. This leads to my consideration of Abramović on her own, 
with a re-look at the faces recorded during her The Artist is Present performance at 
the Museum of Modern Art in 2010. I then return, one last time, to Cut Piece, now 
through the lens of stillness and substitution, concluding with my own recognition 
of networked witnessing. Though my examples span the last 60 years, my interest is 
in how our treatment of them is particularly contemporary, in that I consider the 
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mediated platforms by which they are accessed. I bring these artworks together not 
only around Schneider’s idea of handling but also around her earlier essay “Solo, 
Solo, Solo,” in which she claims performance as being about a response to a call and 
a call for response. Both notions contribute to my understanding of what it means to 
witness photographs, and I ultimately argue that our responsibility as witnesses of 
the present day is to reject witnessing as a mode of confirmation and instead focus 
on the task of looking for the unfamiliar. 
For the photograph that is endlessly reproduced—as many of the ones I look 
at in this chapter are—we may still learn from its canonical inclusion if we prioritize 
looking for the unfamiliar, because that pushes us to examine our own choice to 
reproduce it. In being attentive to the evidence we use in the doing of art history, we 
become more attentive to that which we do not use, and therefore to what we omit, 
which angles we cut away, which voices we silence. Through my own practice of 
handling different materials, modes, and methods, these case studies converge on 
my initial questions—In a photograph of a performance, what is lost and what is 
gained? What might we find hiding in plain sight, if we go looking for the unfamiliar? 
—in order to examine the ways in which the use of documentary photographs in art 
history often produces more than it understands. Ultimately, in focusing on the 
unfamiliar, I expand our methods for using these pieces of historical evidence 
beyond confirmation—as they are so often used—to instead be about 
acknowledging the many layers of witnessing they reveal. 
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Section One – Cutting Cut Piece 
 
When I wrote of my experience with the slide identification exam, where 
“Yoko Ono, Cut Piece, 1964-66” was a potential correct answer, the photograph I 
was holding in my mind’s eye both fits this “correct” categorization and does not. 
The photograph I am thinking of is from a 1965 performance of Cut Piece at 
Carnegie Hall in New York City (Figure 2). Minoru Niizuma took the photograph, as 
an artist in his own right. He was a sculptor who moved from Japan to New York in 
the late 1950s, where he held teaching positions at the Brooklyn Museum Art School 
and Columbia University.123 Showing Ono from the back, the composition makes 
clear that she is seated on a stage, as I see the wood floor of the apron, beyond which 
there is an auditorium with lights and the faintest presence of bodies in seats. I see 
the outline of her eye socket and cheek, the bun holding her black hair, her bra 
straps digging slightly into her shoulders and spreading across her bare back, her 
left elbow illuminated but her hand in shadow. But from this angle, I cannot see 
Ono’s face; I suppose that I do not quite know that it is Yoko Ono seated here. It is 
similarly difficult to tell how much of her clothing is left; her bottom half is 
completely in shadow, providing only a guess that her clothing may be billowing 
around her waist. She looks straight ahead, while to her left a man kneels down and 
holds out a piece of cloth, flexing the scissors and seemingly moving them toward 
her. He is also in shadow, though appears to be wearing a sport jacket or full suit. 
                                                        
123 There is little available information on Niizuma’s life beyond some mentions in 
museum collections catalogues, though basic details are available in his obituary, 
which ran in the New York Times: “Minoru Niizuma, 67, Sculptor and Teacher,” The 
New York Times, September 29, 1998, sec. Arts, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/29/arts/minoru-niizuma-67-sculptor-and-
teacher.html. 
 71 
His features are entirely obscured, other than a mop of hair and a sense of nose. He 
seems to float, with no body part touching the ground of the stage, compared to Ono, 
who appears so firmly planted that she casts a long shadow that trails out of the 
picture frame. Niizuma’s photograph shows the audience member readying himself, 
the fabric, and the scissors for the cut. Niizuma’s photograph also shows Ono sitting, 
staring out into the theater, waiting for the cut. 
 The rhythms of this photograph—the contrast of light and shadow,  the 
action of the audience member and the stillness of Ono, the scissors not yet in use 
but about to be—are familiar to me. I recognize and know them through years of 
encountering this photograph in courses, books, museums, and Internet searches. 
But when I think of my looking as an interview—an inter-view—I begin to notice 
something other: I am looking but I cannot catch anyone’s gaze; instead, I look at the 
man and he looks at Ono and Ono looks at the audience and the audience looks at 
Ono and the man and Niizuma on stage, but not at me. 
My perspective changes when I encounter images of Cut Piece that are not so 
engrained that they may float into and out of my mind. Barbara Haskell and John 
Hanhardt’s 1991 book Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects includes two photographs of Cut 
Piece, both from the 1964 performance in Kyoto, Japan, taken by an unknown 
photographer.124 In both, Ono is sitting in varied states of undress as audience 
members are to her right, scissors close to her body (Figure 4). In the left 
photograph of the pair, Ono still has on most of her clothing. She is kneeling, sitting 
back on her heels, with her hands in her lap and her eyes gently closed. A figure in a 
                                                        
124 Barbara Haskell and John G. Hanhardt, Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects (Salt Lake 
City: Gibbs Smith Publisher, 1991), 90. 
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sport jacket and pants—a man, I presume—is to her right, holding scissors in order 
to cut off what looks to be a piece of the top of her skirt suit. Notably, this audience 
member is also kneeling, making himself almost the same height as Ono. The close 
crop of the photograph—which does not even expose Ono fully in width and cuts 
the audience member off at the shoulder, with a glimpse of hip and leg—is an 
editorial choice made by Haskell and Hanhardt, providing a feeling of intimacy with 
this action by getting closer to the details of the performance. But even with this 
level of detail, the dark clothing on both figures dims the picture overall, as the light 
bounces only off of Ono’s face and exposed knees as well as the audience member’s 
hand.  
 The photograph on the right shows a lot more skin. Framed in a wider angle, 
Ono is in the same kneeling position but now with eyes open, looking slightly down 
and to her right. Most of her jacket and some of her skirt have been cut away, 
exposing a white camisole. A standing audience member, presumably a woman 
given the short dress and wisp of bangs, bends at the waist to use the scissors to cut 
off Ono’s right jacket sleeve. As she pulls the cloth to cut, Ono’s shoulder is exposed. 
The light hits Ono’s face and the right side of her chest and torso along with her 
knees, her body half illuminated and half in shadow. The audience member also 
glows: the backs of her bare legs look thin and pale, the entire back of her dress is lit 
as if there is a spotlight above her, her right arm bent at a ninety degree angle 
reflects light on top and shadow on bottom, and the brightly glowing right cheek of 
her face emerges from her armpit as she leans down to cut. 
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 Both photographs privilege Ono as their focus, pairing her with the 90-
degree bent right elbows of otherwise obscured audience-members-at-work. Unlike 
the photo taken at Carnegie Hall, these two images provide no broader sense of the 
space or the artwork’s viewers. What remains consistent across all three is the 
status of Ono’s body: kneeling, forward-facing, eyes closed (perhaps blinking) or 
looking ahead, a body seemingly without emotion or response. And in the second 
two, I again cannot make eye contact with the audience members cutting, but I do 
look at Ono, whose eye I might catch, as I sit with the rest of the audience, maybe 
next to the photographer. I am now firmly one of them in my position as witness to 
the “before-and-after” effect brought about by the passage of time within the 
performance itself. 
 My change in perspective makes me acutely aware of what I call networked 
witnessing. One photograph of Cut Piece holds so many layers of viewing, happening 
between and among different apparatuses of looking, that work together to create 
meaning. Focusing on the layers just within the photographs does not even begin to 
take into account the layers upon the photographs. For example, in the pair I have 
discussed here, their inclusion in Haskell and Hanhardt’s text is framed by the 
overarching title of “FEMINISM, VIOLENCE, LIBERATION,” which runs across the 
top of the page in the text (Figure 5).125 Most broadly, Haskell and Hanhardt’s text 
sought to provide a definitive retrospective of Ono’s art practice and its various 
forms of production up to that point. Their placement of Cut Piece within “Feminism: 
Violence and Liberation” is part of a larger organizational strategy for the book that 
                                                        
125 Ibid., 90–91. 
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includes categories such as “Nature: Flux and Transformation,” “Linguistic Paradox,” 
and “Political Activism.” Their collection includes many photographs (some of which 
are previously un- or under-published) but few citations, relying primarily on a 
series of conversations with the artist. The prose is more relaxed and the 
scholarship draws a great deal from Ono’s biography as well as the authors’ 
individual impressions. The book draws on multiple sources of evidence—Ono, 
Haskell and Hanhardt, the artworks, the photographers, the photographs 
themselves—placing each of these as writers of history, as well as variable methods 
of authenticating that history—eyewitness accounts, newspaper clippings, 
exhibition and performances brochures, interviews with Ono, and (again) the 
photographs themselves. 
 In doing so, Haskell and Hanhardt’s book served to launch Ono and her work 
firmly into the academic sphere, with certain interpretations making lasting 
impressions. Most publications before this date include Ono primarily as a member 
of Fluxus, which was certainly a significant moment in her oeuvre but not all-
encompassing of her practice, which continues into the present. The early 1990s 
mark a turning point toward a much larger bibliography concerned with Ono in 
particular (rather than as a group member), with writers such as Gillian Gaar, Jon 
Hendricks, Alexandra Munroe, Kevin Concannon, and RoseLee Goldberg as well as 
texts that place Ono’s work and biography at the center of a variety of genres, 
movements, and styles. Haskell and Hanhardt’s book falls early in this moment, and 
their interpretation of Cut Piece—accomplished as much visually through their page 
header as it is textually—eventually became quite established.  
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In his 2008 article on Cut Piece, Kevin Concannon notes that “within five 
years, Haskell and Hanhardt’s rather tentative feminist interpretation has become 
dominant, cropping up regularly in the popular press as well.”126 He traces this shift 
to Objects and Arias specifically, which acknowledges the work as offering “a bold 
commentary on women” but tells the reader that Ono’s works are “far from being 
strident feminist tracts on the subordination and victimization of women,” because 
they place “responsibility of judgment” onto the viewer.127 In this feminist reading 
of the work, Ono manages to avoid stridency by de-centering her own power, thus 
implicating the audience in the politics of how the piece may unfold. But Concannon 
notes that within three years, Marcia Tanner was calling the work “fiercely feminist 
in content” in her catalogue essay for the 1994 exhibition Bad Girls, which was 
organized by the New Museum of Contemporary Art in New York and included 
Janine Antoni, the Guerilla Girls, and Carrie Mae Weems, among others. Even though 
Tanner traces the origins of Cut Piece back to the legend of Buddha (just as Haskell 
and Hanhardt do), she inserts a feminist reading in stating, “When addressing 
serious issues—in this case voyeurism, sexual aggression, gender subordination, 
violation of a woman’s personal space, violence against women—Ono invariably 
found means to combine dangerous confrontation with poetry, spirituality, personal 
vulnerability, and edgy laughter.”128 Tanner’s implication is that the relationship 
between Ono’s choice to give to her audience and the story of the Buddha who also 
                                                        
126 Kevin Concannon, “Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece: From Text to Performance and Back 
Again,” Performance Art Journal 90 (2008): 85. 
127 Haskell and Hanhardt, Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects, 91. 
128 Marcia Tanner, “Mother Laughed: The ‘Bad Girls’ Avant-Garde,” in Bad Girls, ed. 
Marcia Tucker (New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1994), 61. 
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gives freely, which is how Ono explained the work during its inception and first 
performances, is not what is “serious” about the work (a position that 
simultaneously affirms Ono’s status as “Oriental” other while also dismissing this 
identity as less important); rather, such parallels are merely aids to address more 
important issues. Ono acknowledges such a “fiercely feminist” interpretation now, 
as it has become the most common lens through which art historians think, talk, and 
teach about Cut Piece. Significantly, the strident alignment of Cut Piece with 
feminism primarily through the interpretations of violation of woman’s personal 
space and violence against women ignores the fact that the script for the work 
allows for the performer to be a man or a woman:  
Cut Piece 
First version for single performer: 
Performer sits on the stage with a pair of scissors in front of him. 
It is announced that members of the audience may come on stage—one at a 
time—to cut a small piece of the performer’s clothing to take with 
them. 
Performer remains motionless throughout the piece. 
Piece ends at the performer’s option.129 
Of course, Cut Piece can still be a feminist work with a man performing the role 
typically historically assigned to Ono, because the heart of the work—the 
performer’s passivity, the responsibility of choosing to be a participating audience 
member, the exchange that happens through scissors and cloth—remains. This 
becomes more obvious when we consider later performances of Cut Piece, including 
the one offered by Ono in 2003 at Paris’s Théâtre le Ranelagh, which was 
intentionally about forging the interaction of touch and giving as about world 
                                                        
129 Concannon, “Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece: From Text to Performance and Back Again,” 
82. 
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peace.130 Thus, a feminist reading of Cut Piece can and should certainly be about 
gender subordination or violence against women, but it need not be only about that. 
To understand the responsibilities of exchange as themselves feminist is an equally 
if not more interesting task. 
This type of feminist reading also engages the many forms of witnessing that 
are happening within the work and its documentation. When I look at the 
photographs of Cut Piece, I do see Ono sitting nearly half-naked with men, taller and 
anonymous as they move from shadows, wielding scissors over her body. I feel the 
threat to her body. I also see her body, unflinching and unscathed. And, when I look 
at or picture Niizuma’s image in Carnegie Hall, I see the photographer, so close to 
the action that any harm that could come to Ono might similarly befall him. I also 
see the audience, as witness to the entire event. Ono is watching them, perhaps 
judging them, having made an invitation for participation. Perhaps distressed about 
being the subjects of such a gaze, or unsettled by her willful stillness, certain 
audience members act. Still others do not, witnesses as much to Ono’s stillness as 
they are to the photographer’s movement. The event everyone is witnessing is not 
just Ono but this entire network of looking, action, and inaction. 
Photographs showing audience members willingly and willfully cutting Ono’s 
clothing appear frequently in texts, presentations, and museum contexts, but Ono 
has shared throughout her career that audience responses to works like Cut Piece 
were quite varied and inherently complicated, often including long pauses or 
                                                        
130 Peggy Phelan, “The Return of Touch: Feminist Performances, 1960-80,” in 
WACK!: Art and the Feminist Revolution, ed. Lisa Gabrielle Mark (Cambridge, Mass: 
The MIT Press, 2007), 350. 
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indications of discomfort. According to her, Buddhist practice especially influenced 
the reception of Cut Piece in Japan, where she notes, “It was very, very difficult for 
people to come up. So there would be very long silences and then you would hear 
the scissors cutting. There were quiet and beautiful silences—quiet and beautiful 
movements.”131 Ono’s attention to the very sound of the scissors indicates the 
significance of cutting as an action within the work. Ono actually developed a 
number of events between 1962 and 1964 that employed the verb “to decide,” 
derived from the Latin decidere, which most literally means, “to cut.”132 Art historian 
Kristine Stiles, who has a long interest in feminist performance art and written 
about Ono’s work on a number of occasions, including in the Yes Yoko Ono catalogue, 
considers cutting to be an integral aspect of the artist’s work, as to “cut presupposes 
a material thing into which one might cleave or make an incision, or trim something 
off, away, or from the real, and is therefore often associated with pain.”133 Stiles 
considers cutting as a method of removal or separation, with an emphasis on the 
result of a painful reality or realization. But cut has other meanings as well, some 
not so harsh as the ones Stiles evokes. My initial interest in “the cut” comes logically 
out of Yoko Ono’s own performance practice, though I wish to think about it across 
                                                        
131 Haskell and Hanhardt, Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects, 91. Kristine Stiles’ also 
includes a threatening story from the Kyoto performance: “a man came on stage and 
raised the scissors over Ono’s head, threatening her for a long time as if ready to 
stab her. Ono’s response was dismay rather than fear, for his gesture made her 
action more theatrical than she intended, a theatricality she avoided by suppressing 
her emotions and not reacting.” See Kristine Stiles, “Being Undyed: The Meeting of 
the Mind and Matter in Yoko Ono’s Events” in Yes Yoko Ono (158). 
132 Ming-Yuen S Ma, “ReCut Project,” in Perform, Repeat, Record : Live Art in History, 
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133 Alexandra Munroe, ed., Yes Yoko Ono (New York: Japan Society and Harry N. 
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various examples presented here. Cutting has clear associations to removal and 
pain, but these are not its only associations. When something moves us directly and 
without distraction, we say it cuts to the heart. When we have worked hard on 
something, we receive our cut of the benefits. When we are making a film (either 
actual or in our minds), we cut together the most important scenes. And when we 
are not quite sure how to feel about something because it has both favorable and 
unfavorable aspects, we will likely say that it cuts both ways. Embracing the variety 
of meanings of cutting encourages various possibilities for the meaning of the work 
itself while drawing attention to the edited state of the photographs as 
documentation.  
The photographs of Cut Piece are themselves literally cut in that they are 
cropped as well as singularly chosen out of multiple frames, but also more 
figuratively, by narrowing my field of vision, focusing me on one thing while 
implicitly and silently editing out other elements. As a historian, I cut up the already-
happened for better examination. In the case of Cut Piece, I can use such scraps as 
Ono clutching and covering her breasts, the concept of threat, and the proximity of 
male audience members as clear-“cut” evidence in support of a feminist reading, 
while the long pauses between audience participants taking the stage can be 
simultaneously edited out, left on the cutting room floor. 
Indeed, this is exactly the case in the film made by Albert and David Maysles 
of the 1965 iteration of Cut Piece performed at Carnegie Hall. The Maysles brothers 
worked together on over 30 films as directors and producers, primarily in the 
documentary style and with artists and musicians as frequent subjects. Released in 
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1966, their 16 mm film of Cut Piece is eight minutes long, black and white, and 
includes sound. But as Concannon notes, the film was not widely shown until 30 
years after its release, when it appeared as part of the Out of Actions exhibition 
program at the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art in 1998, after which 
analysis of it begins to appear regularly in texts about Ono’s work.134 It is described 
by Maysles Films, Inc. as follows: “Ono sits motionless on the stage after inviting the 
audience to come up and cut away her clothing in a denouement of the reciprocity 
between victim and assailant.”135 This is not language created by Ono, or at least it is 
not used by her elsewhere or attributed to her on the Maysles’ website. Their 
reading of the film as a climax within a chain of events, particularly events between 
a victim and her assailants, makes clear the normalization of reading the work as 
about violence against women, even though the use of “victim” here does not imply 
any urgency for intervention on behalf of those witnessing. Calling Cut Piece “a 
denouement of…reciprocity” seems closer to Ono’s original intentions of the work 
being about gift giving, a thoughtful exchange between her and members of her 
audience. But the seemingly casual reference to victims and assailants, all through 
the lens of “movie” language (as a denouement is typically specific to a film 
narrative of some sort) belies the comfortable loop of the film in the present day, 
where Ono is continuously threatened without those actions being construed as 
threatening by present-day viewers.  
                                                        
134 Concannon, “Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece: From Text to Performance and Back Again,” 
91. 
135 As described on the Maysles archival website, available here: 
http://mayslesfilms.com/film/cut-piece/. Both Maysles Films, Inc. and Yoko Ono 
retain distribution and rights of the film. 
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Throughout its eight minutes, Cut Piece the film zooms in and out of elements 
of the performance: Ono’s face, Ono’s legs, the scissors. While wider shots include 
participants, making them recognizable, the film does not provide close-ups of their 
faces or bodies; occasionally, their hands are the focus, as they cut. In listening to the 
film, we hear smatterings of sound—claps, laughter, the thud or click of shoes on the 
hardwood stage, one male participant joking that “this might take some time” as he 
cuts away Ono’s undershirt and a woman in front of the stage commenting that he’s 
perhaps “getting carried away”—but the audience as a whole remains dark, 
obscured in the shadows of the auditorium behind the photographer. In this self-
conscious revealing of the camera operator’s gaze, the Maysles draw viewers’ 
attention not to the participants as individuals, but rather to the elements of the 
performance that are essential to Ono’s script, using her body—specifically her 
face—as the center on the vanishing point for the film.  
Keeping in mind the many mediations of Cut Piece—Ono’s early insistence 
that the work is about the story of the Buddha as gift-giver, the original script 
allowing for both men and women to perform the work (and the many instances in 
which men have performed it), and the delayed public appearance of the film—I 
return to Julia Bryan-Wilson’s writing on Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece. In her essay 
“Remembering Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece,” Bryan-Wilson traces the way in which one 
specific reading—in this case, the reading of Cut Piece as definitively about 
submission and violence against women—may develop and ultimately color the 
entire historicization of an artwork. Bryan-Wilson asserts, “These statements [by 
which she means those casting Cut Piece to be about sexuality and violence], 
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motored by theories of feminine submission and masculine domination, implicate 
the audience in a series of escalating transactions, from voyeurism to physical harm, 
and present the audience as menacing, terroristic, and compassionless. There is 
little possibility in these interpretations that the invitation Ono proffers might be 
positive….”136 Bryan-Wilson does not discard the feminist reading that engages 
ideas of submission or violence, but insists that this cannot be the only reading 
produced among art historians. And again, in going back to the images themselves, 
there are certainly other interpretations available. 
Yet, for Bryan-Wilson, such a reading is particularly “motored” precisely by 
the widely circulated photographs of the performance, often used by art historians 
negatively to implicate the audience by cutting out the long pauses between 
participants actually taking the stage to cut Ono’s clothes.137 She also points to the 
idea that the work, as a score, facilitates re-workings and recurrences that are 
integrally connected to the documentation, since “with the piece captured on film, 
Ono ensured that the live event could be strung together later in a series of shots or 
watched in its entirety, thus replayed again and again.”138 Significantly, she 
additionally situates this reading in specific relationship to the documentation of Cut 
Piece, as it simultaneously reveals (Ono, breasts, a man, scissors) and conceals (the 
long pauses between audience participants) certain elements that drive its 
interpretation. Bryan-Wilson’s observation demonstrates not only that the 
photographs do indeed cut away quite a bit of the action, sometimes even the 
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presence of the photographers and cameramen, but also that Cut Piece-on-film was a 
conscious part of the work from the beginning. As the photographs of the 
performance match those perspectives of the film strip—indeed, I see that these 
cameramen are in the same places at the same times—and then these photographs 
are reproduced over and over (in textbooks and scholarly articles and museums and 
indeed on every Internet search one could perform in order to learn about Ono and 
Cut Piece), they create a loop as well that gives the impression of isolation and 
duration.    
Cut Piece as a film has distinct cuts as well, where either Albert or David 
releases the camera in order to change out the film roll. At each cut, one of the 
brothers marks the break by saying “That was number one,” etc. When my gaze is 
aligned with that of their camera’s, my perspective has forcibly shifted each time, 
from the front row of the theater trained on Ono to onstage just behind and beside 
Ono (so partially interfering with the audience’s uninterrupted view of the 
performance) to back in front. The state of Ono’s clothing changes, as well, as key 
cuts of the scissors are cut from the film. Sound goes in and out. Other cameramen 
appear and disappear in the frame. In watching the film on a loop in gallery settings, 
eight minutes becomes a lifetime of passivity for Ono, where audience members 
never stop coming on stage and her clothes cannot manage to stay intact. In the 
situation, Ono and the audience and the cameramen and present-day viewers never 
stop witnessing the event.139 Cut Piece becomes a matter of repetition: nervous 
                                                        
139 When the film of Cut Piece was shown at the Museum of Modern Art’s 2015 
retrospective of Yoko Ono, entitled Yoko Ono: One Woman Show, 1960-1971, it was 
somewhat awkwardly located in a gallery nook between a live performance of Bag 
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laughter, Ono’s wet eyes, a male participant smirking and delivering “this might take 
some time” right to the camera, the film cutting out. A seemingly endless loop of 
violence, feminism, liberation. As present-day viewers watching the loop, we not 
only hear the sounds of Carnegie Hall—including “this might take some time” —but 
also the hum of the projector. Bryan-Wilson’s motored theories become literal here, 
as we become aware of the technology that simultaneously moves Ono into our own 
time while confining her to the Carnegie Hall stage.  
But when we look for what we might not already know, we may see and hear 
differently. In watching the film over and again, I notice that it begins with the 
performance underway, and in fact, we do not see Ono at first, as she is entirely 
obscured when seated behind an audience participant kneeling to cut. The third reel 
in the film begins this way as well, with Ono seated and not fully visible. In fact, we 
do not see her face for most of the film; the Maysles zoom in on parts of her body as 
an audience member cuts, or the scissors left on the floor next to her hand, or show 
her from the back and side. This is contrasted with close zooms into Ono’s face but 
bisected, where a single feature sometimes fills the entire frame as Ono works to 
look straight ahead, with eyes open and mouth in a flat line. Jones calls the 
participants in New York “menacing and rowdy” (indeed, we hear lots of laughter 
and talking) compared to other iterations of the performance, a conclusion she 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Piece—initiated several times a day by MoMA staff as well as exhibition viewers, 
who were invited by the posted instructions to participate—and a gallery dedicated 
Ono’s “Touch Poem for Group of People,” which at the museum translated into a 
room with instructions for visitors to “Touch Each Other.” The museum’s choice to 
put exhibition attendees in these performative roles further emphasized the 
inescapable loop of Cut Piece, endorsing the film as iconic and unrepeatable rather 
than as malleable as the other works, with the climax forever centered on Ono’s own 
nearly-stripped body. 
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draws from the film as it shows a constant parade of participants, including the man 
who comments about how “this might take some time” while he cuts away Ono’s 
undershirt.140 I don’t disagree with Phelan that this exchange feels particularly 
misogynistic, though I am struck by the fact that in this menacing moment, Ono 
gestures as if to help him, including adjusting the position of her arm and loosening 
the strap on her left shoulder. She also moves her eyes and head quite a bit, 
responding directly to the presence of another human being onstage in proximity to 
her. To capture this and other exchanges, the cameramen get as close to her as the 
audience participants do, responding directly to their actions; at one point, one of 
the Maysles brothers is onstage and circling around Ono, mirroring the moves of the 
current participant. This reminds me that the invitation to join Ono onstage was not 
in fact about violating her space, but instead about marking your own presence—
through taking a piece of cloth but also through appearing in the documentation—in 
a way that goes beyond simply sitting in the auditorium and watching. 
My ability to watch the film again and again, aware of my subjectivity and 
mediated knowledge even as I look for the unfamiliar, is the difference between 
being an eyewitness and being a witness. Despite my ability to witness the film Cut 
Piece, I cannot place myself in Ono’s audience. Gavin Butt writes about this 
difference in his essay “Happenings in History, or, the Epistemology of the Memoir,” 
in which he discusses Samuel Delany’s record of a performance by Allan Kaprow. 
Butt states, “Though providing a compelling narrative of what it was like to be at a 
happening, I hesitate to use the term ‘eyewitness’ to describe [Delany’s] account 
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here because…it is the limitations which Kaprow’s work presents to optical 
appreciation which most preoccupies Delany.”141 While Butt is making a direct 
connection to the viewing limitations built into Kaprow’s design and performance of 
the work, I emphasize the word here in order to point to a larger idea of limitations 
expressed by Butt: “that happenings are ‘known of’ and not ‘known’, and that they 
are so ‘only through their dispersed traces: hearsay and gossip, reminiscence, a few 
photographs, and documents.’”142 Butt sets up, then, a difference between story-
telling (narratives such as the one provided by Delany) and traces (photographs and 
documents), stating, “These narratives are the ways in which [happenings] are 
repetitively re-enacted and through which they come to be ‘known-of’, even if not 
fully ‘known.’”143  
In the case of my experience with Cut Piece, my known-of is made up of both 
stories and traces, with the acknowledgement that even to its contemporary 
audience, the work was not fully known. My responsibility for knowledge-making, 
then, is not only to the artist and the work but also the stories and the traces, as 
Jones acknowledges in the statement previously shared, “[w]hile the live situation 
may enable the phenomenological relations of flesh-to-flesh engagement, the 
documentary exchange (viewer/reader  document) is equally intersubjective,” 
because all performances and historical evidence meet viewers/readers where they 
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are at, just as we bring our knowledge to these sources.144 This is a matter, again, of 
handling; my physical and scholarly handling of performance photographs is about 
engagement and certainly about my own subjectivity. While I myself am still, sitting 
passively in a darkened museum corner, I watch the act of cutting Ono’s clothes 
makes the hairs on the back of my neck stand, later making me think of the violence 
of history: it is not the performance or its participants but rather historicization 
itself that keeps Ono running on this significantly edited but undisturbed loop. 
But I think again about the photographs and the film in terms of response 
and responsibility. By acknowledging the networked witnessing that such 
documentation makes visible, it is possible to understand these objects as not 
purposefully offering only confirmation or validation of my own interpretation. 
Instead, the loop can belong to Ono, creating a world in which the performer truly 
“remains motionless throughout the piece,” as her aspirational instructions for Cut 
Piece first proposed. This network of witnesses recognizes her presence across time 
and space by registering what we can see. In that way, documentation of Cut Piece 
not only fulfills Ono’s original instructions but also perhaps overlaps with and 
extends another of Ono’s works, Audience Piece (Figure 6), in which performers 
concluded an evening by coming out onto stage and each watching a different 
member of the audience until that “target” averted his or her eyes, with no end in 
sight.145 Or maybe such a loop could usefully remind us of Ono’s Collecting Piece II146 
from the spring of 1963: 
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Put a person on the stage. 
Examine the person as follows in all 
possible detail. 
 
1. Weigh 
2. Measure 
3. Count 
4. Question 
5. Dismember 
6. Burn 
7. Record 
                                                                                                                                                                     
146 As printed in: Yoko Ono and John Lennon, Grapefruit: A Book of Instructions and 
Drawings by Yoko Ono (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). 
 89 
Section Two – Faux Fingers 
 In terms of art historical attention in the second half of the 20th century and 
into the 21st, Amelia Jones may have said it best: “Much ink has been spilled over 
Cindy Sherman.”147 Like Jones does in her essay for the Cindy Sherman Retrospective 
exhibition catalogue, I too want to avoid “attempting to deliver yet another, final, 
definitive interpretation of Cindy Sherman’s work.”148 Instead, my aim in this 
section is to think about Sherman in the context of Rebecca Schneider’s 2011 book 
Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment, primarily 
because Schneider chooses to include in her examination of reenacting as a 
performative historical document an image from Sherman’s lesser discussed 1991 
Civil War Series (which, for one example, is entirely left out of the retrospective 
exhibition and catalogue that houses Jones’ essay). Perhaps this lack of attention is 
because the images in the Civil War Series do not fit so easily into the ways in which 
Sherman’s images are often read through many important concepts to gender and 
queer studies: gender as performance, the male gaze, authorship, and tropes. 
Instead of costumes or sex, the photographs are explicit in showing fingers or feet 
seemingly left for dead amidst dirt and grass. They zoom in closely on particular 
parts of the body (and in fact, these parts are artificial, not Sherman’s) that—
because of the disconnection from other markers—seem to lack specificity entirely, 
rather than offering a larger perspective on what it means to be a woman.  
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Most art historical writing on Sherman traces her work in direct relationship 
to the performance of the actress and the performance of gender, through Sherman 
notes that the initial and most famous series—the Untitled Film Stills—is less about 
feminist theory and more about the roles women can play, noting that there “are so 
many levels of artifice.”149 Abigail Solomon-Godeau uses artifice to explain 
Sherman’s artistic extension of first-wave feminism, in which Sherman’s 
photographs are positioned in relationship to performance and body art practices of 
the 1960s in being about “programmatic demonstration that femininity is 
performative.”150 But this is not just about the roles of femininity or the fact that 
Sherman is literally in costume in her photographs; Sherman’s pictures anticipate an 
audience and their potential connections, performing for the camera and the as-yet-
unknown viewer. Jones reads this phenomenologically in her essay included in the 
catalogue for the late-1990s Cindy Sherman exhibition Retrospective, which toured 
internationally and also included essays by Amanda Cruz and Elizabeth A. T. Smith. 
Jones offers a more personal reading of Sherman’s work, noting this approach as an 
alternative to the copious amounts of art history dedicated to explaining and 
interpreting Sherman’s images. She argues that when the photographs are 
positioned with feminist phenomenology, they “can be seen to encourage an 
opening of the viewer/artist relation such that the viewer (or, more accurately, 
participant) ‘turns inside out,’ experiencing her investments and desires relative to 
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the figures enacted in Sherman’s work.”151 My emphasis here is to imagine 
Sherman’s photographs as soliciting participants, in that they are as much about 
viewer interaction with performing as they are about Sherman herself performing, 
and thus they may take a logical place in a history of feminist performance art. 
The image from the Civil War Series that Schneider discusses in her book, 
Untitled #242, is composed around a bloated-looking upturned hand, the fingers 
curling toward a palm that is partially concealed by dirt and blades of grass (Figure 
7). The left hand looks waxy and heavy, almost too regular in the curl of its fingers to 
be real, as it is surrounded by ground that appears torn up and worn down. It is the 
largest element in the mural-sized color photograph, which is 49 by 72 inches. Yet 
even with its size, the colors are so muted—deep reds staining the ground, grass 
that has dried to yellow shards, skin that is a transparent-blue where it reflects the 
light—that the whole image feels particularly creepy. Even know that the body part 
here is artificial, one wonders about the arm that splays out past such a hand, 
connected to a body that has been left to the earth, weighing down until it itself 
becomes the finely churned red dirt of war. 
As a scholar of performance studies rather than art history, Schneider’s book 
aims to think about the many ways in which bodies are in performance, including a 
chapter on performance in photography, where she looks closely at artworks made 
by Sherman and Yasumasa Morimura. Her assessment of these works to be about 
the gendered actress as performer is paired with considerations of photographs of 
live theater as well as less intentionally artistic pursuits, including the photographs 
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taken during the torture scenarios of Abu Ghraib. About the Civil War Series, 
Schneider says that Sherman’s images are focused on a “body [that] is increasingly 
distorted,” with photographs of “faux corpses, mostly feet and fingers that one reads 
(because of her earlier work) as Sherman’s own (whether they are or are not), 
intermingled with dirt either as if decomposing on the battlefield or trying to 
scratch up out of it.” Schneider’s interest in Sherman is rooted in the idea that her 
photographs, including those in her Civil War Series, “mimic not-quite-precise 
precedents;” rather, they are reenactments that are recognizable to a viewer as 
related to the past, even if that viewer cannot place them firmly within history. The 
value of such work, for Schneider, is that the photograph becomes not just a record 
but also a performance itself, because the photograph offers the reenactment to the 
viewer. Her work on Sherman is done in order to explain a primary argument of her 
writing: “we persist in parsing our mediums according to decidability: privileging 
remains-indicating-absence for photography on the one hand and presence-as-
vanishing-liveness for performance on the other.”152 
A focus of reenactment as central to understanding photography and 
performance is not just about Sherman’s Civil War; it is also about Schneider’s. Much 
of Performing Remains recounts her attendance at several Civil War reenactments, 
which she does in order to enter into further discussion about the ways in which 
reenactments are about how we personally remember or socially conceive of 
history. She begins with a quotation from a Civil War reenactor, who tells her during 
the course of her field research, “The Civil War isn’t over, and that’s why we fight. 
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We fight to keep the past alive.”153 From that point forward, Schneider’s work is 
purposefully cast within this fraught idea that the past could somehow be or come 
alive, that there is a particular past to be revived, and that some but not all may 
access it. The reenactor who gives Schneider her epigraph is reminiscent of Lisa 
Saltzman’s recount of the origins of painting and sculpture: “that mythic moment 
when imminent loss drives the impulse to record and remember. A body, soon to be 
borne off by the forces of history, into war, into exile, if not also into death, is 
commemorated through a sequence of decidedly visual strategies and 
inventions.”154 There is an impulse as well as a desire to fight to keep the past 
present, as if the archiving has indeed been done but that something is lost in that 
process. And certainly, these offerings by reenactors are made with a live audience 
(not the archive) in mind. 
Schneider’s book weaves together reenactors’ testimony in the form of 
interviews and anecdotes as well as photographs, which are intended to provide 
supporting evidence throughout the text. Many of these are Schneider’s own takes, 
recorded and developed as part of her field research and then subsequently tied to 
discussions of the commitment of reenactors to authentic circumstances. I want to 
focus briefly on the first example of photographs as evidence in Schneider’s writing 
about the Civil War, in order to prompt critical thinking about uses of photographs 
in historical and theoretical writing. Here, one image appears directly above another 
to take up an entire page in the text (Figure 8). Both photographs show groups of 
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men in white coats, stained with red, leaning over stripped soldiers whose chests 
and stomachs provide a surface on which saws and scalpels rest. The men seem 
engrossed in the bodies, attending to a hand in one and a foot in the other. These 
extremities are wrapped in gauze and also doused in red, as their owners seem to 
otherwise lie still. The caption to the photographs reads: “Contemporary 
professional doctors who are also reenactors, reenacting surgical procedures at the 
Civil War Reenactment Field Hospital at Hearthside Homestead, Lincoln, RI. Photos: 
Hearthside Homestead.”155 The photographs are full of information but in fact only 
loosely imply surgical procedures (both because actual surgeries would not take 
place at such events and because the photographs do not show any cutting or other 
surgical actions), but there are other indicators a hospital: the bloodied white coats 
(doused with fake blood), patients lying on tables (not really injured, or at least not 
by this fake battle), a Confederate general’s hat (on the head of a reenactor who may 
or may not be a Confederate). The photographs are rich with performance and re-
performance, real and fake, present and past, but they go un-discussed in 
Schneider’s text. They are illustrations—acting as supplements to other 
information—and therefore seemingly singular in their possible interpretation or 
meaning. For Schneider, these photographs show what they show. Or put another 
way, they indisputably show what she says they show. Textually, Schneider explains 
the complexity of Civil War reenactment and how its various roles, time tables, and 
activities lead to a crossing over and touching of times and bodies that are logically 
quite distant or disparate. Visually, the included photographs illustrate this idea, as 
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readers make a connection to real doctors in the present who become fake doctors 
in the past. Readers are led to this connection by the framing of the images, where 
Schneider relies on an understanding of photographs as illustrative and captions as 
demonstrative. 
Here, we might helpfully think of Linda Nochlin’s arguments about realism in 
her pivotal text on the subject, which asserted that the Realism movement was not 
about mirroring everyday life or reality, but that—just as in any style or 
movement—the artist’s depiction of the visible world into the art object is always a 
matter of transformation that is particular to the medium.156 Unlike the 
contemporary, about which Nochlin states that we relatively in agreement about the 
lack of fixed correlation between the universe and the media we use to describe the 
universe, in the mid-19th century, both artists and scientists were reveling in nearly 
constant moments of discovery about the world. The doctors in Schneider’s 
photographs are of both times: the present, with its seemingly limitless complexity 
in the impossibility of knowing, and the past, with its seemingly limitless capacity to 
know. In reenacting the past and acting in the present, the realism of these doctors 
does become a matter of transformation. About such an image, Nochlin would 
encourage us not to take it at “face value” or even to see it only within our own 
contemporary, but instead to grapple with its realist complexities. To do so means 
to see the doctors and patients and Schneider-as-photographer as both reenactors 
of the past and actors of the present, able to occupy multiple positions in 
relationship to history at one time. In my own looking, then, I cannot privilege what 
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I already know, which is what Schneider tells me: that these are doctors posing as 
Civil War reenactors. Instead, I see that their discoveries about how to realistically 
perform mid-19th century surgical procedures fully parallel the discoveries of the 
doctors of that time. Thus, the contemporary doctors are not reenacting at all; they 
are genuinely acting, and their actions are particular to this time. In my own 
enacting of a practice of inter-viewing, I become aware of the multiple and multi-
model types of viewing happening in just this one photograph.  
Reenacting—here, perhaps another word for inter-viewing—my own looking 
forces a reckoning of the power of framing devices. Captions often masquerade as 
straightforward explanations that provide citation information, but the more subtle 
work they do is to indicate to readers what the author considers the most important 
elements of the image, or even what the author considers obvious to the imagined 
audience of her own writing. Captions are in some ways a manifestation of how 
photographs bear the brunt of art history’s disciplinary need to produce, rely on, and 
interrogate images simultaneously; they are always under consideration and speculation 
even when used as evidence. The framing of a photograph is thus central to its interpreted 
meaning, as art historian John Tagg asserts in his 2009 book The Disciplinary Frame: 
Photographic Truths and the Capture of Meaning. Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s 
notion that the frame “gives rise to the work,” Tagg notes that a frame operates as 
an “instrumental regime…determining what is interior to it and what is exterior, 
what is internal evidence and what is background, what is text and what is context, 
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what is structure and what is history.”157 We can think quite literally of a frame 
here: that wooden structure so often painted in gold confines the painting to the 
painting and defines it in opposition to the wall on which it hangs. But the literal is 
also theoretical: the frame functions to provide definition and thereby shape 
understanding. In a photograph, the frame is simultaneously visible and invisible, as 
we can perceive the boundaries of the image even without a physical structure to 
force us to do so. For Tagg, this creates a subsequent blurriness in how we perceive 
photographs, in that the “frame thus stands out against the two grounds that it 
constitutes—the work and the setting—and yet, with respect to each of these, it 
always dissolves into the other.”158  
To trace more precisely how this works, Tagg follows an image that has 
undergone what he calls the “habits of art history” (not unlike Margaret Olin’s 
notion of the habitus of photographs, which considers the socialized knowledge we 
apply to taking, posing for, and looking at images). By utilizing “habits,” Tagg means 
that an image has been situated, or paired, with the name of an artist, a title, a date, a 
location.159 Though these are all “familiar” distinctions—indeed, my chapter begin 
with this concept as applied in the slide identification exam—he uses such 
distinctions to interrogate what we mean by framing, stating “if such framing marks 
the beginning, then [the image] began before I started to speak and was in place or, 
better perhaps, described a place in which the work might find itself and be found;” 
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in conclusion, “such a frame was always already there in advance.”160 Tagg’s 
assertion of the always already makes obvious that when we start to think or write 
about images, we do not start with nothing. This non-nothing-ness is a kind of burden 
in itself. The burden of representation identified by Tagg is not unlike the burden art 
history places on photographs as evidentiary. Photographs find themselves as 
manipulated objects in an endless loop by which they historicize and are 
historicized.  
To think back on the famous Bayard photograph, he draws attention to the 
power of framing through captions by creating a scenario in which one simply 
cannot look (at the caption) and see (the photograph) at the same time. And of 
course, one cannot be both drowned man and photographer of drowned man, as 
Bayard’s image purports to do. Amelia Jones points to the complexity of such a 
status as “the major impetus to the development of photographic technologies: the 
desire for the image to render up the body and thereby the self in its fullness and 
truth.”161 By this, Jones means that photography seemingly promised to offer not 
only a lasting picture of what was there, but also a sense of what was really there—
something that you could hold onto. In doing so, Jones speculates that the 
“photograph promised to return the represented body to some kind of authentic 
state,”162 even as a faux-dead Bayard mourns the loss of his designation as the 
inventor of photography even though he can, very impressively, take a photograph 
of his dead self. Bayard’s loss, then, is not a death of the body but a death within 
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history, his name forever replaced by Daguerre, his self-portrait un-viewable as the 
caption extols the action of handling a photograph, and thus handling authentic 
evidence of the past. For both Bayard and Schneider, it is a matter of (fake) corpses 
making history come alive, neither contemporary with 1840s Bayard, who would 
live to see the real Civil War, or 2010s Schneider, who lives to see the reenacted one. 
According to Schneider, Sherman is as much engaging in “living history” in 
her Civil War Series as the Civil War reenactors, in that both do their work with an 
understanding that “there is no precise original but a reenactment of scenes that 
might have been.”163 This is why Schneider includes Sherman’s Untitled #242 in her 
book, as it in many ways exemplifies her larger point that reenactment is not only, 
or fully, about the original, but instead focused on an experience of the present that 
accounts in some way for the past. Such a comparison is made not only in words, but 
also in pictures. Untitled #242 is printed at the top of page 156 of Performing 
Remains, on the left side of the book fold, in black and white and measuring 
approximately 4.5 by 3.5 inches. If one flips back 100 pages in Schneider’s text, there 
is a very similar image, also on the top left of the fold and otherwise identical in 
placement on the page and size. This photograph (Figure 9) is what Schneider refers 
to as the “faux finger.”164 The “faux finger,” a designation provided by image 
caption—“Faux finger. Chase Farm Civil War reenactment, Lincoln, RI. June 4, 2005. 
Photo: Rebecca Schneider.”—is a reenactment prop left on the battlefield. Schneider 
recounts how she came upon the finger and could not shake its associations, 
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ultimately driven to photograph it herself. Her concern is over several things: the 
prop’s role in the fake surgeries performed by real and/or fake doctors (alluding to 
the previously discussed photographs), the literal digital captured by the 
technological digital, the physical and theoretical pointing to the real (the losses of 
the Civil War, and those absences marked by reenactors) by the fake (the industry of 
war reenactment, and the presence of its accoutrements). She writes, “To tell it like 
it happened, I ended up sitting on the ground beside the bloody point, 
contemplating its farcical detrital gesture for quite some time.”165 Schneider was so 
enchanted by this image that she even chose it for the cover of her book, stating, “A 
digital image of this encounter now graces the paperback cover of this book as if to 
point, troubled index, at the trace of the future of the past.”166 This photograph, 
remarkably similar to the one produced by Sherman twenty years earlier, is 
evidence of what Schneider saw. It is also evidence of her seeing, her own act of 
witnessing, her commitment to telling it like it happened. 
Schneider’s book is not art history, but it is full of images.167 Photographs are 
not only integrally important to Schneider’s narrative and arguments within 
Performing Remains, but they are also intentional supplements to her own memory. 
In the same way that reenactors substitute the bodies of those lost, and thereby 
make those memories matter (as Lisa Saltzman proposes), Schneider’s photographs 
record the absence of those lost as well as her own presence. In writing about how 
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one might approach history with a particular interest in a temporality that takes 
into account both absence and presence, she states, 
To find the past resident in remains—material evidence, haunting 
trace, reiterative gesture—is to engage one time resident in another 
time—a logic rooted in the word ‘remain.’ Time, engaged in time, is 
always a matter of crossing, or passing, or body touching, and perhaps 
always (at least) double. In the two examples above (the body 
accessing material in an archive and the body as an archive of 
material that might be accessed), the past is given to remain, but in 
each case that remaining is incomplete, fractured, partial—in the 
sense both of fragmentary and ongoing. Such remaining also 
presumes a threat, a site of contestation, a fight. In the archive, the 
fight is a battle to preserve the past in its material traces against the 
‘archiviolithic’ that it might disappear. Such preservation is pitched 
toward a future in which the past might be engaged in a future 
present as a site of concern—recalling Benjamin’s famous aphoristic 
claim that ‘every image of the past that is not recognized by the 
present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear 
irretrievably.’168 
 
While I do not disagree with Schneider’s view that the obsession with the archive is 
fed by both material and immaterial concerns over preservation of both the 
immaterial and the material, I believe this passage is indicative of Schneider’s own 
slippage between what constitutes materiality and immateriality. Schneider’s own 
snapshots, published alongside artworks, reveal that the desire to preserve might go 
unchecked by either the body or temporality. Her field notes, description, and 
memory are not enough. Through images, she herself is fighting to keep the past 
alive, because the past provides evidence of her present. Time is double, then, as she 
says above, in that the faux finger is both of and representative of the body, accessed 
in Schneider’s archive while also itself archiving the action on the battlefield, then 
repeated (both visually and figuratively) by Sherman’s fingers, both of and not of a 
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body, meant to evoke both Sherman’s hand and an anonymous hand, in the past and 
the present. By looking closely at both of these photographs, I learn that even 
images that appear to be so alike may not be at all. If Schneider prompts a 
viewer/reader to think about how images can be clear-cut evidence of the “that-
which-happened”—telling it like it is, so to speak—even in the context of shifting 
bodily presence and temporality, then her inclusion of Sherman points me to the 
conclusion that how photographs move between being evidence and being art is not 
so much about their production elements, but instead about the frame of their 
surrounding context.  
In order to understand the relationship of these two photographs to each 
other as something other than that they appear in the same book, I need to inter-
view them: hold them up together in my mind’s eye, reveal that Sherman and 
Schneider are not a confirming dyad but instead challenge each other (even if 
unintentionally), and attend to their individual and overlapping platforms. I learn 
that Sherman is (and art historians are) not the only one who can tell us about the 
meaning of her work, and that Schneider can tell us about it in certain ways without 
even meaning to, and I do so by literally flipping through the book’s pages. In 
intention, Sherman’s photograph has nothing to do with Schneider’s own, but 
Schneider’s choice to bring them together through the topic of “living history” 
makes handling—my hands in action because of these other hands—something that 
keeps the past alive.  
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Section Three – Wild Pictures 
 
When Cut Piece was performed in London as part of the 1966 Destruction in 
Art Symposium, Yoko Ono felt that the scene got especially “wild”—her word.169 In 
the interview in which she discusses this, she does not fully explain what happened 
or what might have prompted such a reaction from this audience in particular 
(though multiple days of artworks dedicated to destruction might have helped). 
However, she does imply that the wildness was at least in part due to the presence 
of multiple cameras.170 This is an odd explanation, given that cameras were present 
at every iteration of Cut Piece as well as at many of Ono’s performances of other 
works. So, why would she think that cameras in this one case caused things to get so 
“wild”? 
Ono does not discuss this comment further in any other interviews or 
writing, so we do not have any evidence to help us privilege her explanation of this 
impression. But Julia Bryan-Wilson, in writing about Cut Piece, does speculate on the 
power of the camera at Ono’s performances. In discussing what she identifies as the 
often “overlooked” presence of photographers and filmmakers, Bryan-Wilson seeks 
to explain the work of these bodies as going beyond mere recording. She asserts that 
the “eye of the camera, with its reassuring presence, not only acted as an extra 
witness to the audience participation, but also authorised the actions on stage.”171 
Bryan-Wilson’s identification of the camera as an extra witness relates to my 
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definition of networked witnessing, in which there are multiple stances and layers 
of witnessing for any given performance or photograph. Furthermore, her proposal 
that this is extra layer of witnessing is what authorized the actions onstage implies 
that the act of witnessing is primarily about validation and confirmation. Not those 
filming and photographing such avant-garde artworks specifically, but instead the 
presence of cameras themselves becomes “reassuring,” in that such a presence 
implies that nothing would truly go wrong if all participants were captured on film. 
It is the filming that makes such audience participants accountable for their actions 
into the future, because the camera provides evidence of that which happened, thus 
reminding us to only do the things that we would feel comfortable looking at for the 
rest of our lives. 
Of course, there are many exceptions to this idea. Members of lynch mobs, 
often with broad smiling faces, frequently posed for photographs with their victims, 
creating tokens of memory to be both cherished and sold on the wider market. The 
torturers of Abu Ghraib posed with their prisoners as well, also offering up smiles 
and thumbs up signs, seemingly not worried about the implications of such images 
for international policy and national concern over a disputed war. In both cases, 
those people willing to step in front of the camera were so sure of their rightness at 
the time that, indeed, capturing certain exchanges on film was not only authorizing 
but also reassuring, as the resulting photographs upheld the systems of power that 
created lynch mobs and torturers in the first place. 
But what of that kind of power being displayed to the camera in an art 
setting? Even though Ono called the 1966 performance of Cut Piece “wild,” the 
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photographs taken during the evening do not look particularly different from any 
other iterations of the performance. Furthermore, the only story Ono ever shares 
about feeling threatened during performances of the work—in which a man raised 
the scissors above his head, looking as if he would dramatically push them through 
the air and into Ono’s chest (though he didn’t)—actually took place in Japan, where 
Ono also said that it was “very, very difficult for people to come up” to the stage.172  
But the presence of cameras does not always confer such a level of response 
and responsibility to an audience. For example, in 1974, in a gallery in Naples, Italy, 
Marina Abramović placed 72 objects—including a feather, scissors, and a pistol—on 
a table and provided instructions that informed audience members that they could 
use these objects however they wished. Her message included the directive, “I am 
the object. During this period I take full responsibility.”173 Over the following six 
hours, Abramović stood or sat in stillness while participating members of the 
audience manipulated her body with the available objects. Similar to Ono’s Cut Piece, 
photographers and videographers documented nearly every minute of Abramović’s 
performance of Rhythm 0, though it is unclear who produced these images; when 
reprinted, the images are offered as a courtesy of the Marina Abramović Institute, 
but Abramović’s own writing about and discussion of the work does not include 
references to photographers or filmmakers. Nevertheless, certain of the 
photographs are prolific, providing evidence that some participants played 
Abramović’s scenario out to the extreme. Such an invitation led to a widely-
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circulated series of photographs of Abramović with a gun pointed toward her neck, 
after it had been placed in her hand and then her body moved, making the artist 
look as if she was going to shoot herself (Figure 10). Several photographs show this 
pose throughout the performance, revealing that eventually Abramović’s face was 
also cut and written on while audience members (mostly men) gathered around her.  
In one image from the performance, our view of Abramović is from an upper 
corner of the room, giving the feeling of looking down on the scene (Figure 11). She 
is without her shirt at this point, which was cut off by an audience participant. 
Abramović faces the almost all male crowd, which forms in a semi-circle around her, 
most only a couple of feet away. The photographer, who is unknown (circulating 
images of Rhythm 0 are credited only with the Marina Abramović Archives if at all), 
has caught what the proliferation of photographs would suggest to be a rare 
moment: participants are looking, instead of doing. With all eyes on Abramović, with 
the exception of a small group toward the back of the gallery who seem unaware of 
the intensity of the mob, the photograph fully conveys the experience of being 
stared at, of a body literally paralyzed by the male gaze. Within the crowd, cameras 
obscure four faces, even though none of the individuals are taking the photograph 
we are now seeing. This only adds to the voyeuristic feel; there are so many eyes on 
Abramović, including our own. 
In her essay entitled “The Returns of Touch: Feminist Performances, 1960-
80,” published in the catalogue for the major exhibition WACK!: Art and the Feminist 
Revolution, Peggy Phelan writes that for Rhythm 0 Abramović “promis[ed] to remain 
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passive for six hours,” take responsibility for what might proceed.174 According to 
Phelan, this promise resulted in “a growing sense of danger” as participants became 
more aggressive with the actions incorporating the objects and Abramović’s 
body.175 In talking about Rhythm 0, Abramović acknowledges that the work is about 
her choosing to risk her body in order to see how far the audience will go. And they 
do go; according to Abramović, participants only got “more and more wild” as the 
night and performance went on.176 Solomon-Godeau connects this to larger 
perspectives on performance practices at the time, in which women were not 
passive in Freud’s understanding of the term (meaning associated with femininity), 
but instead that by staging femininity, they are “anything but passive.” Instead, 
artists like Abramović and Ono take on the role of “cultural producer and impresario 
of the aggression, misogyny, or violence she solicits or actively controls.”177 This 
type of control within the performance is echoed by control of the documentation, in 
which encounters are staged for both the audience and for the camera, and thus for 
the future witness. 
Since Abramović’s intention was to create a risky situation within the 
parameters of the performance, it is not entirely clear if those who chose to 
participate betray Abramović’s trust or fulfill the performance’s possibility, or both 
                                                        
174  Phelan also discusses this work in depth in her essay “On Seeing the Invisible: 
Marina Abramović’s House with an Ocean View,” in Live: Art and Performance, ed. 
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176 Milica Zec, Marina Abramović on Rhythm 0 (1974) (Marina Abramović Institute, 
2013), https://vimeo.com/71952791. 
177 Solomon-Godeau, “The Woman Who Never Was: Self-Representation, 
Photography, and First-Wave Feminist Art,” 343. 
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simultaneously. Things may have gotten wild by the looks of it, but the tenets of the 
performance stayed in place (just as they did in Ono’s Cut Piece at the Destruction in 
Art Symposium), though not without significantly altering the practices and 
perspectives of the artists. About Abramović but equally applicable to Ono, Phelan 
writes, “In this radical gesture of an even more profound acceptance of the 
spectators’ will than the original plan, a gesture that showed how active passivity 
often is, the performance was transformed; Abramović allowed her spectators to 
become co-creators of her work.”178 The perspective that positions participants as 
co-creators aligns with an idea that Bryan-Wilson brings up as well: scholarship on 
Cut Piece mostly ignores the “productive components of this piece—namely, that 
Ono requests the cutting and that the audience takes away something with them.”179 
Both art historians are concerned with the contract created by a performance, an 
idea not entirely resolved in terms of response and responsibility.  
Kathy O’Dell can aid in parsing out response and responsibility, through her 
concern with what types of contracts, or agreements about exchange, are created 
within performance/audience relationships. While O’Dell focuses on the ways 
specific performance artists in the 1970s incorporate masochistic ideas into their 
practices and why, she does touch briefly on the significance of photography to such 
work. She understands reproduced and circulated photographs to only ever be 
fragmentary and thereby resisting completeness, given the “deconstructive 
potential of performance art, inasmuch as any desire for traditional narrativist 
                                                        
178 Phelan, “The Return of Touch: Feminist Performances, 1960-80,” 353. 
179 Bryan-Wilson, “Remembering Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece,” 106. 
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closure will always be short circuited by the limited information available.”180 By 
this, she means that any pull we feel toward declaring an established wholeness of a 
work by utilizing performance photographs to explain its happenings is 
productively challenging: faced with fragments, we are reminded that there is no 
whole possible.  
With this lack of a whole in mind, O’Dell investigates why performance 
photographs overwhelmingly focus on the artist’s body, an idea I previously 
mentioned when discussing the photographs and film of Ono’s Cut Piece. In the 
examples of this work, cameramen do not follow a participating audience member 
back down the theater aisle or even take a photograph of the audience as a whole, 
instead staying entirely focused on Ono’s own body and documenting only those 
who come into contact with her. O’Dell calls this focus on the body haptic, to 
emphasize the significance of touch to our understanding of photographic exchange 
(O’Dell mentions records of infant deaths and small portrait frames but other 
examples include the carte de visite and Bertillon’s criminal portraits, among 
others). By haptic, she means that “[e]ncountering the shared ontology of the body 
makes the viewer mindful of his or her own physical presence as witness to the 
pictured event (even if it is well after the fact).”181 This physical tangible exchange 
between artist and audience is what O’Dell refers to through her book as a contract. 
I draw on this here because of the proximity of O’Dell’s discussion of a contract to 
the idea of witnessing (which in fact goes un-discussed throughout the rest of 
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181 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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O’Dell’s text). O’Dell’s reference to witnessing as fundamental action of interacting 
with a photograph proposes what many assume: the very act of looking at a picture 
is really an agreement to engage not only with its materiality but also with its 
content. To take this a step further, it is possible for a viewer to witness a pictured 
event, even well after its taking place, precisely because of the layers of bodily 
presence that photography conjures. This exchange is then not only about bodily 
presence, or response, but also about responsibility, in that the ontology becomes 
shared; the terms of the contract are accepted. 
Shared responsibility—even around one individual’s body—does and should 
make us think again of Schneider, who troubles a definition of “solo” as singular by 
thinking about jazz and blues music, in which a solo taken by any given performer is 
rooted in collectivity; indeed, solos “bleed into each other, react to each other.”182 In 
elaborating on the exchange in such a process, she states that a contract develops 
“as an artist makes a call and another responds and another responds to that 
response as a call and a response is made which, again, becomes a call citing, or 
reciting, a response as call.”183 Many calls draw forth many different kinds of 
witnesses because it provides opportunities for many responses, creating contracts 
between not just those who choose to participate in cutting Ono’s clothing or 
Abramović’s face, but also those who watch these actions of others, both in the 
present and well after the fact.184  
                                                        
182 Schneider, “Solo, Solo, Solo,” 37. 
183 Ibid. 
184 As far as I know, the “contracts” I am discussing here—those forged between 
performers and audience members that carry the potential for violence or 
violation—have been artistically but never legally tested. For example, Abramović 
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It is often too easy, well after the fact, to tend to any performance work as if it 
was presented in a vacuum, rather than fully wrestling with the idea that it most 
likely had an audience willing to engage in the complexities of live performance. 
During the evening at Carnegie Recital Hall, Ono performed Cut Piece along with Bag 
Piece (in which Ono and a male assistant crawled into a huge black bag, removed 
their clothes, and did something presumably though not necessarily sexual inside), 
Strip-tease for Three (in which three wooden chairs were spotlighted on an empty 
stage), Snake Piece (in which an announcement was made that a snake had been let 
loose in the auditorium), and Clock Piece (in which a clock was placed onstage and 
the audience was told that the performance was over when the clock alarm went 
off).185 And while in London, where—we are told—things got especially wild, Cut 
Piece was one work among many performed by artists interested in the themes of 
destruction, anti-art, and violence, including Otto Mühl and Hermann Nitsch. In this 
way, Cut Piece was always presented among performances that required at least 
some sort of audience participation, implicated the responsibility of audience 
members, and proceeded without clear parameters of what would happen and 
when the events would conclude.  
I want to return then to the Cut Piece film, where the Maysles brothers’ 
documentary style dictates that they are present in the work—see-able by both Ono 
and the audience—while also acting outside of the script’s instructions. When the 
male participant turns to the audience, smiles, and says, “This might take some 
                                                                                                                                                                     
did not pursue legal action against those audience members who cut her skin or 
posed the gun to her head. However, it is interesting to speculate on the possibility 
of such a performance contract having legal obligations or ramifications. 
185 Haskell and Hanhardt, Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects, 29. 
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time,” he is not just talking to Ono or the audience but also to the camera; in fact, he 
looks right at it while speaking. The woman who worries that he is “getting carried 
away” sounds as if she is right next to the person filming, and thus providing a type 
of voiceover (a narrativizing of the events on stage/screen) that expresses not only 
the concerns of at least some of the present audience members but also those of the 
future. The man is performing, then, for an audience throughout time, and he knows 
it, while the many cameramen around him document without interceding. This is 
because the cameramen understand their role as witnesses to be recorders. The 
audience witnesses by being both participants and non-participants, even as they 
are all viewers. Ono’s role as witness is dedicated to being present through stillness. 
And my role as a witness in the contemporary is to be attentive to these many layers 
and to commit to looking at the photographs when I write about them, rather than 
simply know that they are there. Such a case makes clear that the contracts 
established by performance artworks and photographs are examples of networked 
witnessing, in which witnessing is not only listening and thus validating, but also 
can take on many other forms. 
As for Abramović, audience participants did eventually intervene to remove 
the gun as an object to be manipulated; as Phelan puts it, “Abramović accepted their 
care.”186 But otherwise, the contract was carried out for the full six hours, before 
Abramović’s body became a presence other than passive once again. In talking about 
the work, Abramović noted that when it ended and she began to move, the audience 
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ran away, now scared or intimidated by her.187 She had witnessed the extremities of 
the willingness of her participants, and in the end, the participants witnessed their 
own guilt or fear; famously, Abramović has said that what the performance taught 
her is that “[i]f you give [the audience] total freedom, they will become frenzied 
enough to kill you.”188 Such images remind us that our bodily limits are in fact 
mutually created, rather than individually determined. Thus, I feel a responsibility 
to attend to the ways in which the discomfort or even the disgust that the 
photographs of Abramović elicit in me are, in a way, an assumption about the 
potential power of the performance. I am comfortable in my discomfort with the 
audience’s actions, but I am much less comfortable when I contemplate that such 
actions can be made unfamiliar, and therefore positive: Abramović asked her 
audience to follow through, and they did. All sides satisfied the contract. The 
historical evidence not only shows the ruthlessness of some audience members but 
also the success of the performance itself, and the photographs testify that even the 
audience’s overwhelming presence cannot erase that of Abramović herself, who is 
still able to step forward and make them all run away. 
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Section Four – The Eyes of Those Who Have Seen 
The Museum of Modern Art in New York showed documentation of Rhythm 0 
almost 40 years after the performance, as part of their museum-wide retrospective 
of Abramović’s work. Gallery after gallery included photographs of Abramović from 
all ages, reflections on her biography, objects from almost 50 years of previous 
performances, related ephemera, and films, videos, and photographs of the 
performances. In the (literal) middle of it all was Abramović herself, performing The 
Artist is Present, where for over 700 hours the artist sat in stillness with the 
invitation for people to come and sit with her, looking into her eyes as they did so 
(Figure 12). Much has been said about this performance work in the popular press 
as a feat of bodily control, concentration, and audience engagement—all readings 
that fit into overarching interpretations of the artist’s oeuvre, as Abramović is now 
famous for her durational works that push the boundaries of body and mind.189 The 
Artist Is Present was in some ways a return to Abramović’s first long-durational 
work, Rhythm 0. But to say that the artist is present, to give the collection of 
Abramović’s work as well as this specific performance that name, forces the 
question: What is the difference between the artist being present, and the body of 
the artist being present? How would we know? Does such a difference matter? 
I did not “sit with Marina,” as it became known in those heady months of 
spring 2010, but Amelia Jones did. She writes in an article about artist reenactments 
and presence, 
                                                        
189 For a more complete discussion of this work in relationship to Abramović’s 
oeuvre, see Carrie Lambert-Beatty, “Against Performance Art” in Artforum, May 
2010, 208-213. 
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[A]s someone who sat across from Abramović in the atrium of MoMA, 
surrounded by a barrier like a boxing ring, itself surrounded by 
dozens of staring visitors, cameras, and lit by klieg lights, I can say 
personally I found the exchange to be anything but energizing, 
personal, or transformative. Though I felt aware that the person I have 
met and whom I respect as an artist and cultural force was sitting 
there before me, I primarily felt myself the object of myriad individual 
and photographic gazes (including hers), and the experience overall 
was very strongly one of participating in a spectacle—not an 
emotionally or energetically charged interpersonal relation, but a 
simulation of relational exchange with others (not just the artist, but 
the other spectators, the guards, the ‘managers’ of the event).190 
 
Such a simulation of relational exchange is a type of the networked witnessing I 
have proposed. The dyadic framework of witnessing would insist that the 
relationship here is between Abramović and the sitter, where the trauma of the 
everyday becomes unspoken common ground for both participants, leading to a 
validating emotional exchange. But even as The Artist Is Present physically creates 
such a scenario, it denies it all the same. The dyad is completely fragmented; as 
Jones notes, it is her and Abramović and then also the crowd encircling the space, 
the employees of the museum, and the camera. Beyond that, it is me and every other 
viewer who accessed the individual portraits of those who sat with Marina, 
published on MoMA’s Flickr account dedicated to the event.  
In uploading a portrait of every single participant in The Artist is Present to 
Flickr, a website intended for photo storage and sharing, the series includes over 
1,500 photos that have at the time of this writing been viewed approximately 1.5 
                                                        
190 Sean O’Hagan, “Interview: Marina Abramović,” The Guardian, October 2, 2010, 
sec. Art and design, 
http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2010/oct/03/interview-marina-
Abramović-performance-artist. 
 116 
million times.191 It is composed of one photo for each instance (as several attendees 
participated more than once) of a visitor to the museum who sat across from 
Abramović during the performance, click-able and scroll-able in chronological order 
(Figure 13). At the time of the exhibition, the Flickr collection became the 2010 
version of a viral hit, circulating among those in and outside of the art world, often 
met with recognition (prompting exclamatory identifications such as “There’s Lou 
Reed!” or “That’s Aggie Gund.”) as well as some snickering. Indeed, the exhibition 
was such a popular activity that spring that both a blog and Facebook group were 
launched specifically for those seen “crying with Marina.” 
Clearly, it was MoMA’s intention to collect these images from the beginning; 
light screens and cameras were installed before the exhibition’s opening and the 
museum confirmed noted photographer Marco Anelli to do the clicking. The 
museum also dictated a certain look for these photographs, all taken from the same 
angle and cropped around the head of the participant. But I wonder: what, in fact, 
are these photographs showing us at the time of the exhibition? And furthermore, in 
what way do they continue to act as evidence now? And when will they be installed 
on the walls of a museum, as simultaneous documents and artworks themselves? 
The latter has already to some extent been answered, in that the photographs 
were featured in the 2012 exhibition Portraits in the Presence of Marina Abramović, 
at Danziger Gallery in New York City. The show included a selection, not all, of the 
images along with an accompanying publication. The gallery press release makes a 
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comparison between Anelli’s work and that of Walker Evans’ Subway Series, in that 
The Artist is Present “speaks to photography’s capacity to explore the human 
experience from an unobserved viewpoint.”192 But Carrie Lambert-Beatty, in her 
2010 article in Artforum on the work of Marina Abramović, does not fully buy this 
idea, in part because the process is far from unobserved (even if participants are not 
specifically paying attention to the photographer), as Jones experienced. Lambert-
Beatty describes the setting as incredibly intentional: “Batteries of light shine down 
on the artist from the four corners of a stagelike square around her table. A guard 
polices the queue of acolytes waiting their turn to be in her presence, allowing one 
person at a time into the sanctum sanctorum.”193 This turns the idea of presence 
into something entirely based in spectacle, where the “cultural forms evoked by this 
scene are either grandiose (the pope) or absurd (shopping-mall Santa).”194 Lambert-
Beatty stresses that this is primarily achieved by the emphasis placed on Abramović 
being in place before the museum opens to the public and staying in her seat beyond 
its official day-end closing, asking, “Why would it matter if we saw her walk into the 
room and sit down at the table? All it could possibly do is make her seem like an 
ordinary human.”195  
 The terms of the contract of The Artist Is Present were, in many ways, 
overwhelmingly met. Abramović did not leave her seat for the entire duration, and 
participants lined up by the hundreds and thousands on each day. What the massive 
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amount of documentation records—in its very weight, its repetition—is the mostly 
agreeable and non-threatening participation of the audience. Abramović’s body and 
attention—indeed, her passive presence—has become sacred, no longer vulnerable 
to threatening manipulation. Instead, participants who once channeled her 
vulnerability into a drive for control (such as placing the gun to Abramović’s neck or 
cutting her face) are now driven to tears. Those tears become the truth of the 
performance, paralleling the photograph showing a 1974 Abramović with her 
forehead cut and her cheeks stained and glistening from her own tears. Unlike 
Evans’ series, in which the photographer snapped candid photographers of New 
York City subway riders unknowingly and without their consent in order to create a 
cross-section of American urban life, the portraits of Abramović’s interlocutors are 
purposefully meant to look the same, creating one emoting mass rather than 
differentiating human response. As evidence, they are entirely produced—
fabricated by multiple layers of artist and institution for the purpose of 
accumulation. 
 Such layers of witnessing are not only obvious in the experience of the work, 
as Jones details. Running in parallel time, the layers of a social media platform 
illustrate exactly how Abramović is indeed not present, but instead entirely 
mediated with no clear authorial distinctions. Anelli receives credit on MoMA’s 
Flickr page, where users write in commentary on the individuals depicted (and 
these annotations—footnotes, if you will—contain everything from website links of 
pictured artists to ratings of women based on their looks). The photographs have a 
certain uniformity that feels like it could lead to analysis, not unlike Allan Sekula’s 
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negative conclusions about photography, empiricism, and state surveillance using 
the examples of Alphonse Bertillon, a 19th century Paris police official who 
developed a quickly accessible filing system of portraits of criminals, and Francis 
Galton, whose system of taking hundreds of portraits of individuals considered to be 
on the margins of society with the aim of developing an identifiable physical type 
that could be associated with undesirable behavior or attributes.196 Though they 
may not show us the typical viewer of Abramović’s MoMA exhibition, they are 
certainly about a type of connection, even though Abramović and the participants 
are never pictured together; rather, the participants are isolated, floating heads cut 
off from their bodies if not from their emotions.  
Masking all of these individuals in photographic similitude (a Marina 
museum without walls, perhaps?) provides very little evidence of what actually 
happened. Yet at the same time, the sheer quantity of the pictures of those sitting 
with Abramović—as well as their copious tears—seems to testify to the power of 
the performance. In this case, it is difficult to linger over the images in order to draw 
out their un-familiarities; the format of their presentation encourages mass 
consumption and substitution. As a viewer choosing to buy into such a format—
specifically, access to so many images of those who sat with Marina—I feel entitled 
to demand from the photographs a sense of what it felt like to “be there,” to sit with 
this artist, while at the same time thinking of them as staged, overwrought with 
emotion that becomes rehearsed rather than elicited. But in viewing them, I get 
stuck in another loop: up close but too far. The truth I find here is in fact the 
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repetition and continued circulation of Abramović’s own celebrity, a notion already 
established by the artist’s relentless publicity machine as well as her strict protocols 
surrounding any reenactment or re-staging of her performance works. As Jones 
notes, the entire “concept of presence” becomes dependent on documentation.197 
And pages into the Flickr site, Marina herself is entirely absent, with her own image 
replaced by the bodies of her viewers who are in turn substitutions for others 
viewers as well as the performance experience itself: sitting, waiting, looking. 
But in reminding myself to look for not just what I already know, I am struck 
by several things. The occasional smile of a participant, instead of tears, reminds me 
that within the performance there was room for plurality. The repetition also makes 
me aware of the craft of photography, such as the ability to identically light and 
frame each individual, thereby drawing attention to the hundreds if not thousands 
of photographs that must have been discarded be Anelli and/or the museum. In this 
way, the repetition actually reminds me that each photograph is entirely singular, 
made to represent a feeling of an entire sitting session or an entire exhibition, but in 
fact only offering a second of that time. With this perspective, I learn that the work 
itself or Marina herself is not so completely monolithic, but instead made up of all of 
these small parts—these thumbnail faces—in order to merely appear 
encompassing. The documentation denies Marina’s presence through its very form, 
relying instead on the notion that accumulation (of faces, of historical evidence) is 
akin to knowledge. In a way, MoMA’s Flickr site makes for a peculiar slide 
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identification exam, in which every photograph is technically different even though 
the right answer is always “Marina Abramović, The Artist is Present, 2010.” 
Staring at so many crying eyes prompts me to recall Barthes, who when 
looking at an 1852 photograph of Napoleon’s youngest brother Jerome, saw not a 
picture or even a substitution of Jerome, but instead saw “eyes that have looked at 
the Emperor.”198 Indeed, I look at these pictures and understand that I have not seen 
this performance, or even Marina, but I have seen the eyes of those who have seen 
Marina. I have gained a literal glimpse into the experience of the performance, 
which is primarily made up of other people’s experiences instead of my own. The art 
historical purpose of these photographs, then, is to provide a privileged viewing of a 
scene not otherwise visible, and thereby an account of the “complex performance” 
of taking these photographs.199 I access their purpose through the habitus of the 
photographs—the click, the scroll—that requires a type of technological handling. 
Indeed, in this case, Olin is correct: “how photographs look may be less central to 
their habitus than how people look at them. Or how people refuse to, fail to, or 
simply do not look at them.”200 The use of these photographs is in recognizing the 
pose as validation of the event, where we are inundated by the presence of audience 
members who are contained within the parameters of the performance, even as the 
documentation makes Marina’s own body absent.
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Section Five – Still on the Move 
Both Rhythm 0 and The Artist is Present make transparent that the stillness of 
Abramović’s body is not about passivity; instead, stillness becomes action through 
networked witnessing, in which not only the artist but also the audience, 
photographers, and future viewers are made aware of the presence and absence of 
bodies. The distinction between action and stillness is another false dichotomy, such 
as liveness and documentation, that writers within performance studies—many of 
which I’ve discussed here—have adequately challenged so as it make it a now 
impossible assumption. In her discussion of the division between action and 
stillness in Performing Remains, draws on Konstantin Stanislavsky’s An Actor 
Prepares, a book of exercises focused on creating bodily awareness and perception. 
The text includes a Platonic exchange between teacher and students, in which the 
Director-as-teacher affirms that one “may sit without a motion and at the same time 
be in full action.”201  
Ono sits in Cut Piece without a motion or even obvious emotion, but her 
stillness as the actor is an integral aspect of the work. And it is this stillness that 
photographs (and photographers) both capture and convey in depictions of Ono’s 
passive sitting while surrounded by activity. This makes Ono’s performance in Cut 
Piece photographic in its stillness while simultaneously performative in its action. 
Ono’s stillness is a method of suspension that crosses between both performance 
and photography, allowing access to an understanding of how performance may 
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indeed capture time (as Ono sits, passive, waiting) and a photograph may in fact 
make time vanish (all of the actions of the performance —Ono sitting, cutting 
clothes, audience participation—collapsed into one definable and seemingly easily 
contained moment).202 In this way, then, the performance is not linked to action and 
the photograph is not linked to record, with the assumption that a record provides 
that otherwise elusive but necessary evidence. By treating the images as already 
familiar, I have learned to see Cut Piece, by which I really mean “Yoko Ono, Cut Piece, 
1964-66.” In the same way that I cannot un-read the captions Schneider includes 
with her photographs, I cannot return to some time in which I knew of Cut Piece 
through anything other than photographs, surely a symptom of André Malraux’s 
observations about “the museum without walls.” As a French public intellectual 
during the time of Charles de Gaulle, Malraux’s museum without walls explains 
photography as central to creating an art history in which the context of an artwork 
becomes secondary to the ability to picture the work of art in one’s mind’s eye, 
whether or not one have seen it in a museum (or, in this case, seen a “live” 
performance). Malraux’s oft-cited text was subsequently taken up by Douglas Crimp 
in his seminal essay “On the Museum’s Ruins,” first published in October in 1980 
before being anthologized with many of his other writings in a 1993 book of the 
same title. Through tracing a history of the formation of the museum, Crimp pulls 
the practices of the 1960s and 1970s forward in time in order to place photography 
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as a counter to painting.203 As Crimp notes in his text almost thirty years after 
Malraux, “Any work of art that can be photographed can take its place in Malraux’s 
supermuseum. But photography not only secures the admittance of various objects, 
fragments of objects, details of objects to the museum, it is also the organizing 
device: it reduces the now even vaster heterogeneity to a single perfect 
similitude.”204 Over the course of his career, a concern about the homogeneity of the 
museum is an ongoing issue for Crimp, who argues consistently for understanding 
the museum space as one that appears to be the natural repository—or home—for 
artworks but is in fact highly constructed and problematically “universal.” 
Crimp’s form of institutional critique is more pressing, as it becomes 
common “best practice” for museums to collect documentary photographs, 
particularly of performances, and display them as artworks. In arguing that the act 
of photographing artworks is what makes them place-able—and thereby know-
able—within museums, Crimp also makes reference to the academy. This type of 
universalizing of images is obviously central to the practice of memorization that 
disciplinary practices in art history often require, including the slide identification 
exam I already discussed. As he says, “The art historian’s slide lecture and the art 
history student’s slide comparison exam inhabit the museum without walls,” by 
which he means that the practice of teaching art history through memorization is 
                                                        
203 Here, Crimp’s argument is influenced by Walter Benjamin’s concept of the “aura” 
of a work of art that dissipates in its photographic reproduction, as discussed in the 
Introduction. 
204 Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993), 54. 
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yet another iteration of Malraux’s vision of endlessly circulating reproductions.205 
Crimp’s example is about the ability to compare Gustav Caillebotte and Robert 
Ryman, but my own earlier mention of “Yoko Ono, Cut Piece, 1964-66” is just as 
relevant, since Crimp’s point is that photographs have the ability to stand in for 
something else (an artwork, an event, an experience, a person). The pedagogical 
practices of art history as a discipline force works to exist within a museum without 
walls, in that photographs create opportunities not only for comparisons that could 
or would not otherwise be made but also for substitutions. 
The most reproduced and circulated photographs of Cut Piece do 
masquerade as substantial substitutions and totalities, both standing in for a 
person/event (as Saltzman argues they are capable of doing) and encompassing all 
of the elements dictated by Ono’s script as essential to the work. But what the 
photographs in fact offer is what Gavin Butt calls an “elusive totality,” or an optical 
engagement with a subjective experience that cannot be completely known, in the 
positivist sense, through seeing.206 Instead, viewing these photographs is a practice 
of “situated seeing”, in which knowledge is understood to be mediated, in this case 
via both technology (photography itself and the camera as an apparatus) and 
subjectivity (the limitations of embodiment, the possibilities of many 
                                                        
205 Ibid., 54–55. We may think back, too, to Malraux’s remark that “Our feeling for a 
work of art is rarely independent of the place it occupies in art history.” See: André 
Malraux, The Voices of Silence (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1953), 52. 
206 Butt, “Happenings in History, Or, the Epistemology of the Memoir,” 121. Butt’s 
concept of “elusive totality” appears concurrently with post-positivism, providing 
another angle on the way in which truth exists but always in a mediated and non-
objective form. 
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perspectives).207 To understand the intersection of technology and subjectivity that 
photographs present, I embrace a Derridian approach previously discussed: the 
supplement creates space in which the present and the record of the past exist at 
the same time. The appeal of an actual totality, as compared to an elusive one, as a 
method for stilling performance ultimately unravels, even as the photograph seems 
effectively to illustrate both the present and the record. This is not unlike the body 
itself in performance, which Peggy Phelan argues is always about supplementarity: 
“performance uses the body to frame the lack of Being promised by and through the 
body—that which cannot appear without a supplement.”208 Phelan means that 
complete knowledge of the subject is never available, even when the body is offered 
up to us for our viewing and manipulation. The performing body is its own 
supplement to being, just as documentation is its own supplement to performance. 
Supplementarity becomes a matter of representation, then, both in the moment and 
in further interpretation and contextualization. 
The photographs of Cut Piece, not necessarily the performances themselves, 
permit the work to enter a broader art historical discussion, as they can be 
memorized, presented, published, and analyzed. Ultimately, Cut Piece itself becomes 
an apt commentary on history. Not only is the artwork always already given over to 
history in the planning on its documentation, but Ono makes herself into an object 
of study also, establishing a relationship with the audience that is always already 
(art) historical in nature. While Ono is steadfast in her objecthood, the audience 
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goes about choosing a path of participation, which for some involves making or 
taking cuts. Despite the proliferation of images showing the scissors in someone’s 
hand, many audience members chose not to cut at all. What the work does, then, is 
make visible—on different bodies in different moments across time—individuals’ 
modes of thinking or their personal desires. Cut Piece invites, even requires, this 
type of embodied acting out in public revelation of one’s actions. And ultimately, as 
in history, some moments are preserved while others are discarded. Thus, art 
history recycles the same picture of the man holding the scissors as substitute for 
the event, without memorizing or analyzing or teaching or publishing a different 
photograph—which I often wish to be out there somewhere—of the quiet, 
potentially tired (these were often long evenings), maybe stunned audience, all 
staring back at us after they have been told what to do, deciding which path they 
will each take. In this way, use of the photographs of Cut Piece itself becomes 
evidence of a disciplinary desire to make photographs evidential.  
Of course, the photograph I have proposed above is imaginary. Or perhaps it 
isn’t, since I highly doubt that every photograph of every performance of Cut Piece is 
in some form of circulation—so at points I meditate on the idea that such a 
photograph is trapped in a film canister in someone’s attic, as undeveloped as the 
argument that could be made with it as evidence. But I think equally as much about 
a rarely published photograph, made visible in Haskell and Hanhardt’s retrospective 
book on Ono (Figure 14). 209 Minoru Niizuma took it on the night of Ono’s New York 
performance of Cut Piece, though it does not show that work, or even Ono. It shows a 
                                                        
209 Haskell and Hanhardt include this photograph in the "Early Performance Works" 
section of their book, Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects. 
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woman bending down to examine something on the ground, a small square-ish 
object with some kind of face on it, seemingly placed alone on the big wooden stage 
of Carnegie Recital Hall. From Haskell and Hanhardt’s text, we learn that this 
photograph was taken during Clock Piece, the final work performed that evening, 
during which a clock was placed at the center of the stage and the audience told that 
the piece would end when the clock’s alarm rang. Upon investigation, audience 
members realized that the clock had neither arms nor an alarm. Perhaps that is why 
the woman in this photograph has her coat on; it is the end of the night and it should 
be the end of the show, but the dysfunctional clock (or maybe purely non-functional 
clock, or even non-clock, since what is a clock that cannot tell time?) holds the 
audience hostage. 
But behind the woman is my real interest, my punctum. Just over the curve of 
her behind is visible a figure standing about ten feet away from her, whose body is 
mostly in shadow due to his posture, peeking out from behind the stage curtains. His 
face is also obscured, but not because of the light. Rather, he is holding up a camera, 
with one finger on the shutter and the other hand focuses the lens. He is 
photographing the same thing that I see now, but from the other side. He can’t see 
me but I am caught in his shot, able to make eye contact with the camera, equally 
invested in poring over this woman poring over this clock. This man is 
photographing me, in 2016, all the way from 1965. 
When I identify this part of the photograph as the punctum, I am taking into 
account Olin’s elegant dismantling of Barthes’ punctum within the James VanDerZee 
photograph discussed earlier. In reviewing this mistaken moment of Barthes, Olin 
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makes a strong case for the punctum as a moving target, remarking, “the punctum 
may be the composition; the punctum may be forgotten; the punctum may be in a 
different photograph.”210 Within this discussion, she concludes that the “punctum is 
the detail that is not there, or that one wishes were not there…present within its 
absence.”211 In my case with this photograph of Ono’s Clock Piece, the punctum 
prompts me not to wish that something was not there but rather to long for some 
things to be there, to envision and pursue an altogether different photograph from 
the one in front of me. I do not see the photographer’s face and I am not sure of his 
name. I do not even have his picture (in that I have neither his own face nor the 
photograph he takes himself). His presence is marked by further absences. 
The layers of this photograph are as visible—once one really stops to look for 
them—as those that I discussed about the widely circulated photographs of Cut 
Piece: the audience member (who has chosen to participate by coming up on the 
stage) looks at the face of the clock, the audience looks at the face of the clock as 
well as the woman and multiple photographers (whose faces are obscured by their 
instruments), and the photographer’s camera is pointed toward my own peering 
face (even though I know I can and never will appear in his photograph). These very 
layers make obvious the nature of networked witnessing, in that each of the 
witnesses I just named have different responses to the work as well as different 
responsibilities to those responses. The punctum is, in this way, a version of the call 
for response—the detail that is not there or that one wishes were not there. The 
presence that marks both absence and unexpected presence. Such an exchange 
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cannot rely on confirmation, because there are too many different viewpoints to 
provide. Instead, by exposing the unfamiliarly emphasized presence of the 
photographer alongside the noticeable absence of the artist’s body, my 
responsibility is to validate the photograph through consideration of its many 
witnesses. Thus, in one clicked moment that we can now see again, the invisibility of 
one frame frames the visibility of another, unmooring the canonized perspective of 
Cut Piece by forcing recognition that these images are directed, collected, and 
produced, and thereby networked. There are bodies in time, not frozen but 
recording, tasked with keeping the past alive. They are, back then, producing 
photographic evidence that we handle in our present. The photograph as historical 
evidence is simultaneously sure and undefined, knowable and wild. 
Our methods should match their “madness,” then. In the case of Yoko Ono’s 
Cut Piece, art historians need to look at the photographs not as confirmation of what 
we already know but as testimony that can and likely will challenge our perceptions 
and interpretations. We need to resist the slide identification exam substitution. In 
all of the artists and works discussed here, or in any situation in which we turn to 
photographs as historical evidence, we should be careful to remember that these 
documents are not all we have. Rather, we must network them within an entire field 
of witnesses who offer truths about not just the artists or the performances but the 
photographs themselves. We need to train ourselves as art historians to become 
acutely aware of the many layers of documentary photographs—the networked 
witnessing happening both in and on them—rather than treating them as typical 
primary sources. In this chapter, I have proposed the initial steps of that training: 
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looking for the unfamiliar or even the unrecognizable by slowing down, by 
contextualizing, by inter-viewing the photograph rather than finding exactly what 
we came looking for. In these steps, our responsibility is to willingly see 
documentary photographs anew—to see them as unfamiliar—in order to respond 
to them in a way that privileges not just the artist or interpretation, but instead 
advances their multiple possibilities of meaning. 
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Chapter Two: The other side of the tape  
In spring of 2015, I was presenting at a conference in Chicago on a topic quite 
different from that of my dissertation. Having only recently resolved that artist 
interviews would be a significant focus of my research, I had many conversations 
over the course of the weekend about the significance of artist interviews to the 
production of contemporary art history, during which my colleagues offered 
insights into their practices, reflected on how to teach methodologies, and expressed 
interest in how the artist interview came to be so popular. The most compelling 
exchange came during a brief conversation with a mid-career scholar who had a 
story about an interview, though not one she had performed herself. She relayed to 
me an experience of an established art historian who, for a major book publication, 
had set out to interview an artist notorious for offering the same answers in every 
interview throughout a very long life. This scholar spent quite a bit of time plotting 
questions that would prompt the artist to give new and revelatory answers, 
resulting in a more exclusive interview than others. Yet despite the scholar’s 
attempts, the artist did not deviate from providing rote answers, just as always. 
Apparently, upon completion of the interview, the artist looked this art historian 
over and smirked, remarking, “I hope you got what you wanted.” My conference 
confidante relayed this story with a sort of conspiratorial sense of discipline-specific 
gossip, intended to encourage my pursuit of such a topic by agreeing that artist 
interviews are indeed tricky sources. In doing so, she effectively illustrated the 
circumstances under and through which artist interviews are attained and 
circulated. 
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This story reveals the persistent centrality of biography to the discipline of 
art history, where both the voices of the artist and the art historian are emphasized 
as central to any understanding of art-making. It also demonstrates preparation, or 
the willingness to know one’s subject and study it so intensely that one can believe 
that different and better questions will yield different and thereby better answers. 
Furthermore, it reveals a desire for exclusive access on behalf of the art historian 
paired with a desire to attain a certain completeness of vision in terms of who the 
artist is and why. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the anecdote plays out the 
significance of networked exchange among both artists and art historians, and how 
this exchange has a significant impact on the practice and writing of art history. 
More plainly, and more provocatively, one could call this gossip. Gossip is what 
made sure the established art historian knew about the artist’s interview style in the 
first place, and gossip is what got the story to me nearly five years later, with a mid-
career scholar letting an emerging one in on a trade secret. As gossip goes, there’s 
not much at stake in the story itself, but it was whispered in a boardroom corner 
nonetheless. 
Thus, I knew from the beginning that in order to write about artist 
interviews, I would need to become an interviewer myself. When questioned about 
the use of artist interviews in writing contemporary art history, colleagues revealed 
that they often saw artist interviews as prompts to which they could write against, 
as in the search for artists’ words that either definitively support their thinking or 
with which they can stridently disagree. Others said that they avoided interviewing 
artists even when they could, because they did not want the artist to cast too much 
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influence on what they might think or say. An art critic and performance artist 
pointed out that artists might purposefully seek out interviews with scholars in 
order to provide these writers with more intimate access to the artists’ work. The 
intention here is for artists to establish long-term relationships in which they 
continue to influence possibilities for criticality while also assuring that the scholar 
creates documents that establish the artists’ own significance.212 This recalls 
elements of Amelia Jones’ experience of being criticized for not developing closer 
relationships with artists precisely because she believes it clouds her scholarly 
perspective. Taken together, these anecdotes and admissions begin to reveal an art 
historical dilemma: the dream of some of our non-contemporary colleagues—in 
which talking to long-dead artists would provide a clear path to illuminating the 
meaning of the artwork while surely filling in the sometimes threadbare tapestry of 
biography—is not such a simple one. Instead, artist interviews are anything but 
straightforward.  
Popular methodological texts within the field of teaching art history, such as 
Eric Fernie’s Art History and its Methods: A Critical Anthology or Donald Preziosi’s 
The Art of Art History, place the disciplinary origins of art history in artist biography, 
                                                        
212 Here I owe a great deal of thanks to Anthony Romero, whose influence can 
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own words are to the work of art history while at the same time how distant we as 
historians are from them (the words and the artists), even if we are all 
contemporary.  
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connecting the practices of Giorgio Vasari and others to the humanism of the 
Renaissance. While writers such as Winckelmann, Hegel, and Derrida eventually 
challenge this emphasis—as they each in turn as well as with others work to place 
emphasis artists within the development of history over the romance of individual 
achievement or genius—the centrality of the artist never fully dissipates. Logically, 
this emphasis on humanism makes artist biography a primary concern of feminism, 
critical race theory, and queer theory, which are fields that require thinkers and 
readers to understand who exactly is being conceived of as “human” within 
humanism. Out of an interest in the circumstances of both humanity and history, the 
study of artist biography has become a field of art history itself, taken up initially by 
Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz. Kris and Kurz’s own biographies—both precocious 
learners at a young age, both students at Vienna University during the interwar 
period as students of Julius von Schlosser, and both called “intellectual prodigies” by 
E.H. Gombrich213—help to secure their place in the origin story of artist biography, 
resulting in the writing of Legend, Myth, and Magic in the Image of the Artist: A 
Historical Experiment in 1934. In this book, Kris and Kurz are concerned not so 
much with the truths of artists’ biographies, but instead are focused on the very idea 
that stories about artists are told at all. From these stories come tropes: the young 
and uneducated talent is accidentally discovered (this usually involves a boy 
sheepherder and an established mentor fortuitously crossing paths); success is tied 
to an ability to depict nature so accurately as to fool even one’s teachers; the artist 
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becomes a God-like figure whose gifts are, somehow, both innate and God-given. 
Kris and Kurz note that, in fact, the question as to “whether statements contained in 
an anecdote in this or that particular case are true” become entirely “irrelevant.”214 
“The only significant factor,” according to them, “is that an anecdote recurs, that it is 
recounted so frequently as to warrant the conclusion that it represents a typical 
image of the artist.”215 Their perspective emphasizes circulation of information, 
which relates to their concern not with the artist, but with the image of the artist. As 
they put it, “We regard the hero of these typical anecdotes as depicting the typical 
artist—as the image of the artist which the historian had in mind.”216 The work of 
Kris and Kurz has not always been read with this last statement as the focus; rather, 
its primary legacy is within identifying tropes in the larger genealogical practice of 
art history.217 But I am most interested in the way Kris and Kurz acknowledge that 
the image of the artist is always in fact about the mind of the historian, as my 
chapter considers not what artists should look like but how they are expected to 
sound within a given exchange.  
Doing so requires acknowledging the fraught position of biography within art 
history, particularly as so much writing on contemporary art is influenced by Roland 
Barthes encouragement of theorists and general readers alike to rejoice in the death 
of the author/artist, effectively criticizing the idea that “the explanation of a work is 
always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, 
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through the more or less transparent allegory of fiction, the voice of a single person, 
the author ‘confiding’ in us.”218 Catherine Soussloff takes up this criticism in her 
book The Absolute Artist, which reveals our continued romanticization of the 
presence of the author’s or artist’s confidences by pointing out the “obvious lack of 
critical discussion about the concept of the artist in exactly the literature where one 
might expect to find it,” by which she means historiographical writing.219 In her 
writing on the sculptor William Edmondson, whose biography is both central to art 
historical analysis of his work and flexible in its details, art historian Jennifer 
Marshall calls biography “not just out of fashion,” but “contraband—viewed as the 
instrument of a blinkered and politically manipulative form of historiography.”220 
Indeed, it is manipulative in the ways that Marshall points out: the fiction of artist 
biography is “an idealized myth of creative human potency” in which both “human” 
and “potency” come with deep ideological assumptions and motivations.221 But 
there is also the matter of the biographer here. In order to establish the biographical 
tropes that Kris and Kurz discuss, such as divine intervention or talent in youth, 
biographers themselves must “delight in anecdotes of artists insubordinate to 
normative regimes of power.”222  By this, Marshall means that from Vasari onward, 
art historians take interest in the ways in which artists buck social expectations, 
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even as the act of canonization—upheld through biographical historicization—
normalizes these actions. 
Certainly, artist biography can be painted with the broadest of brushes for 
the most narrow of purposes. In a recent article in the New York Times discussing 
the sale of a sculpture by Edmondson, arts reporter Robin Pogrebin notes, “The 
previous record for a work by Edmonson (1874-1951), the son of freed slaves, was 
$263,000.”223 The seemingly casual mention of a biographical detail—“the son of 
freed slaves”—reads all the more dramatically next to a six-figure price tag, 
successfully purporting the narrative of a poor black kid making good in America. A 
more dramatic example is that of Cornel West’s description of Horace Pippin in his 
essay “Horace Pippin’s Challenge to Art Criticism,” in which he writes the following:  
Pippin’s art remained rooted in black folk culture, yet also appealed to 
the culture industry of his day. He indeed gained significant validation 
and recognition from the white art establishment—but at what 
personal and artistic cost? Do all American artists in our market 
culture bear similar costs? Unlike William H. Johnson and Beauford 
Delaney, Pippin did not go mad. But his wife did spend her last 
months in a mental institution after a breakdown. Pippin did drink 
heavily—yet we do not know whether this was related directly to his 
art career. So in regard to the personal costs; our answer remains 
open-ended.224  
 
In these texts, the significance of biography obviously intersects with the meaning of 
race, and even as we grasp the complexities of such a topic—the so-called “personal 
costs” at stake here—their authors include no further details, citations, or 
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explanations. West’s bit of gossip about Pippin’s wife and his drinking has now 
entered the scholarly sphere as artist biography.  
Even if traditional biography has gone “out of fashion,” as Marshall asserts, it 
seems that artist interviews have risen to take its place. Far from contraband, artist 
interviews feel ubiquitous, from the most sophisticated journals to glossy 
magazines, from personal research and archives to online forums. In these various 
formats, unlike other scholarly writing practices and products, artist interviews 
often effectively “stand alone,” by which I mean they come with very little context 
and even less interpretation. Thus, with West in mind, my chapter considers the 
following questions: When we read artist interviews, what exactly have we gone 
looking for? At what cost do interviews come? In such a practice and format, what is 
lost and what is gained? I should warn readers that I do not offer single or simple 
answers to my original questions because the examples I consider require different 
calls for response from readers and art historians. My goal, instead, is to raise artist 
interviews as a problem of the contemporary, in that art historians don’t really learn 
how to do them and we don’t necessarily know what to do with them, despite their 
conferred upon status as useful historical evidence in writing about the present and 
recent past. 
My interest in the third question is why I mention Fernie and Preziosi in a 
discussion of artist biography; these texts provide a methodological foundation, 
frequently employed in introductory art history seminars, that establishes artist 
biography as central to the practice of art history. Yet, the authors rarely 
acknowledge when and how that biography is attained. For example, throughout his 
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introduction to art historical methods, Fernie implies that biography is a central 
piece of documentary evidence, but at no point are artist interviews (or other 
platforms, for that matter) formally named as ways in which artists might present 
their biographies, or their selves, to the world. What is important to my point is the 
ideas that intellectual production makes clear that artist biographies are sought out, 
created, and mediated in various ways and have been throughout history, even as 
art history methodology texts treat biography as un-locatable in terms of its origin 
or generation. Such a gap effectively creates a perception that artists are certainly 
the subjects of art history, privileging them as sites of discourse, but not examining 
the ways in which, as Soussloff puts it, “all written accounts, such as biographies or 
art history dependent on these texts, have been seen as the ‘natural’ expression of 
the artist’s intentions.”225 For such texts that have been “naturalized,” we struggled 
to gain a critical perspective on their contribution. 
My chapter considers printed interviews that originated orally, as there have 
been many recent efforts to capture not just artists’ words but artists’ voices. I begin 
with a long-unpublished conversation between Andy Warhol and art historian 
Benjamin Buchloh, an exchange that introduces many of the major concerns of this 
chapter, including artist networks, history, and death. I then turn briefly to set artist 
interviews within a broader contemporary drive toward archival preservation in 
the 20th and 21st centuries. Next, I return to Buchloh for an interview with Thomas 
Hirschhorn, which proposes to do the work of “typical” art history, an assumption I 
complicate by looking closely at access and audience. I close the chapter with artist 
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words overshadowed by death. First, I consider the lauded “father” of modernism 
and performance, Jackson Pollock, who is made to speak both before and after his 
gruesome and life-ending car accident. Finally, the themes of artist networks, 
audience, and access come together in interviews with Robert Smithson, through a 
discussion of the way artists’ words stay with them and shape the meaning of their 
work long after their death. In working through these examples in terms of my 
questions—When we read artist interviews, what exactly have we gone looking for? 
At what cost do interviews come? In such a practice and format, what is lost and 
what is gained? —I take a cue from Rosalind Krauss, who in the final pages of her 
book The Optical Unconscious relives her own watching of an interview with 
Clement Greenberg about meeting Jackson Pollock, a story which he has recounted 
hundreds of times. In debating whether Greenberg sounds “bored,” Krauss 
determines the opposite: “If he’s willing to broadcast the story over so many 
retellings, no matter how routinized and compressed, it’s because he has a project, a 
mission.”226 This mission, according to Krauss, is to “lift [Pollock] above those 
pictures” that showed him drunk, mean, or frenetically working, “just as it was to lift 
the paintings Pollock made from off the ground where he’d made them, and onto the 
wall.”227 Krauss moves on to talk about the ways in which Pollock’s work was 
perceived as childish and then ordered, but her focus on her own personal 
remembrance of Greenberg—even referring to him as “Clem” throughout—
illustrates the significance of our story-telling, of the act of repeating stories in 
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interviews and texts. Krauss’ account centers her own subjectivity, making the 
interview both faulty and wishful even as she provides for the reader a sense of the 
“real” Clem. 
With this sort of exchange in mind, my aim in this chapter is not to re-do the 
work around interviews that many anthropologists and social scientists have 
already done so well. Scholars within these fields typically focus on the logistical 
unfolding of a conversation, including the length of pauses between each speaker, 
noting who interrupts whom, or interpreting the meaning behind who speaks 
louder or laughs more. These elements are sometimes conveyed—think of the 
“[laughs]” insert—but go relatively unexamined in interviews in the humanities, art 
history included, either as methods of analyzing evidence or within pedagogical 
preparation for working in the discipline. I do not think that art historians should 
start doing detailed linguistic analysis in order to “better” use interviews in our 
practice, and in fact, I avoid doing this type of work in any in-depth way in this 
chapter, because my concern is how art history already uses interviews. My goal is 
to examine what we already do and why and how, not what we might do if our 
discipline morphed into another. A future study could advocate for contemporary 
art historians to become linguistic as well as visual analysts; mine stops short of this 
recommendation because of a loyalty I feel to the object and material production as 
central to art historical study. Even so, there is no good reason for us to continue 
acting as if artist interviews are exactly what they appear to be by avoiding the 
unique type of witnessing relationship that they establish. Thus, I am interested in 
the ways in which interviews deal in a certain form of enviable access and 
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authority—that of the living, breathing artist speaking in (usually) his own words or 
the interviewer managing to capture those words right before the artist becomes 
un-living and un-breathing—while at the same time eluding transparency. 
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Section One – “The way new things happen and stuff” 
In 1985, Benjamin H. D. Buchloh interviewed Andy Warhol, though the 
exchange was not made public until the publication of October Files: Andy Warhol, 
nearly 20 years later.228 I begin here because of the obvious: where else would a 
contemporary conversation about the artist interview start if not with Warhol. 
Warhol is a master performer who, even from the choosing of his own (now 
household) name, worked to elude any establishment of a clear biography while 
also seeking public recognition. From his beginnings, Warhol understood the value 
of giving people—and not just art historians—something to talk about, a project 
that goes along with his work to insert himself (or, at least, his practice) into the 
history of famous (and infamous) figures such as Marilyn Monroe and Jackie 
Kennedy. He formalized this practice in Interview, the magazine he founded in 1969. 
But Warhol is not the only person whose interests come to the surface in this 
1985 interview. Buchloh is a major scholar in the field of art history, whose 
contributions include many books and articles as well as membership in the October 
editorial team. From its founding in 1976 by Rosalind Krauss and Annette 
Michelson, October has been dedicated to rigorous art historical writing that is not 
only intellectually engaged but also politically Left, firmly situating its project as 
distinguishable from the art criticism offered by other magazines. The journal does 
not include interviews very often, preferring long-form and heavily researched 
                                                        
228 October Files is a series of books published by the MIT Press. Each book focuses 
on an individual artist of the postwar period, featuring essays that were often 
initially published in October magazine. The October Files on Andy Warhol is edited 
by Annette Michelson and along with the interview with Buchloh, includes essays by 
Michelson, Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss, Thomas Crow, and Nan Rosenthal. 
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articles. Buchloh has written regularly for the journal, as a member of the editorial 
board, and he was the primary editor of October’s Spring 2010 special issue on 
Warhol. Indeed, Buchloh has a long history of writing on Warhol, including his 
contributions to the 1990 exhibition catalogue for Andy Warhol: A Retrospective, the 
first major examination of the artist’s oeuvre and organized by the Museum of 
Modern Art, and his 2008 book Andy Warhol. Shadows and Other Signs of Life, which 
was published on the occasion of Warhol’s would-be 80th birthday and a significant 
exhibition of his work in Paris.229 
Buchloh’s conversation with Warhol begins with Buchloh stating that he is 
currently researching Dadaism in terms of its reception in the 1950s, and that he 
wants this interview to speak to that history.230 With this frame, Buchloh is 
particularly interested in a never-released film that Warhol made with Marcel 
Duchamp (that other well-known artist whose public personas as both Marcel 
Duchamp and Rrose Sélavy confused biographical definition), which Warhol 
clarifies was never even actually made. Buchloh seems to not like this answer, firing 
questions at Warhol about his relationship with contemporary art history’s original 
trickster—“You knew [Duchamp] well enough at the time to have been able to do 
it?” and “But you had some contact with him?”—and Warhol’s responses revel in his 
colloquialisms—“I mean” and “Well, yeah”—while avoiding directly answering any 
                                                        
229 See: Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, Andy Warhol: Shadows and Other Signs of Life (Koln: 
Walther Konig, 2008). 
230 Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, “An Interview with Andy Warhol,” in Andy Warhol, ed. 
Annette Michelson, October Files 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 119. 
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inquiries.231 As Buchloh continues to suggest a myriad of connections between 
Warhol’s work and that of other artists preceding him, drawing logical lines of 
influence, Warhol submits the ultimate useless answer: “I wasn’t thinking of 
anything.”232 Where does an interviewer go from here? 
This publication leaves out the sort of affect elements that are sometimes 
included in interviews, noting that one speaker laughs while another might smile or 
look concerned, for example. Even without these asides, the printed version of this 
interview creates an experience for the reader through which Buchloh’s frustration 
becomes evident, as he seems to be interrogating Warhol: “So [the repeated images 
as silkscreens] had nothing to do with a general concern for seriality? It was not 
coming out of John Cage and concepts of musical seriality; those were not issues you 
were involved with at the time?”233 Phrasing the questions in the negative is notable, 
rather than genuinely inquiring about Warhol’s own process, which might look 
something like: “What issues were you involved with at the time?” or “Were the 
silkscreens made in reference to other practices of seriality at the time?” Instead, 
Buchloh sounds disbelieving, wanting Warhol to acknowledge these practices as 
connected, if not definitively influential, to his own. 
When Warhol continues to defer defining his relationships with other artists, 
Buchloh changes tactics by moving to statements rather than questions: “Serial form 
                                                        
231 As I will discuss later in this chapter, the presence of Warhol’s linguistic 
idiosyncrasies is a choice of both Buchloh and Michelson, as the editor of this 
iteration of October Files. Often, “ums,” “uhs,” and “I means” are edited out of 
interviews in both transcripts and publications, making their presence here worthy 
of note. 
232 Buchloh, “An Interview with Andy Warhol,” 120. 
233 Ibid., 121. 
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had become increasingly important in the early 1960s, and it coincided historically 
with the introduction of serial structures in your work.”234 Even here, Warhol slips 
out of Buchloh’s grasp by responding to that seemingly clear and correct art 
historical fact with “I don’t know” before losing track of other artists all together: 
“Because then, after a while, I did like some people, like, you know, the guy who just 
does the squares, what’s his name?”235 
When Buchloh moves to statements, Warhol switches to questions. His 
question to his interviewer about painters launches Buchloh into a wordy answer 
stocked with recognizable names within the art historical canon. This exchange 
marks a shift in the interview, where the reader realizes that Buchloh is now in the 
role of teacher rather than interviewer, offering Warhol an art history lesson. In 
response, Warhol takes on the role of unknowing producer—“I didn’t even know 
who that person was” and “I still don’t know the drawings, really”236—while 
Buchloh affirms his role as expert historian (and therefore recounter, rather than 
producer) by recalling who moved to New York when, which dealers were 
circulating works, and what these styles looked like. 
The conversation finally coalesces into a discussion of a new exhibition that 
Warhol wishes to call “The Worst of Warhol,” as it would be full of ideas that he has 
only been trying out without fully developing. Warhol makes it all sound very open, 
but Buchloh is not convinced: 
Buchloh: Yes, but aren’t they also commenting in a way on the current state 
of painting, in the same manner that the Oxidation paintings are 
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extremely funny, poignant statements on what is currently going on in 
the general return to painterly expressivity and technique?  
Warhol: Oh, I like all paintings; it’s just amazing that it keeps, you know, 
going on. And the way new things happen and stuff.  
Buchloh: But don’t you think that there is a different attitude toward 
technique in the Oxidation paintings or in the Rorschach paintings?237  
 
Buchloh is pushing Warhol to see himself not just as a painter, but also as a painter 
who is concerned with and has a firm place within the larger field of painting. 
However, it is just as likely that Buchloh realizes that Warhol will never confirm 
how he sees himself and is instead concerned with how the audience for this 
interview might see Warhol. This attention to audience interpretation becomes 
activated by what I would call “buzzwords” of one sort or another: commenting, 
current state, return, painterly expressivity, technique, attitude. If one were to read 
this exchange out loud, they would likely orally perceive Buchloh’s rhetorical 
corralling: “But aren’t they?” “But don’t you think?” As Buchloh bandies on down the 
mile, Warhol refuses to give him an inch: “and stuff.” The printed interview ends on 
a similarly strange, unresolved note, when Warhol asks Buchloh, “What do you think 
has happened? Do you think it is not that good?”238 Thus at the end, Warhol fully 
takes on the role of interviewer, posing two incredibly open-ended questions to 
Buchloh about the state of the field. 
 Ultimately, Warhol provides very little information about his art practice and 
instead the interview examines Buchloh’s own art history practice—that of doing 
contemporary art history through historical categorization, romanticization of the 
1960s, and indeed the use of artist interviews as access to another place and time. 
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After reading this, interviewing an artist seems like it might not be such an 
enlightening, much less enjoyable, venture. There’s no doubt Warhol was tricky, and 
all Buchloh wanted to know is what other artists have been important or influential 
for him, which to me seems like a fair concern. But I am interested in how their 
exchange and its subsequent publication so clearly displays the ways in which artist 
interviews are unwieldy, offering access to something but doing so without any 
transparency. By a lack of transparency here, I mean that there are many aspects 
that the interview format takes on in its production, such as editing of beginning and 
end, colloquialisms, tone of voice, etc. In this way, the interview is not just about the 
information it contains, but also fundamentally about editing. In Warhol’s 
willingness to be caught with nothing to say, he in fact escapes capture, and Buchloh 
is left to write art history not only with the interview, but also within it. I say this 
because the interview does provide a sense of the “true” Warhol—the elusive art 
star who craved attention while eschewing definition. And now that Buchloh has 
witnessed, first-hand, Warhol’s performance of the self, Buchloh too can testify to 
the truth of the artist’s being, with this interview as evidence. Thus, the interview 
works as evidence but maybe not of what I originally went looking for. By that, I 
mean that I might seek out this interview wanting to learn about Warhol, and 
instead learn about art history or even Buchloh.
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Section Two – Archive Fevered 
 The notion of the intentionally edited interview is so pervasive that it may 
seem unworthy of note, but as I think about what might be lost or gained in any 
particular exchange, then purposes of collection become significant. The second half 
of the 20th century has seen the emergence of several large-scale archives dedicated 
to the arts, a growth that parallels development and interest in the arts more 
generally. Richard Candida Smith traces this institutionalization in his article 
“Modern Art and Oral History in the United States: A Revolution Remembered,” 
linking the shift from European- to American-focused art education heralded by 
Abstract Expressionism to statistical data showing the massive expansion of 
museum, corporate, and private collections after 1940.239 Smith notes that the 
purpose of interviews within the artist has consistently been to understand what is 
considered significant. He states, “The regional and local orientation of most oral 
history projects promoted efforts to show, in the words of one interviewer, that 
while her community might not have witnessed anything as exciting as the birth of 
impressionism, it was never mired in the Dark Ages either.”240 The purpose of such 
interviews can be to expand our view of importance, in that “[o]ral history 
collections give a sense of the variety of experience and the attitudes prevalent 
among the rank and file of professional artists at various times in this century,” 
revealing the ways in which self-image and self-representation connect to larger 
                                                        
239 Richard Candida Smith, “Modern Art and Oral History in the United States: A 
Revolution Remembered,” The Journal of American History 78, no. 2 (September 
1991): 599. 
240 Ibid., 601. 
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socio-cultural trends or circumstances.241 This variety provides opportunity for the 
contemporary art historian to begin to identify national patterns and influences 
(particularly those in the 20th century that were economic, including the New Deal 
and post-World War II welfare systems such as the GI Bill) as well as access 
extremely individual experiences and perceptions. As Smith observes, “Interviews 
often reveal surprising connections, which would otherwise be invisible or purely 
speculative.”242 
Running parallel to the creation of artist interview archives is an explosion of 
artist work dedicated to the archive itself, both in form and in theory. We can easily 
draw from artists such as Joseph Beuys, Gerhard Richter, Mary Kelley, Zoe Leonard, 
Walid Raad and the Atlas Group, and Christian Boltanski, all of who create work 
expressly interested in generating archival material and/or drawing on already 
existing archives. There are also artists whose work becomes specifically about the 
interview, as recorded for posterity, such as Anna Deavere Smith or Andrea Fraser. 
In Projection from 2008, Fraser plays both psychologist and patient in a work based 
on transcripts of actual psychotherapy sessions, adapted into monologues that she 
then delivers as a full-wall projection staring directly into the camera. Smith, most 
known for her primetime television roles, also incorporates interview transcripts 
into her performance practice by taking on the characters and viewpoints of those 
she interviews. 
All of this archival attention, including that given by scholars such as Michel 
Foucault, Douglas Crimp, Hal Foster, and Okwui Enwezor, is part of Jacques 
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Derrida’s diagnosis the 20th century as one driven by “archive fever.” Derrida’s 
conclusions about the archive are driven by Freudian analysis, and in many ways 
belie an assumption of privilege, in which to collect feverishly is a narcissistic act 
rather than one of resistance or survival.243 Yet we should not let the terms here 
mislead us; we know to starve a fever in order to get rid of it, but in reality the 
archive compels us to do the opposite. The projects of these artist archives have no 
knowable boundaries—no end points—because they are driven solely by the 
collection of artists’ voices. At its most basic (which is not to say uncomplicated), 
this is about saving (and thus in some cases, resurrecting) the eyewitness through 
the act of preserving his (yes, almost always his) testimony. This mode of 
preservation inherently assumes that interviews provide something valuable to an 
as-yet unknown but anticipated future generation. The work belies the presumption 
that such future figures will need and want the artists’ own words in order to write 
history.  
 Oliver and Blocker seek to address an extreme form of witnessing in trauma 
that feels so serious in its stakes that it potentially has no relationship to the 
interviews I discuss here. But their willingness to open up questions of testimony 
and the eyewitness—so deeply connected to any issues of an artist’s “own words”—
as related to accuracy and subject position is significant in that it acknowledges the 
power of words to make a reality, indeed to make history. As Blocker notes, any 
kind of witnessing may be traumatic in that “to be a witness means by definition to 
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Chicago Press, 1995). 
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stand outside events, even those quotidian events we experience directly.”244 But 
such a witnessing position means that we collect quite a bit of information, and that 
our proximity to it—as well as the form in which we encounter it—is quite variable. 
Overcome by archive fever, it is perhaps common, or even typical, for one to feel left 
out, even nearly driven mad by the weight of the “stuff” that is left. 
  
                                                        
244 Blocker, Seeing Witness: Visuality and the Ethics of Testimony, 37. 
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Section Three – Typical Questions, Assumed Audiences 
 Twenty-five years after he sat down with Warhol, October published an 
interview between Buchloh and Swiss contemporary artist Thomas Hirschhorn, 
whose works are dedicated to discussing current political and intellectual situations 
through a creative process and materials that value social engagement and access. 
In a moment of likely pure coincidence, Buchloh’s first question in the printed 
interview is also one about Warhol and his influences, though this time in direct 
relationship to Hirschhorn’s practice. Buchloh begins with what he calls “a typical 
art historian’s question” by inquiring whether Andy Warhol or Joseph Beuys is more 
important to Hirschhorn, but also, it seems, to contemporary art more generally.245 
Buchloh’s self-identification as a typical art historian who poses typical art historian 
questions triggers thoughts about what such a classification might mean 
pedagogically or disciplinarily: What does he mean by typical? Does a sense of what 
is typical create the questions, or create the art history itself? 
 Unlike the other interviews I examine in this chapter, the published version 
of this one begins with a caveat: an asterisk after the title “An Interview with 
Thomas Hirschhorn” indicates that the exchange was transcribed and translated by 
those other than its participants, namely Philipp Angermeyer and Russell Stockman 
respectively. This statement seems quite obvious, even harmless, but it is a 
reminder of the power of translation and transcription. There are otherwise no 
indications of transcription or translation in the text. I say this because the journal 
does note that the interview took place in person, but not who was speaking which 
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language (though presumably it is Hirschhorn’s words that come to English 
speakers—the implied “us” of the readership—through translation, evidenced in 
Hirschhorn’s comment Buchloh at the interview’s beginning: “Fine. You live in 
America.”), who was in the room (likely a translator), and where the recording is or 
in what form (as it is unlikely Angermeyer was in the room with Buchloh and 
Hirschhorn, transcribing in real time as they spoke). The presence of so many to the 
interview itself, before it has even been published, marks an inherent inter-viewing 
of the interview’s content, which has now been not only viewed but in fact touched 
by Hirschhorn, Buchloh, Angermeyer, Stockman, and their editors. My own inter-
viewing of the medium reveals the significance of these figures at the intersection of 
one central element: transcription. 
In fields other than art history, including educational research, literacy, and 
curriculum and instruction, there has been a recent push to account for 
transcription as a theory-laden methodology, rather than a straightforward 
approach to quantitative analysis. In a paper given in 1998 at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Educational Research Association, psycholinguistics and language 
education researcher Judith C. Lapadat and early childhood and teacher education 
researcher Anne C. Lindsay presented their research on transcription, providing a 
thorough background on previous literature as well as present understandings. I see 
a treatment of this perspective—despite the fact that it is outside the discipline of 
art history as well as associated humanities fields—as integral to understanding 
artist interviews, since this type of work provides qualitative research about 
language that most art historians do not take up.  
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The basic premise of transcription as a theory-laden methodology is that 
“[e]ach researcher makes choices about whether and what to transcribe and how to 
represent it.”246 Significantly, Lapadat and Lindsay point out that even though 
transcription conventions have been specified or employed by various researchers, 
keys to these conventions are very rarely included in actual published reports, “as if 
these researchers assume that transcriptions are transparent, directly reflecting in 
text the ‘hard reality’ of an actual interaction as captured on audio- or videotape.”247 
Out of work done by Lapadat and Lindsay as well as information presented in 
their literature review, I take the following as a foundational assumption of my 
chapter: 
Transcription can never be complete or objective because the extent 
of detail that can he [sic] transcribed is both practically and 
theoretically limited. Transcription necessarily involves selection… 
This selectivity points to a difficulty in developing transcripts that can 
be used by different researchers for different purposes. The quantity 
of pragmatic information within which any stretch of discourse is 
embedded precludes exhaustiveness: therefore every transcript is 
purposively selective and these initial purposes constrain their 
subsequent uses.248  
  
Of most significance here is the final conclusion, stating that the method of 
transcribing—inherently laden with the theories of the researcher—undoubtedly 
shapes any ability to read and use a transcription into the future. 
Here, I am not making a call for developing some type of transcription 
practice that would be ever more precise, and thus ultimately objective. Both 
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philosophers and researchers of the last 100 years have established pure or 
complete objectivity as unattainable, and particularly in art history, our subjectivity 
can be our best asset. It is my intention, however, to propose that art historians 
answer Lapadat and Lindsay’s call that the “innumerable procedural and 
methodological decisions researchers make while transcribing reflect their 
theoretical assumptions and rhetorical purposes” by acknowledging the conducting 
and use of artist interviews to be a matter of historical ethics.249 In other ways, the 
stakes of writing history are rooted in how material, such as transcribed interviews, 
is used as evidence. 
Here, I also take quite a bit of instruction from Steiner Kvale, whose 1996 
book InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing emphasizes 
that transcriptions are ultimately about the choices made by the researcher. Kvale 
insists, “Rather than aiming for completeness, which is not achievable, researchers 
should ask themselves, ‘What is a useful transcription for my research 
purposes?’”250 So, I ask, what is a useful transcription for my, or any art historical, 
research purposes? This question has two branches: (1) what is useful about artist 
interviews to art historical research? and (2) what types of information within a 
transcription are useful to art historical research? Purpose is at the center of these 
considerations, just as the choices of the researcher—rather than the words of the 
artist—are at the center of an interview. Asking such questions of ourselves 
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challenges us to “make reasoned decisions about what part transcription will play in 
the methodolog[ies]” we use in our writing of art history.251 Derrida’s vision of the 
supplement is perhaps the next philosophical step to a qualitative examination such 
as that performed by Lapadat and Lindsay, which demonstrated that when asked to 
transcribe texts, students “viewed transcription as a type of written language task” 
that allows for analysis of in-person exchange.252 The exchanges transcribed by 
students were video recorded, but the study demonstrates that it is their 
transcription—rather than the recording of the event—that will be subject to 
further coding, analysis, and long-term documentation. In this way, the transcription 
was undertaken as an additional step in information gathering, but becomes the key 
methodological mode for analysis: adding only to replace, forgoing presence for 
measurable value. 
This question of how to understand the role of transcription within a 
methodology is summarized by Lapadat and Lindsay as concerned with “the ‘big 
questions’ about the nature of reality and how to represent it, the relationships 
between talk and meaning, and the place of the researcher in this interpretive 
process.”253 Even if transcription and interviews have not been addressed in 
literature on art history, our discipline—and my dissertation—is certainly 
concerned with these “big questions:” the real, relationships of interpretation, and a 
historian’s place in history. Yet, in numerous methods courses and texts, in years of 
research that includes both archival visits and discussions with artists, I have never 
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once been asked to consider what role a transcribed interview, either performed by 
myself or another, might play in my methodology. Even as I have read thoroughly 
and defended assertively the ideas of previous scholars within performance that the 
record is not the same as the event, interviews have maintained a “trustworthy” 
status, both as representative of the artist and fair on behalf of the interviewer. This 
is ultimately about relationships, as mentioned before: my relationship as an 
interviewer to the interviewee, the intended purpose of my research, the audience, 
and indeed the interview technology itself.254 What Lapadat and Lindsay as well as 
Kvale wish to show through qualitative research, and which I wish to pull into 
interview practices within the humanities, is that these relationships are opaque 
and shifting, resulting in objects of study that are never exhaustive or neutral. 
 Language is up for grabs in interviews, then, as is the linguistic rhythm the 
printed interview works to conform and convey. In doing a close reading of Buchloh 
and Hirschhorn’s exchange with these linguistic techniques in mind, we see that 
Hirschhorn begins his responses with affirmative language, such as “Absolutely,” 
“Correct,” or “Precisely” over 25 times across 57 exchanges. This could be a quirk of 
on-the-spot translation, in which interviewees respond positively at the beginning 
of answers as a way to confirm that they have indeed understood the translated 
question.255 But presented solely in English, it reads as if Buchloh and Hirschhorn 
are resoundingly on the same page, with Buchloh’s questions exactly appropriate to 
not only Hirschhorn’s practice but also his intellectual and personal pursuits. 
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This is not to say that the interview does not have its moments of conflict, as 
when Buchloh pushes Hirschhorn to recognize that a division between high and low 
art exists as a social concept even if Hirschhorn does not himself recognize it.256 To 
Hirschhorn’s denial, Buchloh is definitive in his response: “We have not resolved the 
conflicts between mass culture and high culture. Not even Andy Warhol was able to 
do that.”257 The “we” here is floating, as it could certainly be the general population 
as well as the “we” of October (whose editors certainly have attained a status of their 
own “we” in the art world), or even the so-called “royal we” of Buchloh as 
interviewer and thus arbiter of the proceedings (in a moment of overlap between 
the testimony of the interview and the testimony of court proceedings). 
Nevertheless, Buchloh asserts a hierarchy here: Warhol is the finest example of 
attempting to collapse high and low art, and he did not succeed, and therefore we 
live in a society in which that division persists. This is what one might call a trope of 
contemporary art history, played out across thousands of art historical and pop 
culture examples of Warhol’s fame and superiority. But there is also a kind-of pithy 
exchange between interviewer and interviewee, if paraphrased as: “If not even Andy 
can do it, certainly you can’t Tom…Be realistic.” While the pithy intent of such a 
sentiment is debatable, the takeaway is Buchloh’s insistence on establishing 
Hirschhorn in a broader art historical context that has clear hierarchies not just of 
production but also of ways of knowing. 
 Ways of knowing are surely at stake in the exchange between Buchloh and 
Hirschhorn; take a later point in the interview when Buchloh compares Hirschhorn 
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to Richard Serra, as he—again—tries to establish artist networks throughout 
history. He imagines works by the two side-by-side in an exhibition and concludes, 
“one would recognize immediately that Serra’s work requires a highly specialized, 
knowledgeable way of experiencing sculpture. It presumes an extremely 
differentiated phenomenological approach, one ultimately based on an aesthetic of 
autonomy.”258 Yet anyone who has moved among Serras, especially with children—
to see them running, getting dizzy, and eliciting strange echoes from walls of cor-ten 
steel—can perceive their ability to cut across such erudite notions of specialization. 
This points to a larger question of audience, in which both Buchloh and Hirschhorn 
are invested in the ways in which a reader within the art world would perceive and 
understand their words. Thus, categories of common knowledge and specialization 
are complex here, in that something that may seem quite obvious—the appeal of 
Serra’s works to a broad crowd—becomes specialized while other pieces of 
information—such as that contained with the footnotes of the interview—illustrate 
who Buchloh, Hirschhorn, and October might think of as members of their 
“common,” or typical, audience. 
 I should pause here to do some clarification about what I mean when I refer 
to a footnote. In fields within the humanities, such as art history, footnotes (or 
sometimes endnotes, depending on chosen style and formatting) usually include 
two types of information: citation and annotation. Various scholars have examined 
the evolution of the footnote, though Anthony Grafton is the most notable. His 1997 
book The Footnote: A Curious History provides a great deal of research and reflection 
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on the footnote as a phenomenon with early origins but whose present-day form is 
particular to the work of writing modern history, despite its lack of dedicated study 
(and thus, not only the content but also the methodology of his project is relevant to 
my own—artist biography has long been a factor in writing art history, but artist 
interviews are an under-considered contemporary phenomenon). His text provides 
a comprehensive taxonomy of the footnote that includes complicated histories as 
well as competing aims, though ultimately Grafton proposes the footnote as a 
necessity to writing in the modern world, in which historians “must examine all the 
sources relevant to the solution of a problem and construct a new narrative or 
argument from them.”259 In this scenario, the footnote is the thing that “proves that 
both tasks have been carried out.”260 This may seem quite obvious to a trained 
scholar, but Grafton expands this to recognize that it is impossible to ever have 
enough footnotes to definitively and completely prove something, so that now the 
footnote takes on other functions: “they convince the reader that the historian has 
done an acceptable amount of work, enough to lie within the tolerances of the field” 
and “they indicate the chief sources that the historian has actually used.”261 In this 
way, “footnotes confer authority on a writer,” even—significantly—when they 
contain omissions or errors.262  
 Despite the convincing case Grafton makes for their importance, footnotes 
themselves rarely become the focus of either writing or revision. Presumably, to 
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most readers they offer valuable citations as well as information that may be 
interesting, relevant, or contextualizing but not fully necessary to the argument of 
the text. In this way, then, footnotes provide an opportunity to move backward not 
so much in chronological time but instead in intellectual time, documenting the path 
of research done by the writer, resulting in this most recent production that 
necessarily comes after all of that other work. 
 This concept of moving backward is why I believe it’s important to think 
about what role footnotes play in interviews, beginning by pointing out that 
footnotes rarely appear in printed interviews themselves. I believe this is the case 
because, even among our varying conceptions of the methodologies of art history, 
interviews would fall under the category of primary source. By this I mean that 
interviews are understood to be documents that are original in their content, 
extemporaneous in their expression, and contemporary with their subject matter, 
and therefore do not require explicative citation or annotation. In a scholarly text, 
footnotes take us back along that winding path of intellectual production. With artist 
interviews, there is no further going back to be done: the words of the artist are 
primary in and of themselves. Thus, when Warhol offers the reader an “and stuff” or 
Hirschhorn affirms with an “Absolutely,” it is the texture of their language—the 
conveyance of speech itself in print—that provides the appearance of something 
real being revealed and recorded. Again, then, truth does not come in the details 
(which, as I already discussed, Warhol gives us very few of anyway), but in the 
utterance. The power lies in their own words. 
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 Thus, when footnotes are included in a printed interview, they layer on 
information and perspectives that likely draw a particular kind of attention from a 
reader. In Buchloh’s interview of Hirschhorn—one of a handful of interviews that 
included any footnotes at all out of the many that I read over the course of this 
study—they list when and where a certain exhibition mentioned in the text was 
mounted or give the publication information of one of Hirschhorn’s books. This 
informational, perhaps more accurately factual, type of footnote is most common in 
artist interviews. But “An Interview with Thomas Hirschhorn” also includes 
explicative footnotes. During a discussion of artists considered in Hirschhorn’s altar 
works (one of several types of public sculpture projects included in his practice), the 
interview includes footnotes on those figures to whom the altars are dedicated: Otto 
Freundlich, Robert Walser, Ingeborg Bachmann, and Raymond Carver. The 
footnotes provide two or three lines of basic biographical information, including 
birth and death years, nationality, and—in the case of the first three—information 
about the tragic ends of their lives.263 At first cursory glance (and indeed, footnotes 
often get exactly this kind of treatment), the content of these entries is 
straightforward and benign. This surface-level appearance is what actually 
illustrates the assumption about their typical-ness; they are like slide identifications, 
in that they are memorize-able pieces of information that include details (birth and 
death dates, ethnicity) commonly associated with knowledge about an individual. 
 In an art journal known for not just its rigorous scholarship but also the 
narrow interests of its readers, these footnotes contain only basic information; there 
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hardly seems anything worth adding here. But in realizing that Piet Mondrian—who 
is mentioned in the same list as the above names—does not receive a footnote, 
readers begin to learn something. Indeed, the earlier mentions of Warhol and Beuys 
are not accompanied by footnotes with additional biographical information. In this 
way, the footnotes included in the interview do not simply offer the reader some 
historical context for Hirschhorn’s choices of subject matter. They also reveal 
presumed knowledge of the assumed audience by indicating not so much who 
actually is, but rather who should be, known. A biographical footnote for Otto 
Freundlich assures any reader that it is acceptable not know much or even anything 
at all about this person. On the other hand, the reference to Warhol—not even by 
full name—in the very first sentence of the interview indicates that a reader should 
already know his biography as well as work, arriving to the text already with a sense 
of the larger art historical canon. 
Since the reader of artist interviews is primarily the person engaged in 
writing art history, assumptions about audience are significant. Grafton touches on 
this, as he makes clear that footnotes have long been about the reader, not just in 
providing research information but also through employing various jokes, 
criticisms, or omissions. I take his view a step further to say that the way in which 
footnotes are composed and used is less about the actual, potential reader and more 
related to the interviewer’s or editor’s ideal reader. In the case of Buchloh and 
Hirschhorn, the ideal reader of this interview has a certain knowledge set from 
which to think and work, thereby excluding (and nearly immediately, as in the first 
line) those who might need more citation and annotation.  
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The presence of the reader from the very outset of the interview is not 
insignificant, and I believe we can expand Grafton’s observations from footnotes to 
the questions and framing of an interview as a whole. In his insistence that footnotes 
both “buttress and undermine,” Grafton makes clear that footnotes are necessarily 
of their historical moment.264 What they really do is “locate the production of the 
work in question in time and space, emphasizing the limited horizons and 
opportunities of its author, rather than those of its reader.”265 Indeed, footnotes 
work with what is available and known in the moment; it is readers who will take 
footnotes, and texts more generally, into the future. Thus, I find it useful to think 
about the ways in which interviews speak to readers, including in footnotes, as if the 
readers are witnesses to history. An interviewer and interviewee are not enough, 
then, for the historicizing work of the interview; there must also be the reader—a 
third interlocutor—who brings a sense of responsibility to the testimony provided 
by the artist’s own words.  
Footnotes are often those things that practitioners of history-making learn 
instinctively or illustratively, rather than critically. Grafton gives us footing here in 
his observation, regarding the underpinnings of his entire project, that “Most 
students of historiography, for their part, have interested themselves in the explicit 
professions of their subjects, rather than their technical practices—especially those 
that were tacitly, rather than explicitly, transmitted and employed.”266 This is 
certainly a factor in art history, given what I have already discussed about 
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methodological texts and pedagogy. Certainly, it is not so revelatory to state that 
interviews reveal presumptions and assumptions not only held by the interviewer 
or interviewee, but also by editor(s) or reader(s). In the case of Buchloh and 
Hirschhorn, one can conveniently collapse those categories a bit, as Buchloh is both 
interviewer and editor here. For this reason, a reader of the interview can deduce 
that the included footnotes are not only representative of Buchloh’s own 
assumptions, but also indicate the values of October as a publication as a whole. But 
beyond this seemingly obvious idea, we learn something about our practice—what 
art historians take to be common knowledge, or typical—from acknowledging that 
decisions around footnotes provide information about whom we as art historians 
make known and how we go about doing it. If there is no further going back than the 
artist’s own words, the role of the reader in an artist interview is left lacking 
clarification.   
To conclude, I want to examine Grafton’s example of Pierre Bayle, who 
compiled a dictionary of errors and omissions of footnotes. In his drive to identify 
and define previous scholars’ errors, Bayle asserted himself as an authority not 
through knowledge production but through knowledge classification. The sheer 
amount of data compiled is what set him apart as a scholar, rather than its 
interpretation. Value is placed, in this case, based on accumulation, not clarification. 
This relates back to my earlier assertion that interviews are always already 
understood to be “primary,” not only as a source but also in the type of knowledge 
they share. The authority that added footnotes might confer is unnecessary for 
interviewers and interviewees who are established enough to be sought after in 
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those roles. As with the example here, someone like Buchloh does not need further 
authority conferred upon him, because people like Warhol and Hirschhorn agreeing 
to an interview with him provides the ultimate conferral, and this works in favor of 
both parties. 
 In this way, authority is not granted through the historical tracing provided 
by footnotes but rather the compiling of any first-hand information, such as that 
offered in interviews. This confluence of the interview with authority is what 
provides space for creation of massive interview archives, their power rooted in 
their extent of compilation, the many layers of witnessing that they draw together. 
The feeling here is that by capturing a lot of something—and acting just as Bayle did, 
by compiling without editing out “even what was distasteful”—we gain insight into 
the particular.267 As Grafton says, “the compiler” offers the “critical reader as much 
truth as human effort could attain.”268 Merely collecting interviews—with no 
simultaneous or subsequent analysis in the form of footnotes or anything else—is 
then not only typical but also final, ultimately offering an authorized history that 
appears raw and available for use but is, in fact, always already edited.  
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Section Four – In Her Own Words 
In 1949, Life Magazine asked, “Is He the Greatest Living Painter in the United 
States?” about Jackson Pollock (Figure 15). It seemed a worthy question at the time, 
and indeed, Pollock has already appeared in two separate stories in my own writing, 
both in reference performance, stories, and the myth of the artist. Pollock’s exposure 
by Hans Namuth led art historians to label him the founding father of performance 
art as well, since the dance-like quality of his production both was and was not 
about the produced object.269 As I pointed out, Kirk Varnedoe writes about him that 
his production and life is so full of stories that an art historian has enough primary 
source material for a lifetime of study. Rebecca Schneider points out, “Time and 
again we are told (in a reverberating echo from Alan Kaprow) that the American 
Action Artist Jackson Pollock was responsible for the supremely masculine act of 
liberating art from the canvas and setting the entire performance-based art of the 
latter of the twentieth century into motion. All other possibilities become as if 
relegated to a footnote.”270 As founder of both modern painting and performance 
art, Pollock in particular seems to warrant questions of greatness. 
We already know Pollock’s tragic story: the institutionalization, the drinking, 
the yelling, the periods of inactivity, all culminating in a horrific car wreck. But how 
do we know it? I ask because Pollock was, by all official and unofficial accounts, 
mostly a man of few words. One answer to this is gossip; in his book on gossip and 
gay male sexuality, Butt references Pollock’s “(in)famous brawling at the Cedar 
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Tavern,” without offering any further citation.271 Pollock’s reputation may have 
preceded him, but in fact, Pollock gave only a handful of interviews. After his death, 
his wife—also a successful painter—gave many more, with questions focused on 
Pollock’s practice, life, and legacy. In the introduction to his book which brings 
together all of Pollock’s interviews with many reviews of his work, begun with Kirk 
Varnedoe in tandem with the MoMA exhibition mentioned in the introduction, Pepe 
Karmel writes that it is not just Pollock’s own interviews but Krasner’s as well that 
“form the essential points of reference for all discussions of his working method.”272 
This reliance on interviews reflects the shift in criticism about Pollock, which moves 
from intense interest in the man to great concern for process until eventually 
fundamentally changed by the revelation of drawings that Pollock had produced 
much earlier, in the late 1930s, while undergoing Jungian analysis.273 Though the 
drawings did not provide the “Rosetta Stone for interpretation of Pollock’s work,” as 
Karmel notes that some critics hoped for, their presence situates Pollock as an artist 
who has undergone psychoanalysis, and thus a man who was (at least partially) 
healed by the therapeutic interview. 
For contemporary art historians, it is likely that any of these words are often 
supplemented, if not entirely eclipsed, by the images of Pollock working in his 
studio, primarily those produced by Hans Namuth (Figure 16). In Catherine 
Soussloff’s article on the relationship between Pollock and ritual—a connection that 
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drives the meaning of Pollock’s paintings, according to her, despite other historians 
ignoring its presence—Soussloff addresses the production of Namuth’s film in terms 
of Pollock’s studio practice. According to Soussloff, “the irony for the critical viewer 
of the Namuth films of Pollock at work lies in the observation that the earlier black-
and-white film is less filmic, mere footage—non-serious in a filmic sense—than the 
final color film. Yet, it gives more access to the trance state that the artist moves in, 
to the ritual aspects of his repetitive gestures.”274 This discussion of what type of 
documentation is more serious comes in part out of Soussloff’s concern of J.L. 
Austin’s exclusion of performance (i.e. language spoken in theatrical performance) 
as non-serious and therefore non-ritualistic.275 But it reveals, unintentionally I 
believe, a view of documentation that Soussloff does not interrogate. The 
implication that the black-and-white footage is less staged, and therefore more 
indicative of Pollock’s actual practice, rings strange in terms of an artist who so 
publicly lived his internal experience.  
Of course, I am interested in Soussloff’s almost offhanded assertion that that 
footage “speaks for itself”—what does this mean? It seems that she means that the 
color footage used in the final film requires such supplementary elements as 
voiceovers, interviews, music, and—more generally—context in order to make 
sense. The black-and-white footage, then, does not need these things to make 
meaning; it speaks for itself. We can see here how easily pictures and words become 
crossed. In terms of Pollock, however, Soussloff’s idea that the images speak for 
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themselves becomes productively complicated in relationship to the image that 
haunts Pollock’s career: his fateful car wreck on August 11, 1956 (Figure 17). In her 
book on Pollock’s life and death, which brings together documents directly related 
to Pollock as well as other forms of historical evidence and artists’ responses, Helen 
Harrison concludes that Pollock’s legacy remains so open-ended because “[i]nstead 
of describing, explaining, or answering questions, his art invites speculation and 
encourages flights of fancy. You never know where a Pollock is going to take you.”276 
There is certainly a romantic freedom here, but I believe we could similarly 
conjecture that the open-endedness is a product of Pollock’s seeming disinterest in 
interviews paired with the accompanying presence (or more often absence) of the 
photograph of his car wreck, which is rarely reproduced in texts about Pollock even 
as the event marks such central aspects of his biography. 
How did such an image change the words of Pollock, the greatest living artist, 
especially since his personal troubles rarely make an appearance in either his 
interviewers’ questions or in his own responses? To answer this question, we can 
turn in part to Sarah Burns, who traces how a concept of “the artist” has been 
culturally constructed in her book Inventing the Modern Artist: Art and Culture in 
Gilded Age America, Burns is primarily concerned with the image of the artist at the 
end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, proposing that as the modern 
“publishing industry helped make reputations and establish canons,” artists also 
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“learned to manipulate the media to their own advantage.”277 In this way, Burns 
presents the modern artist as “consumable,” as much an object of consideration as 
any artwork itself.278 I take a cue from her note that this was a very public and 
published affair: “Art writers had a great deal at stake, not only in the business of 
building and legitimizing their individual reputations for taste and judgment but 
also in the kind of culture their writings helped construct and support… Piecemeal 
or not, their authority was real, though never unchallenged, and nearly everyone in 
the ferociously competitive world of art was acutely aware of the power of publicity 
to make or deface an artist’s image, reputation, and credibility.”279 Not much has 
changed since the early 20th century; as mentioned in my Introduction, the drive for 
artists to be recognized as legitimate (by both scholars and the market) continues to 
grow, and much of this power exchange happens in the public (web)pages of art 
criticism. 
The importance of the construction of the “romantic (male) artist—the free, 
creative spirit of untrammeled imagination and unembarrassed ego” lies in placing 
emphasis on the artist’s own unique output, which differentiates him from everyone 
else.280 The same could be said of the critic, as well, who needs to distinguish a 
reputation within the multitude examples of art writing and production. How might 
artists do this with something other than the artist interview? Burns’ book explores 
various approaches: newspaper articles, manifestos, organization missions, and—in 
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the famous case of James McNeill Whistler and John Ruskin—recorded testimony in 
the form of a lawsuit that was also fed by many public stances and run-ins with 
critics. Burns goes so far as to compare Whistler with Warhol, as “Whistler lay the 
germ of postmodern performance art” through “the point where artist and image 
became interdependent” and “the commodified self became a vital marketing 
tool.”281  
However, Burns ultimately concludes that the goal was merely to be in the 
public eye, one way or another. Her study focuses on how artists should look within 
the time period, rather than how they should talk or sound, much less what they 
should say. The latter is what is at stake in artist interviews. In her search for how 
exactly this was a modern problem, Burns inspires me to ask a similar question of 
my own material: Is the artist interview merely another manifestation of public 
consumption of the artist image, or does it matter what artists say, and to whom 
they say it? I argue that artist interviews are indeed another manifestation but a 
more complex one given that they combine previous platforms—newspaper 
articles, manifestos, missions, testimony—into one, becoming as much as about the 
interviewer as the interviewee. Our contemporary obsession with the artist 
interview may be best diagnosed in the realization that not even death can stop us 
from desiring, and producing, the artist in their own words. Indeed, death need not 
be the reason for an artist to no longer speak, as the absence of an artist not only 
casts value on their continued literary presence but also turns those around them 
into ghost whisperers.  
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Most significantly, the photograph of Pollock’s dead body next to his car did 
not silence his own words. Rather, Lee Krasner—an abstract expressionist painter 
as well as Pollock’s wife—has been made to speak for her deceased husband, 
providing interviews to major publications and to mark exhibitions not of her own 
art production, but of Pollock’s. In some cases, the titles of these interviews reveal 
their ultimate goals: they ask “Who Was Jackson Pollock?” or definitively offer “The 
Legacy of Jackson Pollock.” In the case of the 1969 exhibition catalogue for Jackson 
Pollock: Black and White, Krasner is referred to as Lee Krasner Pollock, so there may 
be no confusion as to why an interview with her would be included in such a 
publication.282 Most interviewers or publications mention Krasner as an artist in her 
own right, but very few of the questions are dedicated to her own practice or views. 
Rather, as Bruce Glaser notes in a 1967 interview originally broadcast over WBAI-
FM New York and then revised and edited for Arts Magazine, “The possibility of a 
proper assessment of Miss Krasner’s work…seems to have dissipated as she became 
closely associated with the powerful personality of Pollock.”283 Indeed, publications 
intending to historically situate Pollock, such as Pepe Karmel’s anthology produced 
on the occasion of the 1998 Jackson Pollock exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art 
in New York, place Krasner’s own words as necessary to his historicization. She 
occupies a privileged witnessing position, one that is linked to both intimate access 
as well as valuable perspective.  
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This is not just about insight into production and practice, but also about 
personhood. In a 1967 interview with Francine du Plessix and Cleve Gray for Art in 
America, Krasner declares (in response to a question that has been edited out): 
“There is so much stupid myth about Pollock, I can’t stand it!”284 Here, Krasner 
seems not made to speak but genuinely wanting to speak, both about and as her 
former husband, in order to dispel the myth that draws people to her perspective in 
the first place. Her refusal to comply with the “stupid myth” of Pollock competes 
with the stories that surround Pollock as male artist (as Kris and Kurz explain, all 
good [male] artists have myth), which Rebecca Schneider describes as a substitute 
“aura,” after Walter Benjamin’s insistence on the aura of the artwork.285 Schneider 
explains, “When the aura of the discrete art object dissipated under the habits and 
pressures of indiscriminate reproduction, the aura was displaced onto the artist 
himself – a figure supposedly not given to duplication – i.e., there was only one 
Jackson Pollock, the biological man, and he was not subject to reproduction.”286 Yet 
Krasner does reproduce her husband, or at least her presence, if only primarily in 
words. Earlier in the interview, Krasner discusses Pollock’s family life, punctuating 
one piece of information about his mother with “that’s a fact.”287 In these exchanges, 
then, we see Krasner not just speak of her husband but also speak for him, clarifying 
and defending as she goes.   
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In Barbara Rose’s interview with Krasner in 1980, published in the Parisian 
Review, Rose offers her readers a page-long preface about the significance of Pollock 
to the art world. In this, she writes, “As Jackson Pollock’s paintings are slowly 
beginning to be understood as works of art belonging to a tradition of modernist 
painting, as opposed to scandalous personal acts that created the Pollock myth, any 
information regarding Pollock’s own intention and methods becomes critical in 
defining the actual historical context within which the unprecedented 
masterpieces—the mural-sized, so-called ‘drip’ paintings he began in 1947—were 
created.”288 In these words, Rose reveals a particular ethics about the doing of art 
history: any information becomes critical, so thus art historians are obligated to 
seek everything out. She neglects to comment on why this information is so 
important or in what way it would or could be used; the emphasis (admittedly 
further emphasized by me) is that anything could or should have meaning. She 
continues, “In the following interview with Pollock’s widow, painter Lee Krasner, 
the circumstances leading up to Pollock’s discovery of a new style that involved 
pouring diluted paint onto an unstretched piece of canvas on the floor, rather than 
applying paint to the conventional stretched painting on the easel or wall, are 
clarified.”289 As Krasner is now the one who will clarify Pollock’s revolutionary 
painting method, we are set up as readers to understand Krasner as the authority of 
Pollock’s process. And of course, because any and all information is critical to the 
doing of art history, Krasner is compelled to speak about these things because we—
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as art historians—must, even deserve, to know. But yet, the interview falls short of 
providing those certain necessary facts. When Rose asks if Pollock actually knew 
how significant the “drip” paintings were and would be while he was making them, 
Krasner curbs her ability to know absolutely: “I can only surmise that; I cannot 
quote him. I have a feeling that he was aware of their importance.”290 Ultimately, 
Krasner is made to speak for her husband, though she still cannot speak as him. 
Krasner’s authenticity as a speaker is fully predicated on Pollock’s own 
absence; she would not be the authority if he were still alive to speak for himself. 
Indeed, absence—or loss—looms large over not only the theorization but also the 
most basic motivation around artist interviews. But how does death, whether 
untimely or expected, factor into the printed publication of the interviews 
themselves? When Selden Rodman interviewed Pollock for his 1957 edited volume 
Conversations with Artists, he provides insight into this question by making a 
fascinating rhetorical move, one that simultaneously historicizes and authenticates 
not just Pollock but Rodman’s own work. He includes a footnote to the first sentence 
of his interview preface, stating the following: “This interview took place eight 
weeks before Pollock’s tragic death in August 1956. I have not altered a word of it, 
believing that as it stands it would please him.”291 In the acknowledgement that 
Rodman has not altered a word of this interview, we as readers realize that surely 
that means that the other interviews are altered in some way (this is not an 
amazingly revelatory idea, but it is worthy of note). And as for speculating about 
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Pollock’s psychological state when seeing these words in print—forever captured as 
the artist’s last reflections on his work and life—we might grow skeptical then of 
Rodman’s ending. The interview concludes with the vision of Pollock leaning out his 
studio window in order to gaze at the pond on his property, while saying “Painting 
is my whole life….”292 Here, the artist’s words speak much more for themselves 
when paired with the interviewer’s description of the scene as well as the printed 
publication’s statement that Pollock was dead soon after. Throughout the 
publication of the interview, then, Rodman has asserted his authority in terms of 
what would “please” Pollock, making himself the interviewer who can offer the 
unedited and final version of the greatest living painter in the United States. 
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Section Five – What Is On the Other Side of the Tape? 
Moira Roth’s 1973 interview with Robert Smithson, published in Artforum, 
begins with an editor’s note: “This interview was taped shortly before Robert 
Smithson’s tragic death in an aircraft accident, before the artist had an opportunity 
to revise or edit his spontaneous views. However, the interview as it stands is 
characteristic of Smithson’s independence of outlook.”293 As I am reading this 
ominous introduction, I cannot help wondering about this phrase: “as it stands.” We 
use this in colloquial English to mean, “in the state such a thing is currently in” or 
“unchanged and unmodified,” but it seems also to have a sort of strength. This 
interview will make a stand, is able to withstand the test of time, can stand on its 
own. 
Despite public perception that published interviews are more aligned with 
journalistic practices of hard news, in which a source would not have editorial 
power, it is not uncommon for artist interviews to be reviewed by the artist before 
publication. In fact, particularly with the prominence of email communication, I 
would argue that many “interviews” not take place through typing to begin with, 
limiting the spontaneity of views that may be espoused.294 In Roth’s case, she 
attributes a significant alternative to the lack of editing. Somehow, leaving this 
interview “as it stands” tells a truth—presumably an even greater truth than self-
editing does—about Smithson’s practice and personality. Couched in Smithson’s 
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untimely death, this interview is concerned with his “own words,” which Roth 
seems to believe are valuable—and more valued—in their unedited, spontaneous 
state. Labeling them spontaneous implies an immediacy, or an essence, that is now 
no longer accessible given the artist’s absence. These are the final utterances, 
untouched by another, pure in their expression, As if this interview is a literal last 
gasp. 
Three of the artists discussed in this chapter—Warhol, Pollock, and 
Smithson—suffered untimely and unexpected deaths. Arguably, Warhol is the one 
least contextualized by his death, which came in 1987 following routine gallbladder 
surgery, but he is certainly still marked by it (there are myriad examples, but I am 
drawn to one from my college years, where Jeffrey Wright-as-Basquiat cries and 
screams in the street over the death of his friend David-Bowie-as-Warhol. 
Smithson’s words had been published and recorded in interview archives well 
before his death at the age of 35, but the very shock of the plane crash serves to 
emphasize a psychological and social impulse that is at the very root of the archive: 
preservation in the fact of the unexpected. Pollock’s gruesome and publicized death 
was followed by a similar interview situation to that of Smithson’s, as I mentioned, 
in which Selden Rodman’s 1957 book Conversations with Artists includes a footnote 
that states, “This interview took place eight weeks before Pollock’s tragic death in 
August 1956. I have not altered a word of it, believing that as it stands it would 
please him.”295 Here, again, the interviewer insists on printing the interview “as it 
stands,” emphasizing its unedited state and thus implicitly valuing Pollock’s final 
                                                        
295 Jachec, Jackson Pollock: Works, Writings and Interviews, 143. Original citation: 
Selden Rodman (ed.), Conversation with Artists. New York: Devin-Adair, 1957: 76-87. 
 182 
words as somehow complete in their “his own”-ness. Rodman even goes so far as to 
say that this would please Pollock, a man who—as we know from gossip—was 
notoriously hard to please. These interviews, then, as either Pollock’s or Smithson’s 
last stand—against what, we’re unsure. 
In the case of Smithson, and unlike Pollock, words have made up much of the 
reality around his artistic practice. Smithson was a prolific writer, about his own 
work and that of others.296 Indeed, his words provide the ability for his works, 
which were focused on pushing the boundaries of both art objects and museums, to 
be effectively canonized. Since much of his production is temporary, invisible, or 
difficult to see, it is his words that have staying power, and thus provide his art 
practice with a framework as well as ongoing historicization, which begins with 
Smithson himself. As discussed in Jack Flam’s edited anthology of Smithson’s 
writings, which includes not just the artist’s many exhibition statements and articles 
but also a dozen interviews, Smithson not only paid careful attention to framing his 
work but also often revised or edited his words before they appeared in print.  
Smithson’s success while he was alive was significant, so it is not surprising 
that—a year before his death—he was interviewed so that he could be included in 
the Archives of American Art at the Smithsonian Institute. This interview was not 
prompted by new work or a new exhibition, but instead was driven only by 
preservation and posterity. In 1972 over the course of two days in July, Smithson sat 
with Paul Cummings, a curator as well as the director of the Archives of American 
                                                        
296 Most of these writings are conveniently gathered in Jack Flam’s 1996 Robert 
Smithson: The Collected Writings, though even just leafing through issues of 
Artforum from the second half of the 1960s demonstrates Smithson’s vast and 
significant presence as a writer during his own life. 
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Art oral history project from 1968 to 1978.297 The Archives’ Oral History Project 
was begun in 1958 with the following intention: “to document the history of the 
visual arts in the United States, primarily through interviews with artists, historians, 
dealers, critics, and others.” It now houses papers and other material as well as the 
“largest collection of oral histories anywhere on the subject of art.”  
The Smithsonian’s Archives of American Art—indeed the largest of its kind in 
the United States at approximately 3,000 interviews—can and should be positioned 
within the larger archival turn of the 20th century, as I discussed in my previous 
section, but it is also significant with the Smithsonian’s ongoing efforts toward what 
they consider preserving and historicizing, which are continuously evolving. 
Currently, oral histories are collected under the auspices of the Smithsonian Center 
for Folklife and Cultural Heritage as well as through the National Museum of 
American History and the National Museum of Natural History. The Institutional 
History Division even collects interviews with current and retired Smithsonian staff 
as well as anyone else considered to have made a major contribution to the 
institution. In fitting with the institution’s vision—“Shaping the future by preserving 
our heritage, discovering new knowledge, and sharing our resources with the 
world,” according to the Smithsonian’s website298—the institution has a long-term 
and overarching commitment to collecting oral histories, specifically to the ends of 
“shaping the future.” The Archives of American Art are but one arm of this aim, 
making material the institutional resources put toward the recording of artists’ own 
                                                        
297 For further information on Cummings’ career, see: Roberta Smith, “Paul 
Cummings, 64, Expert on Drawings And Prints of U.S.,” The New York Times, 
February 11, 1997, sec. Arts. 
298 Accessible here: https://www.si.edu/About/Mission. 
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words. The archive itself has shifted focus in time in order to respond to current 
concerns, including focusing on regionalism, the experiences of women artists and 
artists of color, and those artists who are currently midcareer.299 
Unlike Smithson’s other interviews published in art magazines through the 
1960s and ’70s and subsequently reprinted in Flam’s book, this interview is not 
driven by a certain topic (such as Duchamp, entropy, or the earth, all frequent 
conversation starters with Smithson), but instead is focused primarily on the 
biographical. Thus, it begins as we might imagine, with inquiries as to Smithson’s 
birthplace and family structure as well as where he went to school, if he liked it at 
the time, and other questions along these lines. This linearly logical proceeding of 
questions that are intentionally historical reveals the purpose of the interview to be 
record keeping—or testimonial—rather than critical. Because of this, this chapter 
presents the most intentional example of recording an interview with the purpose of 
saving it to shape the future, and this is why I offer a close reading of it, as it is 
composed with a sense of self-awareness about the interview as a medium itself. 
Most obvious in comparison with other Smithson interviews, Cummings’ 
questions reveal an acute awareness of audience. More specifically, Cummings is 
setting up a dialogue that is not geared toward the New York art world. This is 
evidenced by his inquiries into Smithson’s past, certainly, but even more so when he 
asks if Smithson has been back to Europe since working there in the mid-1960s. 
Smithson replies: “Yes, I have been back to Europe. I did Broken Circle—Spiral Hill in 
                                                        
299 For a  more comprehensive discussion of the history of the Archives of American 
Art, see: Smith, “Modern Art and Oral History in the United States: A Revolution 
Remembered,” 600. 
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Holland in 1971. I consider it a major piece.”300 Here, a reader might think that 
Cummings has come to this interview unprepared. Surely, many in the art world 
would have known about Smithson’s return to Europe as well, as Broken Circle—
Spiral Hill is still regarded as one of Smithson’s major works. But in this case, 
Cummings is specifically prompting Smithson to state the obvious for the benefit of 
future generations. 
The second day of Cummings’ interview with Smithson is much more focused 
on the artist’s work over the artist’s life, seeking to pin down Smithson’s major 
intellectual and artistic concerns such as mapping, entropy, and speculation. 
Cummings is also interested in positioning Smithson within a broader view of the 
art world at this moment, revealing that even at this point, the land/earth artists 
were a countable group with one woman, Virginia Dwan, at the center. But in doing 
so, Cummings has a moment of checking himself as an interviewer, when he asks 
Smithson, “How did your association with the Dwan Gallery help you? Or was it a 
help?”301 The first question presumes the relationship with Dwan was helpful and 
thereby valuable, while the second inquires as to its value. It is unlikely that an art 
historian familiar with Smithson’s work would be unaware of Dwan’s influence, and 
Smithson answers as such, but Cummings’ self-correcting points to expectations of 
the medium: the interviewer will posit neutral questions, because the intention of 
the interview is to reveal information about the interviewee. Indeed, this 
presumption is so prolific that plenty of printed interviews omit the questions 
                                                        
300 Flam, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, 284. Original citation: Paul 
Cummings, “Interview with Robert Smithson for the Archives of American 
Art/Smithsonian Institution,” July 14 and 19, 1972. 
301 Ibid., 292. 
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altogether, as if artists’ answers spring from unfiltered and un-infiltrated air. Yet 
here, this issue becomes even more complicated because of transcription. I took 
Cummings above question, “Or was it a help?”, from Flam’s publication of collected 
writings by and on Smithson. The transcript shared by the Archives of American Art 
states the question as, “Or wasn’t it a help?”302 The audio recording sounds to me as 
if Cummings is saying “wasn’t.” Thus, we arrive back again at the potential power of 
transcription; in this case, the shift is subtle (from implying existence to questioning 
influence) but when we are after the value of words—in their own, as they stand—
nuances are critical. 
Cummings has another moment that collides with the medium of the 
interview itself, and this one goes un-self-edited or otherwise. On the second day of 
recording, Cummings states, “I’m curious also, about your interest in religion and 
theology since it was mentioned in so many kinds of oblique ways on the other side 
of the tape.”303 Religion and theology are fairly typical topics of conversation for 
Smithson when it comes to his art practice. But this phrase—“the other side of the 
tape”—forces the reader to consider the ways in which this interview has moved 
across and between media. It is not just that this interview was recorded for the 
archives and then transcribed in order to be published elsewhere, but one may 
visualize where actual words fall, materially speaking. The words—Smithson’s own 
words—can be found on the other side of the tape. 
                                                        
302 The Smithsonian’s transcript of the interview is available for online access here: 
http://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/interviews/oral-history-interview-robert-
smithson-12013. 
303 Flam, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, 285. 
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I said that this “forces the reader” to think on purpose; though the audio is 
available through the Archives of American Art (though not on physical tape), the 
printed interview has a much wider scope of circulation. It was housed in the 
Smithsonian upon production, published in full for the first time in 1979 in The 
Writings of Robert Smithson (edited by Nancy Holt), and published again in 1996 in 
Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings (edited by Jack Flam), and is now available 
online through the Smithsonian, with information from the interview included in 
articles and books about Smithson throughout the last 35 years. So when I say that 
such a phrase forces the reader to consider the ways in which this interview has 
moved across and between media, I mean to point to the idea that the tape is only an 
initial step in its circulation. Even now, I cannot literally go in search of the other 
side of the tape—the Smithsonian makes these records available only digitally, 
limiting plays of the tape in order to preserve the original technology. So not only 
must Smithson’s words themselves be preserved along with his voice saying the 
words, but their method of recording must also now be preserved as well. 
Similar to the experience of watching the film of Cut Piece as compared to 
reading the work’s instructions or attending a live performance, there is a profound 
difference in experience as I move with this interview across mediums. Listening to 
Cummings and Smithson speak to each other takes me about three hours, though 
when I initially read the interview in Flam’s book, it took only 30 minutes. That 30 
minutes included the photographs that Flam adds, which show Smithson through 
time: as a young boy at the site of dinosaur tracks, at the Colosseum in Rome, with 
Holt in the loft that they shared. In each instance, I find my witnessing position 
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drastically altered, as I adjust my access to the information that already seems 
familiar or note that which challenges my knowledge. As I try to assess what is 
gained and what is lost in such exchanges, such transactions, my lists fluctuate and 
shift, finally revealing—through two columns that I have purposefully separated but 
are clearly connected—the complexity of such a question precisely because of the 
connections, or networks, created by these pieces of historical evidence. 
The complexity is because interviews contain varying responses to a call and 
calls for response. In the example I have considered in this section, the initial call is 
made by the Smithsonian to preserve the literal and figurative voices of American 
artists, but the immediate substitution of the transcript for the tape makes the call 
for response—the action of witnessing—one of reading rather than listening. The 
other interviews I have considered here do not have such clear initial calls; rather, 
they are generated out of critical interest in contemporary practice. But their calls 
for response are similar. Their intentions are to not only show readers a moment in 
time with an artist, but also contribute to a cumulative view of who an artist is: he 
(yes, definitely always he) is the sum of his views and statements over time, 
delivered in his own words. 
A tangible example of the layers of history that settle upon the artist’s own 
words is included in David Getsy’s 2015 book Abstract Bodies: Sixties Sculpture in the 
Expanded Field of Gender. Through considering abstract sculptural forms as both 
related to historical notions of the figure and critiquing conceptions of gender, Getsy 
produces an argument that overlaps with mine in his use of artist interviews as 
primary sources, providing necessary information about the practices of these now-
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mythic artists, including Dan Flavin, Nancy Grossman, John Chamberlain, and David 
Smith. In doing so, Getsy uncovers a televised interview between David Smith and 
Frank O’Hara in which Smith remarks about his artworks, “Well, they’re all girls, 
Frank…. I don’t make boy sculptures.”304 Tracing Smith’s words through art history, 
Getsy discovers their mis-use “as a self-evident and uncomplicated statement of 
intentionality,” even given the artist’s other—and many—words dedicated to the 
variability of abstraction and the idea that sculpture (even of the human body) could 
not be expressed through such clear categories.305 Most significant to my 
examination, the artist’s words became inextricably attached to his work and legacy 
precisely because of his untimely death in 1965, when they were “singled out for 
inclusion,” as Getsy notes, in a special issue of Art and America dedicated to 
commemorating Smith.306 From there, the words shape Smith’s entire legacy 
through a critical compulsion to see and know the genders of his sculptures. What 
Getsy calls an “offhand jest” and a “bad joke” subsequently follows the artist 
everywhere, functioning as a false epitaph. Such a story begs the question of why 
such a phrase would be singled out from an entire interview, much less one that 
more broadly discusses the complications and complexities of gendered sculpture in 
the 1960s.  
                                                        
304 David J. Getsy, Abstract Bodies: Sixties Sculpture in the Expanded Field of Gender 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 43.  
305 Ibid. Getsy’s examples include: Rosalind Krauss, Terminal Iron Works: The 
Sculpture of David Smith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), 93; Candida Smith, The 
Fields of David Smith (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1999), 25; Alex Potts, The 
Sculptural Imagination: Figurative, Modernist, Minimalist (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 176. 
306 Ibid. Original citation of Smith’s words: Art in America 54, no. 1 (1966). 
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To speculate—as Roth does about Smithson, or Rodman does about 
Pollock—that the unaltered interview functions as a testament, or a monument, to 
the recently and unexpectedly deceased artist is an incredible case not just of 
privileging the artist, but also of privileged viewing. It reveals the arrogance behind 
the assumption that merely because one had (somewhat) final access to a no-
longer-available artist, that there is some inherently pure truth in these (public) last 
words. But my examples here show that we are never without the “stuff” of art 
history, the layers of mediation and networks of witnessing that do not cloud truth 
but more importantly reveal it is never complete. The danger of the supplement, 
then, is in privileging these words beyond their scale or scope, so that the life and 
work of an artist—much less our art historical interpretations—may never escape 
from their cocoon. In the face of that danger, our responsibility is to treat an artist 
interview as a multi-modal historical source that is most valuable when we counter 
the familiar privileging of the “artist’s own words,” and think instead about how we 
get those words and why we want them in the first place. 
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Conclusion 
In my discussion of Abigail Solomon-Godeau in the Introduction, I alluded to 
the idea that the project of exploring witnessing as a mode of doing art history might 
be inherently feminist, in that it requires not only recognizing but also valuing the 
complexities of selfhood and self-representation, an agenda laid out initially in first-
wave feminism but fully taken up in critical race theory and queer studies. A 
feminist perspective would be in contrast to relying on historical evidence, such as 
documentary photographs and artist interviews, to offer us infallible origin stories: 
complete visions or versions of an artist or event, particularly in the cases where 
that “elusive totality” (as Gavin Butt calls it307) upholds the canon as we know it. In 
her essay “Solo, Solo, Solo,” Schneider cautions her readers to be vigilant about the 
ways in which an obsession with the original or the authentic, and its valuing in the 
canon, continues to shape our imagination about the type of art history and criticism 
that we could produce. She asks,  
If originality is indeed a modernist masculinist myth, does the 
pressure on criticism to be original support that myth? Does our 
anxiety of influence engage in the same founding father patrionics 
that erects white male painters like Jackson Pollock as father of 
postmodern performance art? If I make Griselda Pollock’s or Rosalind 
Krauss’s claim my own (because we have to hear it again) would my 
claim to origin (by my signature) be in error? Or would challenging 
origin through error, engaging the familiar postmodern scam of, and 
thrall to, the copy, get something right in writing about postmodern 
art?308 
 
                                                        
307 Butt uses this term to describe the ways in which personal accounts or 
photographs may masquerade as complete descriptions of performance events. See: 
“Happenings in History, Or, the Epistemology of the Memoir.” 
308 Schneider, “Solo, Solo, Solo,” 26. 
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As interviews become a form (or perhaps even a substitute) for criticism and 
photographs are treated as necessary truth-tellers, questions about the importance 
of originality become ever harder to answer. In my examination of historical 
evidence here, I chose examples that point at and play out the “patrionics” of the 
modernist myth while also making clear the potential for valuable “error” within the 
circulated and supplemental reproduction, in order to explore what we might get 
actually right about contemporary art history if we only stop looking so intensely 
for elements that confirm what we already think is right. 
My treatment of performance photographs and artist interviews is ultimately 
guided by Margaret Olin’s assertion about the ontology of evidence within 
witnessing: “as in any relationship in which photography has a part, one tends to 
demand either too much from a photograph, disparaging its lack of detail, or too 
little, rejecting its testimony altogether.”309 Olin’s concern about either wanting too 
much or trusting too little illustrates an anxiety about the role of historical evidence 
in the writing of history more generally, an anxiety that is directly tied to having 
vast access without ethically debating what to privilege. Annette Kuhn plays out this 
anxiety, which can certainly become quite personal, in her essay “Remembrance: 
The Child I Never Was,” in which Kuhn looks slowly and closely at a photograph of 
herself as a young girl, making note of her childhood pet, her thick wool skirt, and 
her hand-knitted jumper. Acknowledging that the photograph does tell her what 
was there (she was young once, and wore that dress, and sat on that chair), she also 
asserts that “[e]vidence of this sort, though, can conceal, even as it purports to 
                                                        
309 Olin, Touching Photographs, 2012, 16. 
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reveal.”310 A simultaneous ability to conceal and reveal is what Kuhn identifies to be 
unique about photography, in that photographs reproduce a certain moment but 
also capture that moment in unpredictable ways. Their status as evidence is thus not 
about truth, but rather defined by the fact that they are “material for 
interpretation.”311 Thus, photographs simultaneously support and challenge our 
memory, or perhaps our memorization, precisely because their familiarity belies a 
need to “interview” them, so to speak. To make sense of them requires an inter-
view, a perspective that is not only one’s own but also attentive to those of others, 
where truth grows out of the connections, or networks, we can make between such 
views. To assess photographs (and similarly interviews) only with the tools with 
which we are already familiar, or to treat them as tools that we already fully 
understand, yields very little. As Kuhn notes, “You will get nowhere, for instance, by 
taking a magnifying glass to [a photograph] to get a closer look: you will see only 
patches of light and dark, an unreadable mesh of grains. The image yields nothing to 
that sort of scrutiny; it simply disappears.”312  
I admit that in intentionally focusing on photographs and interviews as 
historical evidence that need not privilege the artist, it is possible to lose sight of our 
object of study. But I assert that in losing sight, we are doing exactly what writing 
history about the present and recent past requires of us: to force ourselves to 
engage with the unfamiliar, to train ourselves in new patterns of knowledge-making, 
to question the ways in which we use historical evidence to perpetuate 
                                                        
310 Annette Kuhn, “Remembrance: The Child I Never Was,” in The Photography 
Reader, ed. Liz Wells (London: Routledge, 2003), 395. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
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interpretations or arguments that we may have outgrown. The “we” that I us here 
and throughout is meant to speak to art historians generally, and contemporary art 
historians more specifically. I write with “we” out of both generosity and hope, 
thinking of with Peter Schjedahl’s “we” possibilities: “When a writer folds ‘I’ into 
‘you’ to make ‘we,’ he or she projects a world of common values. Call it civil love. … 
The ‘we’ is make-believe. We—if you’ll pardon the expression—do not inhabit a 
world of civil love. But guess what? We can pretend we do.”313 Perhaps some would 
read this statement and get no further than the admittance that such a “we” is make-
believe, but—inspired by Carrie Lambert-Beatty’s insistence in the make-believe as 
integral to creating new and more just worlds314—my “we” throughout is as critical 
as it is aspirational toward a contemporary art historical practice in which historical 
evidence can serve as more than confirmation. 
To say that a photograph or an interview may be all we have of an artist or 
work ignores the many things we have ourselves created, thereby placing an undue 
amount of pressure on these types of historical evidence to show us what we think 
we need. Instead, we need to know that we are all these pieces of evidence have, and 
                                                        
313 Peter Schjeldahl first discussed this in a lecture given at the School of Visual Arts 
in New York on November 18, 2010. An essay version was subsequently published 
in Frieze magazine. See: Peter Schjeldahl, “Of Ourselves and of Our Origins: Subjects 
of Art,” Frieze, no. 137 (March 2011). The full text is available online here: 
https://www.frieze.com/article/ourselves-and-our-origins-subjects-art. 
314 In her article “Make-Believe: Parafiction and Plausibility,” Carrie Lambert-Beatty 
coins the term parafiction to describe artworks (and thus, also, artists) that hinge on 
some form of deception. Lambert-Beatty’s conclusion is that the value of 
parafictional work is in fact in valuing the trick, which requires a different type of 
response and responsibility of scholars, who must weigh what to reveal and conceal 
when writing about a work that is attempting to re-order or re-value the world 
through the parafictional. See: Carrie Lambert-Beatty, “Make-Believe: Parafiction 
and Plausibility,” October, no. 129 (Summer 2009): 51–84. 
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that our choices—about a single photograph among many, about an artist’s final 
words—remain present long after the artist’s body is absent. Our responsibility, 
then, is to continually see this evidence anew, and to value the unfamiliar within it. 
All of this historical evidence only has us. It is in our hands. 
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ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure 1: 
 
James VanDerZee, Family Portrait, 1926  
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Figure 2: 
 
Yoko Ono, Cut Piece, 1965. Photograph by Minoru Niizuma, taken at Carnegie Recital 
Hall in New York. 
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Figure 3: 
 
Hippolyte Bayard, Self-Portrait as a Drowned Man, 1840. Black and white 
reproduction of the   original direct positif process. 
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Figure 4: 
  
Detail of book page from Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects by Barbara Haskell and John 
Hanhardt (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith Publisher, 1991). 
 
Figure 5: 
 
 
Full book pages from Yoko Ono: Arias and Objects by Barbara Haskell and John 
Hanhardt (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith Publisher, 1991). 
 200 
Figure 6: 
 
 
Yoko Ono, Audience Piece, 1962. Photographer unknown, taken at Sogetsu Art 
Center, Tokyo. 
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Figure 7: 
 
 
 
Cindy Sherman, Untitled #242, 1991. From the Civil War Series. Black and white 
reproduction as printed in Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical 
Reenactment by Rebecca Schneider (New York: Routledge, 2011).  
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Figure 8:  
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Full book page (“Contemporary professional doctors…”) from Performing Remains: 
Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment by Rebecca Schneider (New York: 
Routledge, 2011).  
 
Figure 9:  
 
 
 
Detail of book page (“Faux finger”) from Performing Remains: Art and War in Times 
of Theatrical Reenactment by Rebecca Schneider (New York: Routledge, 2011).  
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Figure 10: 
 
 
Marina Abramović, Rhythm 0, 1974. Photographer unknown, taken at Studio Morra 
in Naples, Italy. Photograph compilation produced by the Marina Abramović 
Archives. 
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Figure 11: 
   
Marina Abramović, Rhythm 0, 1974. Photographer unknown, taken at Studio Morra 
in Naples, Italy. 
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Figure 12: 
 
Marina Abramović, The Artist is Present, 2010. Installation photograph by Marco 
Anelli, taken at the Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
 
Figure 13: 
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Marina Abramović, The Artist is Present, 2010. Selection of audience portraits 
photographed by Marco Anelli and shared by the Museum of Modern Art through 
Flickr. 
Figure 14: 
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Yoko Ono, Clock Piece, 1965. Photograph by Minoru Niizuma, taken at Carnegie 
Recital Hall in New York. 
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Figure 15: 
 
Spread from the Jackson Pollock article in Life Magazine, August 1949. 
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Figure 16: 
 
Jackson Pollock in the act of painting as photographed by Hans Namuth, 1950. 
Figure 17: 
 
 211 
Jackson Pollock’s body at the scene of his car accident on Fireplace Road in Springs, 
NY, on August 11, 1956. Photograph by Dave Edwardes. 
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